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Abstract
This thesis examines the unintended effects of immigration policy. It devel-
ops a new theoretical framework to examine how aspiring migrants respond
to immigration policy restrictions and the role social ties play in this process.
It formalises this framework as an agent-based computational model (ABM)
embedded with a range of experimental and other empirical designs that
purposefully target different challenges in causal identification and measure-
ment. This combination of methods allows us to examine policy scenarios
and their counterfactuals and clandestine populations.
To help researchers combine empirical instruments with ABM, this thesis
develops a general “Proactive Approach to Empirical Embeddedness,” which
relies on the co-evolution of empirical and ABM designs to generate target-
ted data collection strategies. The ‘proactive’ approach guides the research
process of this thesis. The thesis is informed by an original nation-wide sur-
vey of Jamaica, a country with rich history of migration, designed with the
primary aim of informing the model. Issues of endogeneity in measuring the
effects of policy are addressed through the design of an audiovisual experi-
ment, which showed that policy affects individuals’ perceived ability but not
their desire to move. Theory expects these feelings of ‘involuntary immo-
bility’ will drive unauthorised migration. Issues of social desirability bias
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in asking about this sensitive topic are mitigated through the design of a
list experiment, which finds support for these expectations. The ABM, with
these and other analyses embedded, shows that barriers to family and low-
skilled migration produce the most unauthorised migration and that border
enforcement is an inefficient solution. In the last chapter, this thesis ex-
amines another response to policy: reorientation to alternative countries.
Theory expects robust spatial corridors to emerge from path-dependent net-
work migration. Using ABM, this chapter shows policy restrictions can break
path-dependence under dynamic conditions.
6
Impact Statement
Examining the causal effects of macro-level factors, such as a policy change
or the introduction of a new technology is extremely important for social sci-
entists. However, when we observe these types of changes in the real world,
we cannot easily infer what would have occurred in their absence. In an
agent-based computational model (ABM), we can simulate macro-level con-
ditions and their counterfactuals, allowing us to isolate their causal effects.
This thesis tailors an origin country survey to inform and feed data into an
ABM of migration. Aside from examining policy scenarios and their coun-
terfactuals, this combination of methods allows us to examine policy targets’
adaptive and unexpected responses, simulate difficult to observe populations
(such as unauthorised migrants) and examine the nonlinear effects that may
emerge when policy information spreads across networks. These aspects are
impossible or impractical to observe using statistical methods on their own.
ABM is a flexible method, which can integrate information from many
types of qualitative or quantitative instruments. The synergy between agent-
based modelling and empirical methods is vast and, as of yet, insufficiently
explored. For example, it is difficult to observe the causal effects of a pol-
icy change. However, policy change may affect individuals through signals
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reflecting the new status quo and it is relatively easy to construct an experi-
ment that exposes a randomly selected group of respondents to these signals.
In an ABM framework, researchers can piece together this and other micro-
level designs and simulate the macro-level conditions that trigger them. In
so doing, researchers can develop simulation tools that model macro-level
effects we cannot observe or isolate in the real world. These capabilities not
only benefit scholars interested in the effects of immigration policy, but also
those seeking to understand the full impact of a wide range of macro-level
factors on a population. Furthermore, by allowing us to simulate scenarios
that we cannot observe in the real world, ABM allows empirical researchers
to access a wealth of new questions.
Empirically-driven ABM can also help practitioners, in any policy arena,
develop expectations on policy outcomes. By allowing us to test hypothet-
ical scenarios, ABM can also help us design smarter policies that limit its
unintended effects. This thesis has had an impact on the way the UK gov-
ernment thinks about the effects of immigration policy. The main findings
of this thesis were presented to the Migration and Border Analysis Unit in
the UK Home Office. They said they believe it is the first time they have
seen credible estimates of the extent of the ‘substitution effect,’ whereby
otherwise legal migrants decide to migrate through unauthorised means due
to changes in policy, and were interested in using a model such as the one
presented in this thesis to estimate the efficiency of their enforcement efforts
as a function of expenditure. Given the amount of data they have access to
in-house analysis they carry out, this opinion shows that, in addition to its
academic impact, the thesis can also have an important policy impact.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
All countries have the same basic aims when it comes to borders: Allowing
movement that is beneficial to their national interest, while keeping the rest
out of the country. As such, entry policies consist of a multifaceted regu-
latory arm – a set of categories with different quotas and conditions – and
an enforcement arm to deter and dampen illegal movement. This combi-
nation of interdependent components creates the legal environment within
which aspiring migrants make plans and adapt to change. As I will discuss
in Chapter 2, interpersonal ties between migrants and would-be migrants fa-
cilitate the circulation of information. Over time, these repeated local-level
interactions become a system with its own internal momentum. As policy
conditions change, the system adapts in ways that are difficult for govern-
ments to predict (Massey, 1990; Rosenblum and Brick, 2011).1 Imposing
1Migration scholars have often used the term migration system to denote systems of
countries which are connected by trade and migration (e.g. Mabogunje, 1970). In this
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these complicated policy structures on adaptive social systems means that
a change in one policy component can have “perverse, regrettable, and of-
ten unintended, consequences and feedbacks” (Hansen and Papademetriou,
2014, p. 1).2
In regards to security, a particularly costly form of adaptation is the reori-
entation of migrants to unauthorised channels when legal entry is restricted.
Historical evidence has shown that unauthorised migration tends to coincide
with visa restrictions (Clemens and Gough, 2018). Levels of unauthorised
migration around the world are high and on the rise (GCIM, 2005). Esti-
mates show that over 11 million migrants lived in the United States without
legal documentation in 2016 (Krogstad et al., 2017) – a more than three-fold
increase from 1990 levels (Passel et al., 2009; Hoefer et al., 2009). In the
European Union, the size of the irregular migrant stock in 2008 was mea-
sured to be between 1.9 and 3.8 million. The recent refugee crisis led to
a significant surge in irregular migration, with arrivals to Greece by land
and sea surpassing 900,000 in 2015 (IOM, 2015). These high levels of un-
documented movement are often perceived to threaten national security, the
economy, and national identity (Hood and Morris, 1998; Cohen, 2001; Brader
et al., 2008; Malhotra et al., 2013; Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013; Hain-
mueller and Hopkins, 2014). For migrants themselves, the choice to migrate
illegally is risky and can lead to precarious living conditions. Unauthorised
migrants have limited access to services and protections from the state, they
often work for sub-market wages, and they must accept conditions of extreme
thesis, I define a system to be a collection of individuals connected by social relationships.
2While many policies affect migration (Czaika and De Haas, 2013), this thesis refers
specifically to restrictions on entry.
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uncertainty (Eschbach et al., 2001; Donato et al., 2005). The cycle of risk
perpetuates itself as restrictive, complicated immigration policies increase
demand for intermediaries and create a market for organised criminal groups
(Herna´ndez-Leo´n, 2013).
Policy restrictions can also have knock-on effects by reorienting migrant
flows to other countries. With developed economies being difficult to access
for many of the world’s population, citizens of developing countries often
migrate to other developing countries (Castles, 2004a; Bakewell, 2009). The
extent of the so-called ‘South-South’ migration is vast and growing; in 2017,
more than one-third of international migrants moved from one developing
country to another (UNDESA, 2017). Despite its size and importance, we
understand very little about the processes driving South-South migration
due, in part, to a lack of reliable data (IOM, 2013). Immigration into de-
veloping countries can boost economic development at both the origin and
destination, but it can also be a burden on developing countries, which may
not have the resources or infrastructure to absorb a large number of new
migrants (Hujo and Piper, 2007; IOM, 2013; Lesser et al., 2006; Bakewell,
2009), and subject migrants to vulnerable situations. In many developing
countries, social policies addressing migrant integration or human rights are
weak and may lead to ethnic tensions and conflict (Hujo and Piper, 2007;
Bakewell, 2009; Lesser et al., 2006). Developing countries that are geograph-
ically close to industrialised nations can become temporary stops or even
turn into permanent destinations for migrants who wish(ed) to settle in the
industrialised nation. These transit countries and the migrants that pass
through them face particularly difficult challenges. In Mexico, for example,
27
undocumented migrants from Central America who may be travelling to the
US are extremely vulnerable and experience violence and abuse by gangs and
the government, including arbitrary detentions, assaults, beatings and sexual
violence. These migrants also lack access to legal help or healthcare (Infante
et al., 2012). In the Caribbean this reorientation of migrants is often associ-
ated with irregular migration, migrant smuggling, human trafficking and the
spread of HIV/ AIDS (Lesser et al., 2006).3
Despite these severe externalities, no systematic empirical research ex-
ists to assess migrant reorientation given policy restriction, or what De Haas
(2011) terms “substitution effects.” Existing studies tend to focus on total
migrant inflows or on the effect of a policy on its target category (e.g. Mayda,
2010; Ortega and Peri, 2009; Hatton, 2004) and can, therefore, not capture
the diversion of flows to other channels (Czaika and De Haas, 2013, p. 504).
This is an important shortcoming because if we are unable to observe the
reorientation of flows, we are also unable to assess the full impact of immigra-
tion policy. A clear example is reorientation towards unauthorised channels,
which are difficult to observe empirically. Researchers estimating the effects
of immigration policy restriction in the presence of this substitution effect
will, likely, be overestimating its effects. This is simply because restriction
can lead a larger portion of inflows to become clandestine and, therefore, ab-
sent from the data. Similarly, neighbouring countries like Mexico or Canada
may be interested in estimating the impact of US policies, recently imple-
3Mobile populations and individuals living in transit areas are considered at higher
risk of HIV/ AIDS contagion. This is due to many factors including the separation of
individuals from their families, the exploitation and vulnerability of migrants en route,
particularly among young women, and the prevalence of sex trafficking (IOM, 2006)
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mented by the Trump administration, curtailing rights and opportunities
for legal and unauthorised migrants (Kim, 2017; Batalova et al., 2018) on
immigration into their own countries.4 However, any significant increase in
immigration into these countries may be due to a variety of factors – domes-
tic policy or macro-economic shifts, for example – and may be difficult to
attribute exclusively to US immigration policies.
These examples illustrate two of several methodological challenges to as-
sessing the full effects of immigration policy. In this thesis, I identify three:
(1) the problem of substantial unobservable populations, particularly when
the effect we seek to estimate, in itself, is likely to affect the size of these
unobservable populations; (2) the challenge of attributing changes in over-
all migrant flow or composition to immigration policy change and, (3) the
difficulties in estimating the scale of migrant flows in the presence of net-
work effects. I expand on each of these points in turn. First, unauthorised
migration is difficult to measure because data, if available, is often prob-
lematic. Some countries measure unauthorised migration using estimates
of individuals caught, detained or deported (Thomas-hope, 2003; Heckmann,
2004). The United States estimates this population by applying the ‘residual
method’ on census data. Briefly, the residual method consists of subtracting
the number of immigrants residing legally in the country from the total num-
ber of immigrants as measured by the American Community Survey or the
Current Population Survey carried out by the U.S. Census. The difference is
assumed to be the number of unauthorised immigrants in the survey (Passel
4The reorientation of migrants from the US to Canada has been documented in media
reports (e.g. Craig, 2018)
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and Cohn, 2014). The number of legal residents is estimated through a series
of indirect questions in the survey. Migration scholars have conceded that
the residual estimates are of “limited scope,” and “the quality of the data
and assumptions underlying the residual method are becoming more tenuous
each year” (Warren, 2014, p. 307). One source of bias stems from the fact
that it is based on self-reported responses on items relating to legal status,
which may suffer from under-reporting; and another is that the data being
used is often severely outdated (Warren, 2014).
The likely impact of policy on unobservable populations – the second
consideration in problem 1 – is related to problem 2: the measurement of
immigration policy. Quantitative researchers measure immigration policy
change using two types of models. The first is to use a binary immigration
policy variable in an econometric model, marking the years in which a policy
change occurred (e.g. Karemera et al., 2000; Vogler and Rotte, 2000), and
the second is to construct an index that can measure the intensity of policy
restrictiveness (e.g. Mayda, 2010; Ortega and Peri, 2009). Most of these
studies use written policy measures because measuring policy implementa-
tion is incredibly difficult, if at all possible. However, the problem with using
written policy measures is that intended policy changes can differ substan-
tially from those actually implemented (Czaika and De Haas, 2013, p. 498).
Policy implementation deficiencies are common and may arise due to practi-
cal or budgetary constraints or as a consequence of corruption or subversion
and may, in practice, significantly water down the policy change intended
(Hollifield and Wong, 2000; Hollifield et al., 2014). Isolating the causal effect
of immigration policy change is also extremely difficult, for various reasons.
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First, policies often interact with other variables, which hampers our abil-
ity to measure its unique effect; for example, Mayda (2010) finds that when
immigration policies are more restrictive, factors such as distance and the
relative number of young people in origin countries have larger effects. Sec-
ond, if immigration policy responds to changes in migration inflows, as was
the case in many European countries in response to the refugee crisis (UN-
HCR, 2017), we cannot easily determine the direction of causality. Third,
policy may drive migrants outside the purview of available datasets, not only
by reorienting individuals towards unauthorised channels, but also through
reorientation to countries not be captured in the data (Czaika and De Haas,
2013). Experiments that randomly assign individuals to be subject to an
immigration policy “treatment” provide a good solution to the problems of
confoundedness and reverse-causality – the first two points mentioned in this
paragraph. Such an experiment can be carried out through the use of visa
lotteries, which exogeneously treat random respondents with the receipt of
a visa. McKenzie et al. (2010), for example, examine the economic impact
of migrating for Tongans receiving a lottery visa to migrate to New Zealand.
However, such an experiment is costly, difficult to carry out and requires es-
tablishing government collaborations. As such, few of these kinds of studies
have been carried out.
A third challenge I identified involves forming expectations about migrant
flows in the presence of network effects. The ‘multiplier effect’ in legal family-
based migration has long been documented. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1986, p.
291), for example, write,
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The potential for growth in excess visa entitlements is high given
provisions rendering siblings, parents, spouses, and adult children
of U.S. citizens eligible for visas... Indeed, the multiplier effect
can, in principle, be infinite through “chaining.” As in a ge-
nealogical table, a new link is forged each time that an “original”
immigrant sponsors a new immigrant; the set of all new immi-
grants brought to the United States by the original immigrant con-
stitutes that immigrant’s direct “progeny,” a second generation.
Each member of that second generation may, in turn, sponsor
the immigration of a third generation, and so on... the potential
explosiveness of this hypothetical multiple-strand chain depicting
the reproduction of immigrants has not gone unnoticed.
Recently, US President Donald Trump has said that his country’s current
immigration system allows a single immigrant to “bring in virtually unlim-
ited numbers of distant relatives” and called for limiting migrants’ ability to
sponsor family members to spouses and minor children (Bennett, 2018). This
statement is, of course, an exaggeration, but it does indicate that this effect
is gaining political relevance. The exponential effects of migrant networks is,
however, not isolated to family reunification. As I will discuss in Chapter
2, networks are essential to perpetuating most forms of migration including
unauthorised migration (Boyd, 1989, p. 649). The modulating effect of net-
works makes migration and, by extension, the effects of immigration policies
difficult to anticipate (Klabunde and Willekens, 2016).
Our lack of understanding of immigration policy effects does not stem
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purely from lack of evidence or unsuitable methods: The mechanisms driv-
ing migrant reorientation are also weakly theorised. I delve into theoretical
shortcomings at length in Chapter 2, but I make three general points here.
First, students of migration have until recently, paid little attention to the
effects of immigration policy on population movements (Massey, 1999). In-
deed, most migration theory attempts to explain what would occur in the
absence of legal or political barriers (Arango, 2000; Massey et al., 1998; Car-
ling, 2002). This is an important omission given the role of immigration
policy in shaping migration flows. As Massey et al. (1998) suggest, consider-
ing global disparities in wealth, the actual size of migration flows is “only a
fraction of what might potentially result” if migration systems were left “to
operate without state interference” (p. 7).
Second, theories of migration have often focused overly on structural
drivers of migration (for example, labour demand in destination countries) or
have adopted an individual focus that conceives of migrants as atomistic util-
ity maximisers with perfect knowledge of their environment (Castles et al.,
2003). According to the latter perspective, which is couched in expected
utility theory, it is easy and effective to deter unauthorised migration by
intensifying sanctions that increase the costs and risks of migration. Yet,
increased enforcement have been largely unsuccessful (Donato et al., 1992;
Espenshade, 1994; Ryo, 2013). The fact that migration flows continue to
rise despite restrictive immigration policies (UNDESA, 2017) has led several
scholars to question whether labour-importing states can effectively control
their borders in a globalised post-industrial world (Sassen, 1999; Castles,
2004b; Cornelius et al., 2004). According to Bhagwati (2003, p. 1), “... the
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ability to control migration has shrunk as the desire to do so increased.”
Individuals do not respond to policy in exactly the way governments might
want them to because they are not atomistic utility maximisers. As I will
discuss in Chapter 2, potential migrants are reflexive and creative, and use
these qualities to try to overcome structural constraints such as immigration
policy (Giddens, 1984). Specifically, individuals actively search for informa-
tion that can allow them to adapt to restrictive policies (Gigerenzer and
Selten, 2002; Simon, 1957). As I will argue in Chapter 2, the tendency of
individuals to actively search for information to solve problems (as opposed
to being passively all-knowing as assumed in expected utility theory) is an
essential aspect of what makes individuals agents.
Furthermore, migration theory is highly fragmented and often focuses on
processes occurring at one or two levels of aggregation (i.e. micro-, meso- or
macro-level). Therefore, a single theory cannot explain migration in all its
dimensions, rather, different theories must be drawn upon to explain different
parts (Massey et al., 1998; Castles, 2010). This is a significant shortcoming
because, in real life, migration processes taking place at different levels of
aggregation interact with each other; that is, they are not entirely amenable
to being examined independently. Immigration policies, for instance, operate
at a macro level, yet we cannot assume individuals react directly to macro-
level measures. Instead they form perceptions (Carling, 2002) by considering
their experiences and others’ experiences with immigration policy, processes
that occur at the micro- and meso- levels (Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2016;
Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002; Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2009). Theoretical inte-
gration would allow us to describe migration and the effects of immigration
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policy in a more natural and realistic way (Brettell and Hollifield, 2000;
Massey et al., 1998; Castles, 2010; Haug, 2008).
1.2 Aim
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how migrants respond to chang-
ing immigration policies, the role that social ties play in this process, and
how this behaviour plays out on an international level.5 I argue that, to
understand the full impact of immigration policy, we must: (1) consider the
externalities of immigration policy, namely the reorientation of migrants, and
(2) we need to adopt an agency-centred approach to migration that connects
migration processes occurring at multiple levels of aggregation. Specifically,
I ask: To what extent do migrants adapt to immigration policy restrictions
by adopting illegal routes or alternative spatial corridors, and what role do
social networks play in this process? This thesis focuses primarily on unau-
thorised migration and begins to explore spatial reorientation (with a focus
on theory) in the last chapter.
This thesis aims to advance the study of migration and immigration pol-
icy by addressing the theoretical and methodological shortcomings described
above. To address these theoretical gaps – as well as others – this thesis de-
velops a new agency-centred theoretical framework to examine the effects of
immigration policy on individuals and their social context. This framework,
which draws on theory across the social and behavioural sciences, will guide
5To be clear, this thesis does not aim to examine the determinants of migration (i.e.
what drives people to migrate); it focuses exclusively on the effects of immigration policy
on migration decisions and how these effects are propagated across networks.
35
the empirical work presented in my thesis. This framework aims to address:
the conceptualisation of migration; the heterogeneous effects of immigration
policy and the diverse migration outcomes it can produce across a popula-
tion; the manner in which perceptions about immigration policy are formed
and the role that social context plays in this process; how migrants assess
policy on normative and rational levels; and the kinds of behaviour that are
expected to arise from this process.
I aim to, then, formalise this theoretical framework in the form of an
agent-based computational model (ABM). Agent-based modelling, which I
detail in Section 1.3 below, consists of building a theoretical or inductively
derived mechanism in the form of a computer program. The researcher will
generally identify an observed pattern in the real world and a hypothesised
mechanism thought to generate it. She will then formalise and program
this mechanism explicitly into the ABM and observe, through simulation,
whether this mechanism indeed gives rise to the observed pattern (Macy
and Willer, 2002; Epstein, 1999). In order to make inferences about the
real world, agent-based modellers often embed data and empirical estimates
into their models and agent-based models are flexible enough to integrate a
wide range of empirical designs, including experiments (Boero and Squaz-
zoni, 2005; Tubaro and Casilli, 2010).6 In this thesis, I aim to construct and
implement an original nation-wide survey of Jamaica (the Migration Deci-
sions and Policy survey) – a country with a rich emigration history and a
large number of aspiring migrants (Thomas-Hope, 2003) – with the explicit
6All ABMs in this thesis are implemented in NetLogo, a state of the art multi-agent
programmable modelling environment (Wilensky, 1999).
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intention of informing and setting numerical parameters in the simulation
model.
In Section 1.1, I identified three methodological challenges to measuring
the full impact of immigration policies: (1) the problem of unobservable or
unauthorised populations, (2) the difficulties in attributing changes in migra-
tion to immigration policy change and, (3) the challenges of estimating the
scale of migrant flows in the presence of network effects. This thesis aims to
address these challenges by combining simulation and experimental designs
implemented in an origin country. Agent-based models allow us to incorpo-
rate a range of different empirical instruments. Therefore, I aim to leverage
ABM’s flexibility with data types and implement designs that can allow us
to draw causal inferences about how individual-level decisions and strategies
respond to changes in immigration policy and provide us with reliable mea-
sures for sensitive issues such as unauthorised migration – addressing the first
and second point. Agent-based models are the only form of simulation that
can allow us to explicitly model the effects of social interaction and observe
the nonlinear effects that emerge at the macro-level. As such, this thesis
aims to incorporate the effects of networks into its estimates of unauthorised
migration using this platform.
The following section provides a brief background on agent-based mod-
elling, why it is a useful method for examining the effects of immigration
policy on migration, and how data is embedded into these kinds of models.
This is necessary to understand the specific methodological contributions of
this thesis, which will be detailed in Section 1.5 below. It will also serve as
a background to the literature review presented in Chapter 3, which focuses
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on the use of data in ABMs of migration.
1.3 Methodological Background: Agent-based
Modelling
Agent-based modelling is a relatively novel analytical method; it is a form
of computer simulation where the programmer creates a artificial society of
agents, generally, based on theory. They allow us to generate a “natural”
depiction of a system, which is very difficult to achieve using other analytical
methods (Bonabeau, 2002; Gilbert, 2008). ABM is a generative approach
(Epstein, 1999). Its goal is to construct a mechanism from the bottom up to
explain the emergence of macroscopic regularities, such as non-random crime
hotspots (Pitcher and Johnson, 2011; Malleson et al., 2009); the formation
of schools fish or flocks of birds (Tang and Bennett, 2010) or, as done in
this thesis, patterns of unauthorised migration (Chapter 7), or the spatial
clustering of migrants from one origin country in a given destination country
(Chapter 9). A generativist often seeks to ask two questions: First, what
mechanism produces a given pattern or regularity that we observe in the real
world (Epstein, 1999) and can we replicate this mechanism in a ‘natural’
or realistic way? Second, what outcomes do we get if we systematically
change certain conditions (i.e. immigration policies, amount of rainfall, or
the number of police patrols on a street). The second question usually is
dependent on an affirmative answer to the first, as I will explain in Section
1.3.2 below.
38
Agent-based models can serve different functions. They may aim to de-
velop theory: agent-based models are an ideal platform for what Cederman
(1997) has called “complex thought experiments,” allowing us to introduce
or relax assumptions and test the boundaries of theoretical expectations (Ep-
stein, 1999). I present a model of this type in Chapter 9. Others researchers
may use agent-based models to produce more realistic outcomes, as is done in
Chapter 7. Regardless of modellers’ intentions, according to Gilbert (2008),
agent-based models have six key features: (1) ontological correspondence, (2)
heterogeneous agents, (3) a representation of the environment, (4) agent in-
teractions, (5) bounded rationality and (6) learning. I expand on each point
in turn.
In an ABM, autonomous individuals or entities – for example, nations
or people – are generally represented with correspondence to the real world
(Gilbert, 2008). Like real nations or people, agents have a clear goal, they are
independent or autonomous in making decisions to reach a certain goal, and
they adapt their decisions to changing situations (Grimm et al., 2005). While
social science theories often assume individuals are similar and act similar in
key respects, agents in an ABM may act according to heterogeneous prefer-
ences or even follow different sets of rules, according to the theory tested. For
example, agents may be classified as migrants and non-migrants, or they may
display a higher degree of individual difference, such as possessing different
demographic characteristics (age or gender, for example). Agents need not
be different to each other, but modellers usually take advantage of ABM’s
flexibility for producing agents that can vary on a seemingly endless set of
dimensions – as in the real world.
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Agents exist in an environment, which may be entirely abstract or display
different degrees of realism. For example, agents may live in an abstract rep-
resentation of an area (e.g. a simple grid) or a spatially explicit geography,
where locations are identified with real coordinates. Agent-based modelling
affords the flexibility of incorporating data from Geographic Information Sys-
tems (GIS), which store and analyse data about phenomena with a spatial
location (Brown et al., 2005). Incorporating some sort of geographic realism
is relatively popular among modellers in different disciplines. According to
a systematic review of agent-based models of urban crime, more than 80%
of articles reviewed use some form of spatially explicit model, with 34% of
modellers using GIS with varying levels of detail (Groff et al., 2018). In
Chapter 3, I review ABMs that examine migration (as the main behaviour
or one of many) and find that these models follow a very similar trend with
more than 80% using spatially explicit models and 33% using GIS.
Models may also contain social networks, which may be as abstract or
realistic as the researcher wants them to be and may serve different pur-
poses. They may connect geographic locations to one another (e.g. Hassani-
Mahmooei and Parris, 2012), to map movement trajectories for agents. They
may also connect individuals and enable them to exchange information or
resources. These network representations may be stylised, like a random-
network (Erdo˝s, 1959) or a small-world network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998).
They may be fixed or evolving over time as agents interact with one another
and form friendships (Klabunde and Willekens, 2016). They may also be
data driven. Agent-based models allow us to easily import adjacency matri-
ces – for example, the sexual or friendship networks collected in the National
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Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Harris et al., 2009) – and connect
agents using a real network topology.
Agent-based modelling allows agents to be boundedly rational – that is,
they may have limited knowledge about their environment or situation and
limited cognitive abilities for processing information (Simon, 1957). Rather
than assuming that individuals have perfect knowledge, agents can be given
the capacity to accumulate knowledge from a variety of sources – such as
their physical environment or their networks – and evaluate their situation
inter-temporally. In general the rules guiding agent decision-making are sim-
ple and do not involve unrealistic sequences of complex reasoning (Gilbert,
2008, p. 15). Programmers may also choose to incorporate cognitive biases
by weighting information signals differentially, as this thesis does in Chapter
8. ABMs sometimes incorporate evolutionary algorithms, neural networks or
other learning techniques to make agents learn and adapt to change realis-
tically (Bonabeau, 2002). Modellers may also design their agents as having
perfect information and to act in a deterministic manner, or to have no infor-
mation at all. The degree of knowledge a programmer endows their agents
with is completely up to their discretion.
The main benefit of ABM is often considered to be the ability to observe
emergence: system dynamics that arise from the interactions between agents
(Railsback and Grimm, 2011, p. 10). Emergence is a behaviour that is diffi-
cult to predict from observing individual components in a system because the
interactions between these different components can, itself, cause behaviours
to arise. For example, we could consider a simple model where 50% of agents
wish to migrate to location A and the remaining 50% wishes to migrate to
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destination B – and they have no impediments in doing so. From observ-
ing individual components, the outcome is clear: agents will be distributed
equally amongst locations A and B. However, if we connect agents to one
another through networks and allow them to distribute information about
this location, we may see a very different sort of behaviour. If the first indi-
vidual who migrates moves to destination A and transmits positive feedback
to her network connections, she may be the start of a new path-dependent
behaviour that causes all agents to end up in location A, rather than just
half. Because emergent behaviour is difficult to predict, it can explain why
policies or interventions often lead to unintended consequences in the real
world (Room, 2011). Agent-based modelling is the only method that allows
us to explicitly model interactions and generate emergent dynamics that are
“out of the reach of pure mathematical methods” (Bonabeau, 2002, p. 7280).
As mentioned in the beginning of this section agent-based modellers seek
to generate observed patterns and also examine what may occur if conditions
change. Generally, if a model is able to replicate a real-life pattern, the mech-
anism formalised in the model is a good candidate for the real-life mechanism
underlying this pattern. This is often referred to as model validation and will
be discussed further in Section 1.3.2 as well as Chapter 3. If the model is
a good candidate, modellers will often also want to experiment with alter-
native scenarios. Specifically, agent-based models generate results by way of
in-silico experimentation. Modellers apply some ‘treatment’ or condition to
the system and compare it to a baseline model. The baseline model is the
same in all respects, except that the condition of interest is ‘turned off.’ An
in-silico experiment is usually repeated several times to observe variation that
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may occur due to randomness and compute a measure of uncertainty across
simulation runs (Railsback and Grimm, 2011). In this way, in-silico experi-
mentation allows us to infer the cause of a particular phenomenon and can be
a highly advantageous way to explore causality in situations where human-
subject experiments are impractical or unethical (Gilbert, 2008). However,
unlike human-subject experiments, in-silico experiments do not generate new
data about the real world (Morton et al., 2010) and depend on whether the
model is a true approximation of the real mechanism at play. To address this
issue, modellers often use a combination of theory and empirics, as will be
discussed in Section 1.3.2 and in Chapter 3.
1.3.1 ABMs, Migration and Agency
The theoretical framework for this thesis was developed in tandem with an
exploration of ABM’s capacity to model processes in a natural way. Because
the method allows us to test theories explicitly (Johnson and Groff, 2014),
this framework could take seriously details of human cognition and behaviour
that researchers may consider extraneous simply because they are unable to
test them. In short, an agency-centred, multilevel theoretical framework is
facilitated by a method that allows us to depict agents and multiple levels of
aggregation. Without presenting the theory that it draws on, I am unable
to discuss this theoretical framework. Therefore, in this section, I describe
the general correspondence between real migration systems and the type of
behaviour that is often depicted in ABMs. All references to the characteris-
tics of migration are discussed in Chapter 2, and the attributes of ABM are
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discussed in the section above.
1. ABMs are driven by agents. Agents are autonomous individuals who
are thoughtful and adapt to change by learning about their environ-
ment. This is not only a more realistic way of depicting individuals,
but it is also the ideal perspective through which to examine potential
migrants’ response to immigration policy change. The reorientation of
migrants to alternative (illegal) channels or destinations is an adaptive
response resulting from experiential learning of the policy environment
(Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011; Simon, 1972).
2. Individuals in an ABM generally interact,7 most often through net-
works, with no global entity controlling the system. Migrants and would-
be migrants also exchange information and resources locally through
social ties (Haug, 2008).
3. Processes can occur in stages, whereby the previous stage will affect
the next. Decisions in econometric models, for example discrete choice
models, are taken in a single step. Agent-based models are dynamic
and changing conditions or the prior actions of other agents may affect
the decision at a given point in time. This can cause systems to evolve.
As in the simple migration example presented in the above section,
some agents had an initial preference to behave in a certain way but
changed due to feedback being sent through the system. Their mi-
gration decision then affected those who would migrate in the future,
7This is what sets ABM apart from similar methods such as microsimulation (Gilbert,
2008)
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producing path-dependent behaviour. This is another essential feature
of migration, made most explicit in the theory of cumulative causation,
which will be discussed in Chapter 2.
4. ABMs allow us to observe emergence. As mentioned above, emergence
is the presence of a behaviour, unexpected given the individual com-
ponents of the system, which comes about through interaction. Policy
failures or unintended consequences are often due to the unpredictable
nature of emergent behaviour (Room, 2011). As such, being able to
depict migration systems using a method that allows us to observe
emergence is extremely important to this thesis’ research question.
As these points illustrate, ABMs are very useful for the study of migra-
tion. However, as I will show in Chapter 3, literature using this method in
migration is scarce and this thesis contributes to this nascent field. This
thesis also contributes a new approach for the use of empirics in ABM. The
following section provides a background on general practices to contextualise
this contribution.
1.3.2 Types of Models and Use of Empirics in ABMs
Modellers can use empirics in three main processes: model calibration, vali-
dation and specification. Model calibration is the use of numerical evidence
to set the features of a model component. Modellers may, for instance, set
agent characteristics such as age or aspiration to migrate, by inputting val-
ues from a survey dataset. They may also employ data more sparingly by
using stylised distributions (e.g. a normal or exponential distribution), with
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measures of centrality and dispersion derived from empirical data to assign
numerical values to model characteristics (Gilbert, 2008). Empirical valida-
tion is the qualitative or quantitative comparison of computational outputs
with empirical patterns (i.e. migration stocks or flows over time) to assess
whether the model is sufficient to explain a particular natural process (Axtell
and Epstein, 1994). Model specification refers to the selection of appropriate
model components (e.g. types of agents, micro decision processes) and the
relationship between them. This aspect is often guided by theory. How-
ever, modellers have used a wide range of quantitative and qualitative data
sources (first- or second-hand) to obtain evidence that certain relationships
are present in their selected case. Whether or how modellers use data in
these processes or if they employ these processes at all, usually depends on
the class of model in question and available resources, among other factors.
However, as will be shown in Chapter 3, migration studies that do use data
or empirics to calibrate, validate or specify model processes, rarely use data
in all model components. This is also the case for ABMs in other fields, such
as crime (Groff et al., 2018). This thesis develops an approach to facilitate a
more thorough use of data in the ABMs (see Chapter 3).
According to Gilbert (2008), there are three broad classes of models: ab-
stract, middle range and facsimile models. These types of modes differ in the
degree of realism with which the researcher aims to depict a phenomenon.
Abstract models are not intended to represent a specific empirical case, rather
a simple mechanism that need not perfectly correspond to observable reality.
One of the most cited abstract agent-based models is the Schelling model,
which aims to explain racial segregation in cities within the United States.
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The model is a very simple one. It is based on a regular rectangular grid of
cells representing an urban area. Agents – who belong to one of two (ethnic)
groups – are initially positioned in separate cells selected at random from
across the grid, leaving some cells empty. Every time step, agents evaluate
the eight cells surrounding theirs and compute the ratio of neighbours be-
longing to the other group to the neighbours belonging to their own group.
They compare the resulting fraction to a constant “tolerance” threshold. If
the them-to-us ratio is above the tolerance threshold, the agent relocates to
a random empty cell. Schelling found that, at tolerance values equal to or
above 0.3, agents naturally segregate into uniform clusters. Schelling con-
cludes, then, that even low values of racial prejudice can lead to segregation.
These types of models are generally used for theory development and are not
intended to approximate the characteristics of the system under study in an
empirical sense. Therefore, they often do not make use of empirical data
to set parameter values. Instead, they use simple assumptions to substanti-
ate model rules and do not validate the model beyond demonstrating it can
generate the phenomenon in question (i.e. segregation in Schelling, 1978 or
cooperation in Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981).
Facsimile models are at the other extreme of the spectrum. These models
look to reproduce a specific case as precisely as possible, often to predict
future scenarios. One of the most well known examples of a facsimile ABM
is the Artificial Long House Valley agent-based modeling project (Dean et al.,
2000; Axtell et al., 2002), which aimed to explain, in precise detail, the rise
and fall of the Anasazi civilisation of Native Americans in the southwestern
United States between AD 800 to AD 1350. This model made use of extensive
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archeological, anthropological, and ecological data to specify, calibrate and
validate the model, in an effort to credibly replicate the trajectory of this
civilization. As I show in Chapter 3, many agent-based models of migration
are of the facsimile type. The authors collect extensive evidence on a very
limited geographical area and attempt to replicate behaviour in that area.
Between abstract and facsimile ABMs are middle-range models or what
Bruch and Atwell (2013) call low-dimensional realism models. These are
more generic models, which aim to depict the characteristics of a real social
phenomenon, but do not compare exactly to a particular observable case.
They generally aim to reproduce stylised facts, or simple empirical findings
that are consistent across a range of different cases such that they can be
generalisable. For example, Epstein et al. (2008) takes a traditional math-
ematical model of contagion and adds a simple behavioural component to
it. Specifically, in this model agents do not simply contract a disease based
on a rate of contagion, as in traditional mathematical models, they also ac-
tively hide and flee to a safer area. This sort of adaptive behaviour has been
documented in historical cases and the authors show that the inclusion of
this behaviour more closely approximates patterns observed in historical epi-
demics in a qualitative sense. The authors compare how long disease takes
to spread when agents are able to hide and when they are not but do not
compare outcomes to numerical figures from historical accounts. This model
is middle-range because the model itself is relatively stylised – it is derived
from a classic mathematical model – but is adapted to include a more real-
istic behavioural feature. Furthermore, it does not aim to produce patterns
that can be compared to a specific case in a quantitative sense. It just aims
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to show that flight, a documented behaviour, can actually improve how we
represent contagion. The use of data in a middle-range model varies. Re-
searchers may not use any data, they may calibrate the model by assuming
stylised distributions and anchoring measures of centrality and dispersion to
empirical data, or they may populate agent characteristics by importing data
directly from a survey dataset, for example. Validation is often qualitative.
That is, empirical stylised patterns may be compared to model outputs by,
for example, comparing the distributional properties of the agent population
in simulated and empirical data (Axtell and Epstein, 1994).
1.4 Modelling Process
After having established the research aims, the ABM of unauthorised migra-
tion was developed in the following stages:
Stage 1: Conceptualization of ABM
The first stage of development consisted of the following three steps, which
were iterated through multiple times: (a) reviewing existing theory and build-
ing a theoretical framework, (b) finding gaps in the literature that needed to
be investigated (c) developing a sketch of the ABM architecture.
The theoretical framework was developed incrementally. The overarch-
ing set of theories that built the basis of the ABM concerned the effects
of immigration policy on migration decisions (Carling, 2002; Czaika and
De Haas, 2013). As parts of the model were further refined, theories on
migrant decision-making, migration networks and the law were explored and
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incorporated (see Chapter 2). This was needed in order to substantiate the
modelling choices made. In this way, agent-based modelling was a conduit
to a wide repertoire of complementary theories.
Theory was then formalised as an agent-based model. In other words,
theory was transformed into to rules telling the ABM what operations to
perform. For example, theory maintains that policy affects agents’ perceived
ability to migrate (Carling, 2002; Castles et al., 2013a). This is translated into
a rule whereby whenever agents receive a signal reflecting immigration policy,
their perceived ability to migrate will be either incremented or reduced. The
full set of rules, contained within components or modules (shown as boxes in
Figure 1.1), form the ABM’s architecture.
In the process of formalisation, certain gaps in the literature became
evident (Johnson and Groff, 2014) and became empirical questions which
needed to be investigated. These are summarised in Table 2.1 (Chapter 2).
Returning to the previous example, while literature maintains that immi-
gration policies lower individuals’ perceived ability to migrate, it is unclear
whether they lower individuals’ aspiration to migrate as well. As such, when
defining the rule that guides how learning about immigration policy affects
agents, it was necessary to gather data on the relationship between policy
and perceived ability and the relationship between policy and aspiration to
migrate.
Formalisation also highlighted the parameters in the model that needed
to be quantified. For example, given that a signal about immigration policy
affects agents’ perceived ability, it was also necessary to know by how much.
In this stage, I identified the survey data needed to conduct the appropriate
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statistical test and any empirical challenges that would arise in doing so (e.g.
causal identification or gathering truthful responses).
Stage 2: Data Collection, Analysis and Embeddedness
The survey was designed to address the items listed in the previous stage.
Guided by ABM rules and overall architecture, the survey design consisted
of experimental and non-experimental items on perceptions, attitudes and
preferences, migration history and migrant networks, demographics and an
experiment on immigration policy. These items were designed to address
the empirical challenges identified in the previous stage. Further details are
described in Chapter 4. For instance, it was necessary to disentangle the
effects of an exogeneous influence (information about immigration policy)
from pre-existing attitudes, which were in and of themselves affected by the
policy environment. This was tackled through the design of a policy exper-
iment where the only difference between the treatment and control group
was exposure to an audiovisual cue regarding the immigration policy envi-
ronment. A difference-in-means test would then identify the unique effect of
receiving immigration policy information on attitudes.
Once data was obtained, analyses were used to substantiate assumptions
and answer the questions identified and quantify parameters in model func-
tions, (e.g. the effect of policy on perceived ability to migrate) and agent
characteristics. I expand on these in turn.
By addressing theoretical gaps, empirical evidence from the field helped
refine ABM rules. The analysis of the policy experiment, for example, iden-
tified a statistically significant relationship between receiving policy infor-
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mation and perceived ability to migrate but not a statistically significant
relationship between policy information and aspiration. This informed agent
rules: when receiving feedback, agents’ perceived ability to migrate would be
altered, but not their aspiration.
The survey data was also used to calibrate the model. First, a slice of
the MDP survey dataset containing the relevant variables was input into the
program. Agents, equal in number to the survey respondents, were given
the characteristics of a randomly selected respondent. Second, the numerical
output of statistical tests were used to quantify model parameters. Specifi-
cally, I used the parameters of a curve of best fit resulting from an inferen-
tial statistical model to quantify a relationship of the same form within the
ABM. For example, parameter pi, which guides the amount that an agent
alters their perceived ability to migrate when exposed to policy information,
was set to the Average Treatment Effect of the policy (or audiovisual) ex-
periment. When immigration policy is restricted in an in-silico experiment,
aspiring migrant agents’ odds of success decreased (I expand on this in the
next stage). Successes and failures were operationalised as signals. When re-
ceiving a failure signal, an agents’ ability to migrate was lowered by quantity
pi.
Stage 3: Analysis of ABM
The first step in the analysis of the ABM consisted of examining its quality.
This was done by comparing ABM outputs to independent data sources (this
is described in Chapter 7, Section 7.3). This involved evaluating metrics
such as the proportion of migrants that are unauthorized in relation to real-
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life estimates on unauthorized migration, for example. Once evidence for
the quality of the model was found, the next step involved running several
in-silico experiments on different immigration policies (Chapter 7, Section
7.4). These experiments consisted of changing the number and type (in
terms of sociodemographic characteristics) of migrants admitted into the
destination country in a variety of different ways. For example, the low-
skilled labor migration was restricted by reducing the quota of low-skilled
agents admitted into the country.
A series of sensitivity tests were also carried out, examining parameters
that I was not able to collect data on, for example, biases in decision-making.
The purpose of these sensitivity tests was to examine the full range of the
unknown parameter and its impact on results. These sensitivity tests can be
found in Chapter 8 and in Appendix A.
1.5 Structure of Thesis and Contributions
My thesis is organised around the design, implementation and results of an
agent-based model of unauthorised migration. Part 1 (Chapters 2 to 4)
discusses the general background of the model, Part 2 (Chapters 5 and 6)
relates to the empirical specification and calibration of specific portions of
the model. Part 3 (Chapters 7 and 8) presents the full description and results
of the agent-based model of unauthorised migration, bringing together the
work shown in all previous chapters. Part 4 of the thesis examines spatial
reorientation.
The first two chapters of my thesis set out its theoretical and method-
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ological framework. Chapter 2 critically reviews theory across the social
sciences with a view to understanding the effects of immigration policy on
migration systems. It, then, introduces a new agency-centred theoretical
framework for the study of immigration policy on multi-level migration sys-
tems. This theoretical framework helps us think systematically about the
effects of immigration policy on systems of adaptive individuals. It con-
sists of the following elements, which, in Chapter 2, are subdivided into
eight premises. First, migration must be conceptualised as non-binary. Im-
migration policies create different modes of legal (i.e. family reunification,
low-skilled or high-skilled work) and unauthorised migration (i.e. complying
with some aspects of immigration law or bypassing it entirely). Each mode
consists of a different migration experience, with different levels of security
and risk, and these differences matter in the decision to migrate (Carling,
2002; Ruhs, 2010). Second, immigration policy constraints affect individuals
differently depending on their individual characteristics (i.e. wealth, skills or
family members abroad). This explains why some individuals succeed and
others fail in their migration plans (Carling, 2002). Third, to understand
how individuals act when their options are constrained, we must understand
their reflexive process; that is, the process by which they form normative and
rational perceptions. Individuals are boundedly rational (Simon, 1972) and
may display cognitive biases (Hattle et al., 2016) when learning and deciding
to migrate under different policies. The manner in which individuals send
and process information will have some bearing on individuals’ decision to
migrate and within which mode, thereby distorting the effects of immigration
policy through differential weighting of information or through the bounded-
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ness of network relationships. Fourth, social context – the ‘crucial meso-level’
(Faist, 1997) – can shape and reshape the options individuals consider and
the decisions they ultimately take. This theoretical framework contributes
to migration theory by (1) conceptualising the migrant as an agent that is
responsive to changes in immigration policy, (2) conceptualising the hetero-
geneous effects of immigration policy, and (3) systematically laying out how
immigration policy effects trickle down from the macro-level to the individual
and their social context, addressing the theoretical gaps identified in Section
1.1.
Chapter 3 reviews the nascent literature using data-driven agent-based
modelling to study migration, focusing on the use of empirics in model speci-
fication, calibration and validation. Based on this review, I propose a “proac-
tive approach to empirical embeddedness.” This approach consists of mak-
ing survey data collection an intrinsic aspect of the ABM design process
and, thereby, anticipating data needs. This process consists of three steps
that combine an ABM design process with a data collection process: (1) a
conceptualisation of the data collection project and an initial sketch of the
ABM, (2) an operationalisation of concepts and an identification of ABM
calibration needs, and (3) a plan for data analysis and an identification of
ABM validation needs. Aside from making sure that the adequate data is
collected (particularly as data collection is often costly and errors can often
not be remediated), this framework for data collection allows us to elicit data
that can be analysed in a dynamic setting. This is done by visualising survey
respondents in a similar fashion to simulation agents who may change their
perception and behaviour under different states of the world (or simulation
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settings). It also allows us to identify junctures where particular kinds of
empirical instruments may be needed or desired. For example, if we want to
exogeneously vary immigration policy in the ABM, we can use the results of
a human-subject experiment, which similarly assigns respondents an exoge-
neous treatment to calibrate this part of the model. This novel approach to
data embeddedness can help extend the explanatory power of individual em-
pirical instruments by integrating several designs that target specific aspects
of decision-making (i.e. aspirations, attitudes, perceptions) and simulating
future behaviour, which is often impossible to observe. This can make agent-
based models useful to researchers accustomed to more mainstream methods.
In sum, it presents a methodological advance on the current way in which
data is used in ABMs as well as a possibility to extend the use of agent-based
models outside its current niche.
Chapter 4 presents details on the design of the MDP survey instru-
ment and why Jamaica was chosen as the case of study. It also provides
an overview, including descriptive statistics, of the variables used to cali-
brate the model of unauthorised migration. To provide the reader with an
overview of the ABM and the components of the thesis, the ABM processes
and the data feeding into them are presented in Figure 1.1. In this figure,
the numbers in parentheses refer to textual description below. The ABM of
unauthorised migration is simple and focuses on the effects of immigration
policy on migration. Governments control legal migration by imposing a set
of channels to categorize and select ‘wanted’ from ‘unwanted’ migrants (1).
This legal categorization gives different agents different options for migration
by heterogeneously reducing agents’ perceived ability to migrate through le-
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gal channels (2), but not necessarily their desire to migrate (3). This gener-
ates a gap between aspiration and perceived ability (Lee, 1966; Massey et al.,
1998; Faist, 1997; Carling, 2002; Sen, 2001; Castles et al., 2013b; De Haas,
2003, 2010). As this gap widens, agents become increasingly likely to adapt
by migrating through illegal channels, depending on personal attitudes to-
wards lawbreaking (4) and rational considerations for doing so (5) (Castles,
2004b; Herna´ndez-Carretero and Carling, 2012; Czaika and De Haas, 2013).
As immigration policies are notoriously complicated and opaque, individuals
are not likely to be perfectly informed of policy changes. Individuals nav-
igate the policy environment through a gradual learning process influenced
by their own experience (6) and communication with their networks (Massey
et al., 1998; Massey and Zenteno, 1999), and this model focuses on the role
of networks in spreading information about migration policies (7). Steps 2
and 3 above are examined empirically in Chapter 5. Step 4 is examined in
Chapter 6.
The ABM architecture depicted in Figure 1 can be summarised as follows:
Following empirical evidence, policy affects ability to migrate but not aspira-
tion. As such, when policy is restricted, a gap between aspiration and ability
is created at the micro-level. Agents’ willingness to include an unauthorised
strategy into Strategy Set S, indicating their normative preferences, is driven
by a dynamically-adjusting ability to migrate on one hand, and a desire to
migrate – unaffected by policy – on the other. In the ‘Choose Strategy S∗’
procedure agents select the strategy they believe they are most able to exe-
cute and ignore other choices. Their probability of attempting a migration is
driven by the actual probability of success for their chosen strategy. Policy
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affects agents through local information signals. Agents learn about their
environment through first and second-hand experiences (Gigerenzer and Sel-
ten, 2002; Epstein, 2003b; Massey et al., 1998; Massey and Zenteno, 1999),
as is shown in the relationships coded with red arrows in Figure 1.
Figure 1.1: System diagram showing agent decisions, feedback processes, and
data types used for calibration
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This model addresses the three methodological challenges involved in eval-
uating the full effects of immigration policy. It allows us to (1) model un-
observable populations, (2) attribute changes in migration to (simulated)
immigration policy change and, (3) observe migrant flows in the presence
of network effects. As shown in Figure 1.1, the model was specified and
calibrated using standard survey items as well as two experiments, which
directly address the first two points. As mentioned in Section 1.1, drawing
causal inferences in empirical evaluations of immigration policy is a chal-
lenge: policies are not exogenous (policies might respond to migration flows
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and vice-versa) and we, generally, cannot disentangle their effects from other
processes that may be affecting migration. Chapter 5 examines the effects of
receiving information about immigration policy on aspiration and perceived
ability to migrate using a simple experiment. In this experiment, individu-
als were randomly selected to view a 4-minute video focusing on restrictions
within the most common visa routes for the top three destination countries
for Jamaicans – United States, United Kingdom and Canada – specifically
geared towards the Jamaican context. Immediately following this interven-
tion, we elicited their responses on aspiration and perceived ability to mi-
grate. The findings from this experiment showed that, while perceived ability
to migrate was affected by immigration policy information, aspiration to mi-
grate was not. Numerical findings from Chapter 5 are used to calibrate a
key relationship motivating this chapter: the influence of policy on migrant
decision-making (1 in Figure 1.1). The combination of an individual-level
information experiment and a macro-level policy simulation can allow us to
evaluate policy effects in a manner that is more realistic, much less costly and
much more feasible than a large-scale immigration policy evaluation such as
the lottery experiment mentioned in Section 1.1.
This thesis also provides a solution to the problem of identifying hidden
populations by eliciting several variables that are theorised to play a role in
unauthorised migration decisions from the origin country – for instance, sup-
port for unauthorised migration. This strategy is, however, also challenging
as unauthorised migration is a sensitive topic and may produce bias in mea-
surement when asked directly. These challenges are addressed in Chapter 6.
This chapter describes and examines the results of a list experiment, a novel
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approach to measurement designed to limit the effects of social desirability
by protecting individuals’ privacy (Glynn, 2013; Kuklinski et al., 1997). This
technique is used to generate estimates used in model specification and cal-
ibration. The second portion of Chapter 6 examines whether a perceived
gap between aspiration and ability is associated with a higher likelihood of
supporting unauthorised means of migrating. This is done through further
analysis of the list experiments. This analysis lends evidence to model spec-
ification and calibration of variables in process (3) in Figure 1.1. Chapter 7
presents the ABM of unauthorised migration, which examines the effects of
immigration policy on the volume and legal/ illegal composition of migration.
This chapter brings together the work presented in all previous chapters.
As part of the modelling process, the question arises of whether individ-
uals weight information differently depending on whether it is positive or
negative, or whether it is based on one’s own experience or those of others.
Chapter 8 explores this issue further with additional in-silico testing of the
ABM of unauthorised migration. The aim of this chapter is to present a
basis for further empirical exploration of the manner in which information
about immigration policy and odds of migration success is sent, sought out
and processed by aspiring migrants.
In chapter 9, I evaluate another form of adaptation: reorientation towards
other destinations. This type of reorientation is a theoretical puzzle. Accord-
ing to social network theory, flows tend to be increasingly “siphoned off” to
already dominant destinations following the movement of others. Alterna-
tive destinations maintain limited appeal despite changes in policy conditions
that might make the alternative destination easier to access (De Haas, 2010;
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Massey et al., 1993). The question that arises, then, is do policies divert mi-
gration flows? Addressing this more precise theoretical question requires a
different approach than in previous chapters. I explicitly formalise social net-
work theory as an abstract agent-based model and demonstrate this theory
can explain the emergence of both stable, path dependent migration systems
as well as systems that adapt and shift in reaction to immigration policy
conditions if we consider an oft-neglected aspect of migration – return. This
chapter advances migration theory by extending the explanatory power of a
highly influential theory of migration (Epstein, 2008). In future work, I will
use these theoretical findings to extend the adaptive behaviours of the ABM
of unauthorised migration.
This project was funded by a Leverhulme Trust Research Project grant
(RPG-2014-271), which I co-authored with my PhD supervisors Prof. Shane
D. Johnson and Prof. David Hudson. This grant funded my PhD (in conjunc-
tion with the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council), employed
postdoctoral researcher Dr. Cassilde Schwartz, and funded the Migration De-
cisions and Policy survey (MDP). In this grant, I was lead ABM designer
and programmer (having the same interactions with my supervisors as would
be the case in any other PhD). I also co-designed all experimental and non-
experimental portions of the survey and coordinated data collection with a
professional survey team in Jamaica together with Dr. Schwartz, project
lead for empirics. Although the work presented in this thesis is the result of
a close collaborative effort, my thesis focuses on agent-based modelling, the
portion of the project that I led.
The empirical work presented in this thesis was also presented in academic
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papers in an edited form. For transparency, I disclose all relevant academic
articles:
Simon, M., Schwartz, C, Hudson, D., and Johnson, S.D. (2018). A data-
driven computational model on the effects of government policies on migra-
tion flows. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
Simon, M. Path Dependency and Adaptation: The Effects of Policy on
Migration Corridor Formation (2018). Invitation to Revise and Resubmit.
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation.
Schwartz, C., M. Simon, D. Hudson, and S. D. Johnson (2016). Legality is in
the eye of the beholder: Experimental evidence on the criminality and risks of
irregular migration. Presented at the 6th Annual Workshop on Comparative
Approaches to Immigration, Ethnicity, and Integration, Yale University
1.6 Summary
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how migrants adapt to changing
immigration policies with the influence of their social networks. This thesis
is concerned with the extent to which migrants are driven to adopt illegal
routes or alternative spatial corridors when entry into a destination country
becomes difficult. No systematic empirical research exists to assess these
‘substitution effects’ in migration, limiting our understanding of the full im-
pact of immigration policies and hampering their successful implementation
(Czaika and De Haas, 2013). I argue that, to understand the full impact
of immigration policy, we must: (1) consider the externalities of immigra-
tion policy, namely the reorientation of migrants, and (2) we need to adopt
an agency-centred approach to migration that connects migration processes
occurring at multiple levels of aggregation.
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This thesis advances the study of migration and immigration policy on
both theoretical and methodological fronts. Students of migration have until
recently, paid little attention to the effects of immigration policy on popula-
tion movements (Massey, 1999). Drawing on existing theories of migration,
this thesis develops a systematic theoretical approach to examine the effects
of immigration policy on adaptive migration systems. Traditional statistical
approaches are unable to examine the reorientation of migrants to other cate-
gories or countries or the social process by which specific migration strategies
evolve (Czaika and De Haas, 2013). To address this shortcoming, this thesis
tailors an original nation-wide survey of Jamaica – a country with a rich
emigration history and a source of concern for future unauthorised migration
flows into the UK, US and Canada (Thomas-Hope, 2003) – to inform and
calibrate an agent-based computational model. Agent-based models (ABMs)
allow us to observe how migrant behaviour might give rise to complex mi-
gration patterns at an international level and are flexible enough to integrate
a wide range of empirical designs. The work presented in this thesis, thus,
aims to further develop theories of migration and to examine the impact
of policies on migration patterns using a methodological approach that has
received only minor attention in the existing literature.
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Chapter 2
Theories of Migration,
Decision-Making, and the Law
Despite a continuing demand for immigrant labour, major destination coun-
tries view migration as a “social and political problem that needs to be
managed” (Massey et al., 1998, p. 6). This perspective is borne out of fear
that immigration will erode national security, social cohesion and the econ-
omy (Weiner, 1995; Schlesinger, 1998; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014) and
it has lead to – often draconian – policies to restrict legal immigration and
heavy enforcement strategies to deter lawbreakers. This is the case in major
destination countries, for example, the US (Massey et al., 2016b), Australia
(Williams, 2010), and in countries across Europe (Meko and Sharma, 2016)
and Asia (Albert, 2018; Williams, 2010).
However, this does not mean that migrants’ agency is necessarily thwarted
by these policies. Media reports abound with stories of individuals attempt-
ing to migrate despite immigration restrictions. A salient example is the
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2014 surge in the migration of unaccompanied minors into the United States.
Central American families, unable to migrate legally, sent minors across the
border unaccompanied, following rumors from family, friends, acquaintances
and smugglers, that U.S. law made special provisions for migrant children.
At the height of the surge, the Border Patrol apprehended 10,631 minors
(Hulse, 2004). North African and Middle-Eastern migrant flows into Eu-
rope are equally dexterous and responsive to attempts at restricting entry.
The transmission of migrant experiences and rumors facilitate the emergence
of “spontaneous” migrant flows and fluid spatial routes (Hagen-Zanker and
Mallett, 2016; Katsiafikas and Ruiz Soto, 2016, p. 1-2). These events may
seem extraordinary and bounded in time by extreme situations in the origin
country. However, the fact that, in 2005, an estimated 200 million migrants
around the world did not have regular residency status (GCIM, 2005) indi-
cates the persistence of agency when movement is restricted.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how migrants adapt to chang-
ing immigration policies with the aid of their social networks. In a broader
theoretical sense, it is concerned with examining individuals’ agency, or the
ability to pursue their migration goals under policies that look to restrict
their movement. I argue that, a framework that allows us to understand
decision-making under policy constraints must consist of the following ele-
ments. First, migration must be conceptualised as a multifaceted choice.
States’ laws and entry classifications create different modes of migration and
the decision to migrate should be qualified with the specific conditions of
each mode. Even unauthorised migration is a multifaceted choice: there
are different forms of unauthorised migration, involving different risks (see
66
Section 2.3) and individuals may consider migrating under some conditions
but not others. Second, immigration policy constraints affect individuals
differently depending on their individual characteristics. This diversity is
essential to understanding why some individuals succeed and others fail in
their migration plans, as I discuss in Section 2.1. Third, to understand what
individuals do when their options are constrained, as this thesis proposes, it
is important to understand how aspiring migrants perceive these constraints
at both a normative and a rational level (Sections 2.1.2 and 2.3), as well
as the process by which these perceptions are formed. As discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2, individuals are boundedly rational and may display cognitive biases
when learning and deciding to migrate under different policies. These biases
and cognitive limitations, may lead them to act differently than they would
have under assumptions of perfect information and cognition (In Chapter 8,
I explore the possible effects of cognitive biases on migration patterns using
simulation). Fourth, migration outcomes are not a direct consequence of
individual decisions. Social context – the ‘crucial meso-level’ (Faist, 1997)
– can shape and reshape the options individuals consider and the decisions
they ultimately take (Sections 2.1.2 and 2.2).
In order to develop this theoretical perspective, it is important to incorpo-
rate a range of multidisciplinary literature. In this chapter, I review and syn-
thesise literature on migration. I, then, consider theories of decision-making,
focusing in particular on bounded rationality and cognitive biases. I also
examine literature on the rule of law, focusing on types of non-compliance in
migration as well as normative and rational deterrents to lawbreaking that
can be used to understand why individuals migrate through unauthorised
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means. Finally, I synthesise key concepts into an agency-centred theoretical
framework for the study of migration under immigration policy constraints.
The framework will guide the remainder of this thesis.
2.1 Migration Theory
Migration theories can be classified according to whether they consider the
social structure within which individuals exist or the individuals themselves
more worthy of focus when describing the real world. There are three types of
migration theories: the historical-structuralist perspective, the functionalist
perspective, and more modern agency centred approaches (Castles et al.,
2003). The historical-structural perspective, inspired by Marxist political
economy, emphasises social structure above the individual decision-maker,
while functionalist theories and the more modern agency-centred approaches
emphasise the individual decision-maker, albeit in notably different ways.
Historical-structural approaches consider migration to be the outcome of
the unequal economic relationship between developed and developing coun-
tries and the effects of capitalist penetration (Massey et al., 1998, p. 34-41).
Three models of migration are of particular importance to the historical-
structural tradition: dual and segmented labour market theory, dependency
theory and world systems theory. Dual and segmented labour market the-
ory (Piore, 1979) argues that the structural demand for cheap and flexible
labour is the dominant driver of migration. In advanced industrialised coun-
tries, there are two types of labour markets. The primary market consists
of secure and well-paid jobs for the natives and the secondary labour mar-
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ket consists of low-skilled, risky and badly-paid jobs. The secondary labour
market is mainly filled by migrant workers because migrants are easily ex-
ploitable – particularly if their legal status is precarious. The secondary
labour market is segmented to the extent that it can be subdivided into
employment subsections according to gender, race or nationality. Labour
agents and employers organise the employment of individuals with specific
characteristics into certain jobs, and this segmentation is then perpetuated
through networks of co-nationals who recruit migrants to join the ethnic en-
clave economy (Fussell, 2012, p. 28). Dependency theory considers labour
migration to be a product of the unequal way in which the developing world
has been incorporated into the capitalist economy. Capitalist penetration
traps individuals in underdevelopment, forcing them to migrate internally to
urban areas or migrate internationally in order to survive (Morawska, 2012,
p. 60). Dependency theory has very similar implications to those of world
systems approaches (Wallerstein, 1974). These approaches classify coun-
tries according to their position within the global market economy. ‘Core’
nations are the dominant capitalist powers, while the ‘periphery’ and ‘semi-
periphery’ are countries that are either wholly or partially dependent on the
core through asymmetric trade relationships and capital penetration. Similar
to dependency theory, world systems theory conceives of capitalist influences
as disrupting labour practices, “creating potentially mobile pools of labour
available for migration” (King, 2012, p. 18).
As these theories illustrate, the historical-structural approach considers
political and economic structures as ‘all-determining’ (Castles et al., 2003,
p. 37) and the movement of people inevitable, as countries go through the
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motions of a “grand script” (Arango, 2004, p. 27): Migrants are passively
recruited into jobs for which there is a structural demand and they are pas-
sively dislodged from their traditional economic activities by the global forces
of capitalism. While it is certainly true that migrants’ actions are shaped
by opportunities that often times correlated with “the pathways of capital
penetration,” (King, 2012, p. 19) migration is still a decision and therefore
entails a degree of free choice (Castles et al., 2003, p. 32). Migrants respond
to politics and policy and make plans accordingly (Hagen-Zanker and Mallett,
2016), and this process will cause migrants to deviate from expected histor-
ical trajectories. Conceptualising individuals as thoughtful and adaptive is
essential to understanding changing policy environments can drive changes
in migration behaviour. Furthermore, individual heterogeneity is essential to
understanding how immigration policy can shape migration because policies
themselves disaggregate individuals into categories based on their individual
characteristics. Historical-structural approaches leave no room for diversity –
in individual characteristics, life-goals or migration outcomes. It is, perhaps,
for this reason that these approaches pay little attention to the role of the
state in affecting migration flows (King, 2012).
These aspects render historical-structural approaches inappropriate for
examining this thesis’ research question. To understand, how individuals
respond and change paths in tandem with constantly changing policy en-
vironments, we need to adopt the perspective of the decision-maker. To
understand the effects of immigration policy, we need to expand beyond ex-
planations of labour demand to examine the direct influence of state policies
in shaping migration flows; and we need to be able to conceptualise these
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policies as having heterogeneous effects on diverse populations. Therefore,
in the remainder of this section, I focus on functionalist and agency-centred
approaches. Functionalist approaches consider migration systems to be a
collection of interdependent parts (individuals) and seek to explain why it
functions the way it does, focusing on individual action within this system.
Functionalist perspectives are widely used in the study of migration and, as I
show below, are essential to understanding the real or intended effects of im-
migration policy. However, they have also been criticised for not adequately
conceptualising agency (King, 2012). This criticism emerged in the 1980’s, in
line with a paradigm shift in social theory towards ‘structurationism’ (Bour-
dieu, 1977; Giddens, 1984). Scholars argued that functionalism conceived of
individuals as atomistic utility maximisers, who execute predictable actions
in accordance with their roles within the system.
In the 1980’s, new approaches to migration arose, which regarded decision-
makers as creative and thoughtful, with actions that cannot be determined
by a cost-benefit equation (de Haas, 2014). These theories were part of a
paradigm shift in social theory, which considered structure and agency to
be part of a single process – “the constitution of society” (Giddens, 1984).
Structurationist theories aim to explain how societies are made and remade
over time through social interactions. From a structurationist viewpoint,
human beings both reproduce and shape the societies they live in through
practices they do not fully understand or have complete control over. In
Section 2.1.2, I describe this paradigm shift and how the concepts developed
by its two most important theorists, Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens
(Inglis and Thorpe, 2012), relate to the study of migration and immigration
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policies.
In this section, I begin by reviewing classical functionalist theories of mi-
gration. I, then, take a step back to discuss the shift in social theory that
gives way to more current agency-centred approaches to migration. Through-
out this review, I pay specific attention to migration theories’ treatment of
agency and the obstacles to migration.
2.1.1 Functionalist Theories of Migration
Ravenstein’s (1885; 1889) ‘laws of migration’ are one of the earliest contribu-
tions to the study of migration. Among other laws, Ravenstein laid out the
predominance of economic motivations; the direction of outward movement
– from agricultural to industrial areas; the intrinsic relationship between mi-
gration and economic development; and the concept of return migration as a
counter-stream to outmigration.1 He also theorised on the joint importance
of distance and population size in determining location choice, laying the
foundation for the well-known gravity models of migration – also known as
push-pull models.
Push-pull models dominated much of the work on migration until the
1960’s, if not later (King, 2012). According to these models, which draw
heavily on Newtonian physics, the volume of movement between two loca-
tions is directly proportional to the product of their masses (which has been
interpreted as population size) and inversely proportional to the square of
the distance between them (White and Woods, 1980, p. 39). These simple
1The study of two-way migration dynamics – the subject of Chapter 9 of this thesis –
was only researched in depth in the 1970s and 1980s and remains an understudied topic
today (King, 2012).
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models considered migration to be driven by a set of push factors at the origin
country, such as poverty, unemployment, political repression, low social sta-
tus; and pull factors operating from the destination, for example, income, job
prospects, better education, political freedom, among other aspects (King,
2012). In the seminal push-pull model by Lee (1966) (1966), he argued that
migration decisions were determined by ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ factors in areas of
origin and destination, obstacles, and personal factors.
Many scholars have discredited push-pull models for being overly deter-
ministic and purely descriptive (Castles et al., 2013b; Carling, 2002; Skeldon
et al., 1990). As Skeldon et al. (1990) explains, push-pull models consist of “a
list of factors, all of which clearly contribute to migration, but which lack a
framework to bring them together in an explanatory system” (pp. 125-126).
Even so, Lee (1966) conceptualises the role of immigration policies and other
obstacles (physical distance, cost, cultural barriers) in limiting movement,
which is not considered enough in more modern literature (Arango, 2000),
and the list of factors these models consider is often more wide-ranging than
the explanatory models that have succeeded them (e.g. political variables
have often been set aside despite their importance (Leblang et al., 2009)).
Furthermore, push-pull models are still widely used, particularly in literature
on conflict- or climate- driven migration (e.g. Moore and Shellman, 2007;
Mayda, 2010) because they distinguish between planned and spontaneous
migration (Hein, 1993).
Neo-classical models share some of the same principles as push-pull mod-
els – namely the underlying assumption that migrants are rational utility
maximisers and the notion that geographical differences in labour supply
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and wage shape migration flows (King, 2012, p. 13). They are, however,
more sophisticated than push-pull models, and remain prominent today. Mi-
gration, in neo-classical models, is driven by wage differentials resulting from
differences in the supply and demand for labour across regions or countries.
Specifically, capital-rich and labour-poor countries have a high equilibrium
wage, while labour-rich and capital-poor countries have a low equilibrium
wage. These wage differentials drive movement from labour-surplus coun-
tries to labour-scarce countries. In parallel, investment capital moves from
capital-rich countries to capital-poor countries, as the relative scarcity of cap-
ital in the latter yields a high rate of return. With this movement, we see a
counterflow of skilled managers, technicians and other skilled labourers.
Neoclassical models tend toward global equilibrium (Castles et al., 2013b).
That is, the international movement of workers leads wages to fall in the
capital-rich country and rise in the capital-poor country. Hence, wage dif-
ferentials narrow and may at some point be eliminated, thereby ending the
movement of labour (Massey et al., 1993; Harris and Todaro, 1970). The neo-
classical economic model considers migration to be a positive phenomenon:
it benefits all parties involved and tends towards greater global wealth equal-
ity (Castles et al., 2013b, p. 27). From this perspective, state intervention
is considered to distort the “immigration market,” and limits the benefits
it can bring about (Borjas, 1989a). However, according to this theory, im-
migration control has a decisive and determinative effect on migration flows
(Zolberg, 1989, p. 405-406) and, despite its view of unrestricted movement
as beneficial, neoclassical theory has been greatly influential in the design of
immigration control policies (Massey et al., 1998, p. 19), as will be discussed
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later.
Corresponding to the macro-level model is the neoclassical model of in-
dividual choice (Todaro, 1969; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987; Borjas, 1989a).
Micro theory focuses on the individual’s cost benefit analysis for displace-
ment, where the highest valued location is that which can lead the individ-
ual to have the greatest expected discounted net returns over a defined time
period – usually an individual’s lifetime. Massey et al. (1993) summarises
the cost-benefit calculation in the following equation:
ER(0) =
∫ n
0
[P1(t)P2(t)Yd(t)− P3(t)Y0(t)]e−rtdt− C(0), (2.1)
where ER(0) is the expected net economic return to migration at time
0; n is the length of the migration trip; P1(t) is the probability of not be-
ing deported if the individual is an illegal migrant; P2(t) is the probability
of obtaining employment at the destination and Yd(t) is the earnings the
individual can expect. Variables P3(t), Yo(t) and r relate to home country
characteristics. P3(t) is the probability of obtaining employment, while Yo(t)
represents the earnings received; r is the discount factor reflecting a greater
utility of earning money in the present than in the future. The costs of
migration C(O) are subtracted from the integrated difference. If ER(0) is
positive, a rational individual will migrate.
According to this model governments can control undocumented migra-
tion with policies that affect the probability of obtaining employment at
the destination, P2(t), (e.g. sanctions on employers hiring unauthorised mi-
grants) and deportation, P1(t), (e.g. monitoring and enforcement efforts).
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For example, the US Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 imposed
sanctions on employers who knowingly hire illegal workers. The motivation
behind this policy is clearly based on the neoclassical model: “By lower-
ing the odds of employment for undocumented migrants, Congress hoped
to reduce the expected value of U.S. wages and, in doing so, to reduce the
expected gain from illegal entry” (Massey and Espinosa, 1997, p. 949-959)
This theory also suggests government policy can select legal migrants
according to desired characteristics. According to Borjas (1989a, pp. 460-
1), when choosing the country of residence that will maximise their economic
well-being, potential migrants choose from a set of “offers,” and will therefore
sort themselves across host countries. Borjas (1989a) describes this concept
as equilibrium sorting in the immigration market. The notion that countries
“compete” for specific skill sets by enacting selective policies, may strike as
odd in the current political climate, but the concept of equilibrium sorting
is very relevant today. Immigration policies are founded on the premise that
a specific configuration of costs and incentives can shape the composition
of immigration (Castles, 2004a). The points-based immigration system used
in Australia and the UK, is a clear example. As the name suggests, this
system allocates points based on desirable attributes. These attributes can
be language ability, the capacity to support oneself financially or previous
occupation, for example. However, immigration policies may also limit en-
tries of a given characteristic by imposing yearly quotas. For instance, in
the 1960s and 1970s, the US sought to reduce immigration from Mexico by
reducing the number of visas available. These actions raised the costs of mi-
gration by creating lengthy visa backlogs and waiting times, and increasing
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legal expenses.
Neo-classical theory has been criticised for its overly simplistic treatment
of immigration policy – that is, for assuming the state can control immigra-
tion effectively and in a straight-forward manner. There are several limits
to the effectiveness of state control over immigration. First, the ‘supply’ of
immigration control is subject to compromise between a diverse set of polit-
ical interests (Money, 1997; Meissner, 1992; Freeman, 1995). Scholars have
found that competition between natives and immigrants – economic, cultural
or both – drives demand for stricter control (Money, 1997; Meissner, 1992).
Ideational, cultural or institutional factors can also affect the policies ulti-
mately implemented (e.g. Haus, 1995; Watts, 2002). For example, restricting
family reunification is often politically problematic in Western democracies.
This is an important limitation to state capacity for control, as kin members
with special entry privileges may, of course, possess the characteristics the
state considers undesirable.
Another reason why policies are unable to exert the effects they would
like is migrant agency. According to Castles (2004a, p. 858),
Two types of belief have been particularly influential in migration
policy formation. One is the economic belief in market behaviour
based on neo-classical theory, according to which people move to
maximise their individual utility (usually through higher income),
and cease to move, or return home, if the cost-benefit equation
changes. The second is the bureaucratic belief that regulations de-
signed to categorise migrants and to regulate their admission and
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residence effectively shape aggregate behaviour. Together these
two beliefs add up to the idea that migration can be turned on and
off like a tap by appropriate policy settings.
Here, Castles (2004a) is echoing the structuration theories of Pierre Bour-
dieu and Anthony Giddens. According to Giddens, actions are not deter-
ministic, as the neoclassical model prescribes and, while autonomy may
vary, creativity and thoughtfulness can help individuals act in ways that
can transform their social structure (Cohen, 1989, p. 152). Immigration
policy, according to Castles (2004a, p. 860), are “opportunity structures”
and “migration rules [are] just another barrier to be overcome in order to
survive.”
2.1.2 Creativity under Constraints
Since the 1980’s, a new body of migration literature emerged, which aimed
to break out of individual or structural determinism. According to Castles
et al. (2003, p. 37), these new theories
... highlighted the diversity of migration and stressed the role
of migrants’ agency by describing the various ways in which mi-
grants try to actively and creatively overcome structural constraints
such as immigration restrictions, social exclusion, racism and so-
cial insecurity.
As mentioned earlier in this section, these new theories were influenced
by the structurationist theories of Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens.
78
Structurationism hinges on two broad concepts: social reproduction – act-
ing in ways that maintain rules from the past and reinforce the social order
– and social transformation, the altering of social order through interac-
tion. In this way, structure and agency become one and the same: indi-
vidual action shapes social structure and social structure shapes individual
action. Bourdieu’s work focuses on class-based social reproduction, and like
the historical-structural approaches to migration discussed earlier, was influ-
enced by Marxism. Giddens, on the other hand, leans more towards social
transformation and was, perhaps, more influential in shaping our view of
agency in migration.
Still, Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’ and ‘capital’ were highly influen-
tial in these new agency-centred approaches to migration. ‘Habitus’ consists
of ideal and physical ‘practices’ – or actions that people take without fully
reflecting on them – that are particular to the social group to which the indi-
vidual belongs. This is because the habitus is inculcated into the individual
through a process of socialisation, such that the individual adopts values,
attitudes and ideas belonging to the group. An important aspect of habitus
is that it “adjusts expectations to reality,” such that individuals within a
particular social class do not expect things which they are unlikely to obtain
given the social structure in which they belong (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012, pp.
214-215). Habitus sets the possibilities for action. That is, it creates and
changes the social structure and, at the same time, limits the set of action-
able alternatives (Reay, 2004). The idea that belonging to a social group
can dictate the sort of decisions one may take, is reflected in several of the
theories described below. For example, the concept of ‘relative deprivation,’
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which is essential to both the New Economics of Labour Migration and capa-
bilities approaches to migration, considers the importance of local reference
groups in shaping aspirations and alternatives for action.
Bourdieu conceived of modern societies as consisting of series of ‘fields’ or
separate social structures within which ‘games’ are played. In these games, all
players seek to dominate others, often in ways that are not entirely conscious.
Some players have advantage over others, occupying a higher position in the
field. Their position in a field is determined by a specific amount and type of
‘capital.’ Capital consists of both the resources – the ways in which actors can
play a game – and the stakes – or what players are attempting to accumulate
by winning the game. There are three types of capital: Economic capital
(money); social capital (social connections) and cultural capital (the amount
of prestige associated with a person’s practices, i.e. how well they speak or
how much they know about art). The concept of capital forms the basis of
a very influential theory of migration, social capital theory, also known as
social network theory, which is discussed later in this section. This theory
considers social capital, which may be transformed into economic capital,
to be an essential force in perpetuating migration. In this thesis, I take a
step further and conceptualise immigration policy as an objective condition
that provides necessary advantages only to individuals who possess or have
access to a particular type of ‘capital’ (i.e. social or economic), as I discuss
in Section 2.4.
Although, Bourdieu’s approach is not deterministic it has been criticised
for not considering individuals to be reflexive enough (e.g. Mouzelis, 2008).
Giddens conceives of individuals as thoughtful and creative and capable of
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change. He rejects functionalism (among other theories) because of its “un-
acceptable downgrading of human agency” (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012, p. 225).
Agency for Giddens is captured by the concept of the ‘ontology of potentials,’
which holds that every agent could have potentially acted in a way that is
different than the way they did in a given case. According to Giddens, even
individuals in the most constrained social circumstances, such as slavery –
have some kind of agency (Cohen, 1989, p. 152). This agency drives indi-
viduals to transform a situation in ways the agent may not intend or may
not fully understand. Similar to Bourdieu, Giddens considers individuals to
be heterogeneous in the set of resources they have at their disposal and how
skilled they are at using them. This heterogeneity can help some individu-
als overcome structural constraints more successfully than others (Inglis and
Thorpe, 2012), a concept that is essential to understanding the effects of
structural constraints as developed in the capabilities approach to migration
and, in particular the work of Carling, which will be discussed below. How-
ever, though Giddens emphasises agency and change more than Bourdieu,
he also pays due attention to the importance of inheritance from the past.
Past practices that are not necessarily one’s own but have been inculcated
through socialisation are termed ‘memory traces’ (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012).
Memory traces limit the set of actions available and can lead to path depen-
dent behaviour. In other words, individuals tend to repeat or reproduce what
individuals before them have done and this limits their capacity to change
social structure (Giddens, 1979, p. 5). This path dependency is, once again,
very similar to the process of cumulative causation in migration, which is
described later in this section.
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In the remainder of this section, I describe modern theories of migra-
tion, which were influenced by the structuration approach. These theories
describe how successful migrants can transform social structures and help
others surpass situational constraints of different kinds. These new practices,
if successful, can then perpetuate themselves through social reproduction.
New Agency-centred Approaches
The New Economics of Labour Migration (Stark and Bloom, 1985) emerged
as a critique to functionalist theory – in particular neoclassical models –
on two fronts. The first is that migration is a household or community-
wide strategy aimed not only at maximising income, but also at mitigating
risk. Families or collectives can form joint strategies to minimise the risk of
market failure by diversifying labour allocations. If income streams across
geographically discrete areas are loosely or negatively correlated, families can
have some control over risk of market failure. For example, farm households
in developing countries are subject to human or natural events that can
substantially lower crop yield. Families have an incentive to send workers
abroad, so that these workers can transfer money to the household and insure
the household against potential harvest failure. In developed countries, risk
of crop failure can often be mitigated with agricultural technology, but in
developing countries, these risks pose a significant constraint to well-being
that may only be overcome with migration (Massey et al., 1998).
The second key affront to neoclassical theory is the argument that mi-
gration does not arise from absolute poverty but relative deprivation (Stark
and Bloom, 1985, p. 174). Relative deprivation and inequality are often used
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in conjunction, but they are not the same. Inequality means a segment of
the population is poorer relative to another, but feelings of relative depriva-
tion cannot take place if well-being comparisons within a proximate reference
group do not occur. This concept considers want and the ability to move as
constructed by one’s social environment, rather than abstract macro-level
concepts such as poverty.
The concept of relative deprivation has been associated with Amartya
Sen’s capabilities approach to human development. Sen’s capabilities ap-
proach defines development as a process of expanding freedoms and stresses
individuals’ ability to lead lives that are subjectively valuable (Sen, 2001).
This approach considers factors such as education, health, and different kinds
of inequalities as opportunity structures constraining and enabling people’s
decisions (De Haas, 2011). In this framework, human development includes
the capability to decide where to live (De Haas and Rodriguez, 2010), a
capability that can be constrained by immigration laws.
Carling’s (2002) aspiration/ ability model is a seminal study within the
capabilities approach (de Haas, 2014). According to the model, the interplay
of aspiration and perceived ability can generate three migratory categories
of people: migrants, involuntary non-migrants and voluntary non-migrants.
Migrants are individuals whose movements can be observed; involuntary non-
migrants are those who wish to migrate but are unable to do so; and vol-
untary non-migrants are those who stay because “because of a belief that
non-migration is preferable to migration” (p. 12).
The aspiration/ ability model and related literature (e.g. Castles, 2004a;
Castles et al., 2013b) has been relatively unclear about the effects of restric-
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tive policies on aspiration and ability – that is, whether it produces voluntary
or involuntary non-migrants. Immigration policy is likely to reduce people’s
perceived ability to migrate, but we do not know whether it also decreases
their aspirations to do so. This question has significant theoretical and real-
life implications. Theoretically, the question sits at the crux of the social
reproduction/ social transformation debate. According to Bourdieu, habi-
tus “tends to make a person’s ‘subjective’ mental outlook on life mesh with
‘objective’ social conditions,” such that a person who has little chance of
migrating successfully, for example, would never think of doing so. This
thought would remain “outside their range of possible thoughts” (Inglis and
Thorpe, 2012, p. 214-215). On the other hand, Giddens’ ‘ontology of po-
tentials’ highlights that all individuals have some agency to transform social
structure, regardless of objective conditions (Cohen, 1989). This philosophy
would contend that individuals will adapt and search for alternative – pos-
sibly illegal – ways to migrate. An enduring aspiration to migrate despite
objective constraints is a necessary condition for social transformation to
occur. I examine this question further in Chapter 5.
One of the most important contributions of the capabilities approach to
the study of migration is the concept that immigration policies have different
effects on the capabilities of different people (De Haas and Rodriguez, 2010;
Ruhs, 2010). Carling’s (2002) concept of an ‘immigration interface’ is a set
of legal and irregular migratory channels – each consisting of their own costs
and risks. Differing individual characteristics such as age, gender, family
network or level of education make individuals heterogeneous in their ability
to access any one of the migration modes within the policy interface – as in
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Bourdieu’s skilled players in a game. This concept is very similar to Borjas’s
(1989a) “equilibrium sorting,” albeit with a different normative tilt. That
is, Carling pays greater attention to constraints instead of opportunities or
“offers.”
The concept of the ‘immigration interface’ is a step towards understand-
ing migration as a non-binary choice. This concept ‘zooms in’ on the in-
teraction between the individual would-be migrant – with a set of unique
characteristics and resources – and the set of migration options laid out by
the state. Although Carling concludes that most individuals do not have the
capability to decide where to live – that is, they are ‘involuntarily immobile’
– he develops a detailed framework that can help us systematically examine
individuals’ potential choices for migration.
Carling’s model also takes seriously the manner in which macro-level
structural conditions are processed as perceptions at the individual level.
People’s desire to emigrate, according to (Carling, 2002, p. 17), “is a result
of their own understanding of these problems rather than a straightforward
function of unemployment rates and precipitation figures.” However, the
concept of an ‘immigration interface’ draws the image of individuals choos-
ing from a clear inventory of legal and illegal options – most of which are
inaccessible. In reality,however, individuals continually learn about, assess
and reassess migration alternatives and adapt to changing conditions (Simon,
1972; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002), a point to which I will return later in the
chapter in the context of bounded rationality and adaptation (Section 2.2.1).
According to Giddens, this thoughtfulness and reflexivity is a key aspect of
agency (Beck et al., 1994).
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Because learning takes place through one’s own experiences as those of
family, friends and contacts, and because migration itself can change out-
comes for one’s relationships and broader community, theoretical concep-
tualisations of migrant agency and choice cannot be divorced from social
context, “migrants are not isolated individuals who react to market stimuli
and bureaucratic rules, but social beings who seek to achieve better outcomes
for themselves, their families and their communities by actively shaping the
migratory process” (Castles, 2004a, p. 860). In other words, we need to be
able to understand migration at the meso level: the level of social context.
Social network theory considers migrant agency and creativity in the form of
relationships that benefit the migration process.
Migrant networks are sets of interpersonal relationships between migrants,
non-migrants and former migrants spanning origin and destination areas. Ac-
cording to social network theory, aspiring migrants can derive several benefits
from connections to established immigrants, which can help them achieve
their migratory goals. The main expectations from social network theory
(SNT) are as follows. First, networks are cost-reducing. Ties abroad pro-
vide information and resources that mitigate the costs of the move. Upon
arrival, newcomers can draw upon social obligations to provide them with
access to lodging, food and employment. In the case of Mexico - U.S. migra-
tion, cross-border connections between origin and destination communities
are often institutionalised, for instance, through daughter communities in
the U.S. or sports clubs. These arrangements promote the frequent sharing
of news and information between migrants and non-migrants, and provide a
solid base for migration assistance (Massey et al., 1987).
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Second, social networks are risk-reducing. According to SNT, migra-
tion decisions can be undertaken at the level of the individual or household
(Massey et al., 1993). That is, households may send members abroad to di-
versify labour allocations or individuals may be driven to move by a desire to
seek opportunities abroad. Regardless of how the decision is arrived at, SNT
emphasises the importance of social relationships and obligations spanning
origin and destination. By helping new migrants access employment abroad,
networks make migration an attractive strategy to diversify household in-
come. Using data from a 2003 survey, Adams et al. (2005) find that money
transfers made by migrants working abroad accounted for 15 percent of per
capita household income in rural Mexico. According to Palloni et al. (2011)
“Having a tie to someone who has migrated yields social capital that people
can draw upon to gain access to an important kind of financial capital, that
is, high foreign wages, which offer the possibility of accumulating savings
abroad and sending remittances home” (p. 1264).
Third, migration is self-perpetuating and overshadows macro-level condi-
tions, including immigration policy. As people migrate, they become a source
for network benefits that future migrants can draw on. This induces further
migration which, in turn, reduces costs for a further set of people, increas-
ing their likelihood of migrating. According to SNT, networks will have a
larger effect on migration flows than wage differentials, employment rates or
immigration policy. Migration can remain an attractive option despite neg-
ative employment or policy conditions due to the falling risks and costs of
movement stemming from the growth of networks over time (Massey et al.,
1993). Massey and Alarco´n’s (1987) seminal study on the social process of
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migration from four Mexican communities to the United States finds that,
though international migration began through the macro-level dynamics of
supply and demand, it has become a mass phenomenon through its intrinsic
network dynamics.
However, the benefits brought about by social capital are not endless. So-
cial capital can also be or become exclusionary and networks must eventually
decline in strength and extent (King, 2012; Putnam, 2002). Several scholars
have pointed out that the same dynamics that further migration also lead to
its endogenous decline. Increased labour supply reduces wages and increases
competition for jobs. At this point, established migrants may become un-
willing to help newcomers, reducing the extent to which social capital can
be mobilised (Massey, 1990; Faist, 1997; Massey et al., 1994; De Haas, 2010;
Epstein, 2008).
The theory of cumulative causation2 can be considered an extension of
social network theory. It focuses on the dynamics of social network formation.
In an initial period, networks are considered to increase the incentives and
lower the costs of migration. Those who are relatively deprived begin to
migrate to take advantage of better opportunities abroad. Once a critical
mass of migrants has established itself at the destination, migration through
family reunification and other channels quickens, and social capital is spilled
over to others who may not be directly connected to the established migrants.
Aside from increasing the expected probability of attaining a higher wage
through migration, feedback can take the form of changing the distribution of
2the concept of cumulative causation was first coined by Myrdal (1958) and applied
to economic development.
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income through remittance sending, or the distribution of land, as a portion
of the labour force moves away (Massey and Espinosa, 1997; Faist, 1997;
De Haas, 2010).
Social network theory and the theory of cumulative causation do not aim
to explain how migration starts or why it might accumulate in one destination
and not another. Rather, these theories concern themselves with the perpetu-
ation of movement across an established spatial corridor. According to these
theories, migration displays path-dependency. This path-dependency mani-
fests itself spatially in the form of distinct spatial clusters. For example, we
can find concentrations of Turkish nationals in Germany, Moroccans in the
Netherlands, Italians in Argentina (Epstein, 2008). This clustering pattern
can be observed in even within countries. One example is the Indian dias-
pora in the United Kingdom, which is settled in identifiable areas of London,
Birmingham and Leicester (Somerville and Dhudwar, 2010).
Social network theory and the theory of cumulative causation emphasise
the internal self-reinforcing dynamics of migration at the detriment of policy
effects. Indeed, these theories assume governments will have difficulty con-
trolling migration because the cost and risk reducing effects of networks will
counter government policies. However, social network theories’ treatment of
policy effects is simplistic and relies on several questionable assumptions.
First, the claim that “the process of network formation lies largely outside
[government] control and occurs no matter what policy regime is pursued”
(Massey et al., 1993, p. 450) may be an oversimplification. Collyer’s analysis
of (2005) Algerian asylum-seeker migration to France, finds that strict immi-
gration controls increased the burdens on aspiring migrants’ social networks.
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Immigrant ties, then, began to avoid claims from aspiring migrants on their
assistance, leading this corridor to contract.
Second, if movement is path dependent and produces identifiable spa-
tial clusters despite government efforts to restrict movement into a particu-
lar destination, we might expect migration flows to be spatially static and
largely undocumented. However, spatial reorientation has been observed be-
tween countries (Collyer, 2005) and within countries (Ellis et al., 2014; Garc´ıa
et al., 2011; Bohn and Pugatch, 2015). This is an important affront to social
network theories because it questions one of its most important theoretical
predictions: if movement is path dependent and produces identifiable spa-
tial clusters despite government efforts to restrict movement into a particular
destination, how can spatial reorientation take place? I tackle this theoretical
puzzle explicitly in Chapter 9.
Third, the primary expectation of network theories is that migration
begets more migration. However, although the perpetuation of migration
is driven by positive feedback, network theories generally do not question
whether this information is an accurate reflection of the odds of successful
migration. Restrictive entry and enforcement policies in major destination
countries have made the odds of success relatively dire for most of the world’s
population (Carling, 2002). Is there, then, an implicit ‘positivity bias’ in this
theorised feedback process, and if so is the sender or the receiver to blame?
What role do migration failures play in decisions to migrate?
Fourth, although network literature emphasises the importance of previ-
ous migration experience when considering the likelihood of subsequent trips
(Massey, 1986; Piore, 1979), it is unclear about whether personal experiences
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have a larger or smaller influence than the experiences of friends or family
members. I expand on this and the aforementioned point in the context of
biases in decision-making later in this chapter. I also explore the possible
effect of cognitive biases on migration at the macro level in Chapter 8.
Fifth, as policies have a determinative effect on the overall volume of
legal migration admitted, the only way in which migration can persist despite
government restriction is through illegal means (Massey et al., 1998, p. 45).
The assumption that migration will remain, unchanged, despite the new
conditions under which it must take place is also simplistic. Even if social
networks can mitigate the risks and costs of illegal migration, individuals are
likely to face normative barriers when contemplating a migration alternative
that is outside the law (Ryo, 2013). This point is discussed further in the
context of compliance and decision-making later in the chapter.
Sixth, these theories do not pay sufficient attention to the role of net-
works in transmitting information that can help potential migrants learn
about and navigate the ‘immigration interface.’ Individuals do not have per-
fect knowledge about immigration rules, which are obscure and labyrinthine
(Fazito and Soares, 2013; Wilson, 2007). Due to the complexity of legal im-
migration rules and requirements as well as unauthorised migration practices
(Spener, 2009), individuals must rely on information from social contacts to
learn about the immigration environment and how to navigate it (Massey
and Zenteno, 1999). Integrating this process in our understanding of social
network effects is crucial because of the wide-ranging implications it entails:
Migrant networks not only facilitate further migration, as social network the-
ories prescribe; they also play a role in modulating migration flows pertaining
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to legal and illegal migrant categories by propagating information on policies
established at the macro level; an effect that is clearly visible in the examples
on Central American child migrants and the European refugee crisis detailed
at the beginning of this chapter. Understanding the mechanisms by which
individuals acquire and act on policy information requires that we examine
psychological theories of decision-making.
2.2 Theories of Decision-Making
In this section, I expand beyond migration theory to examine theories of
decision-making. First, I examine theories of bounded rationality, which can
help us understand unauthorised migration as an adaptive process. I, then,
examine theories on biases in decision-making that may explain migration
despite substantial policy-induced risks. Bias in decision-making may be
considered under the umbrella of bounded rationality (Gigerenzer and Selten,
2002). However, I consider the two separately because biases may result in
maladaptive behaviour – that is, behaviour that runs counter to what is best
for individuals’ self interest – by distorting the actual situations individuals
face.
2.2.1 Boundedly Rational Learning and Adaptation
Bounded rationality can be best described in contrast with the traditional
approach to rationality which conceives of the individual as an expected
utility maximiser. In the latter perspective, individuals’ decision-making
process is simple and consists of maximising a goal value (i.e. getting the job
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with the best salary) and the probability of succeeding in this goal. However,
it hinges on several unrealistic assumptions. It assumes that (1) individuals
possess all the information available to make a decision and (2) are able to
process this information without incurring any costs (Bala´zˇ et al., 2014). It
also considers (3) behaviour to be always optimising (Selten, 1998), that (4)
individuals are able to perfectly assess the value of an attribute or goal and
the probability of successfully attaining it and (5) that the subjective weight
attached to some probability of succeeding is equal to the objective value (i.e.
decision makers value a 50% chance of winning as a 50% chance of winning)
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Bounded rationality is an affront to all these assumptions. Herbert A.
Simon’s (2000, p. 25) intentionally long-winded description of bounded ratio-
nality betrays the complexity of decision-making and how Expected Utility
Theory cannot describe the real world:
Bounded rationality is simply the idea that the choices people
make are determined not only by some consistent overall goal and
the properties of the external world, but also by the knowledge that
decision makers do and don’t have of the world, their ability or
inability to evoke that knowledge when it is relevant, to work out
the consequences of their actions, to conjure up possible courses
of action, to cope with uncertainty (including uncertainty deriv-
ing from the possible responses of other actors), and to adjudicate
among their many competing wants. Rationality is bounded be-
cause these abilities are severely limited.
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The rich body of literature on bounded rationality has associated bounded
rationality with adaptation. This research examines how humans make in-
ferences about their environment under the constraints of time, knowledge
and cognitive capacities, and use this information to make decisions.
According to Gigerenzer and Selten (2002), individuals’ mind is an ‘adap-
tive toolbox’ containing a series of heuristics – or mental shortcuts – that are
specific both to the cognitive abilities of the individual and to the domain
of the problem she is trying to solve. This contrasts with Expected Utility
Theory’s depiction of the mind, where tools are generalisable to a range of
problems and have no limitations. Gigerenzer and Selten (2002, p. 43) liken
the boundedly rational mind to a “backwoods mechanic”:
The backwoods mechanic has no general-purpose tool nor are all
spare parts available to him. He must fiddle with various imperfect
and short-range tools, a process known as vicarious functioning
(Brunswik, 1955). He will have to try one thing, and if it does not
work, another one, and with step-by-step adjustments will produce
serviceable solutions to almost any problem with just the things at
hand.
Though domain specific, heuristics are composed of more general building
blocks, that guide the search for information. Specifically, these building
blocks guide search direction and when to stop searching to make a decision.
The search itself consists of two dimensions: the search for alternatives – or
the construction of a ‘choice set’ – and cues to evaluate the alternatives.
The aspiration adaptation theory of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957;
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Selten, 1999), for example, describes the search for alternatives as an iterative
process by which individuals seek new information to construct their choice
set, and update their expectations as they learn. Cognitive, emotional and
normative heuristics can help reduce the task of constructing the choice set
by restricting the range of options evaluated and focusing the individual’s
attention on specific aspects of the information at hand (Hanoch, 2002). In
the case of migration, for example, if an individual is normatively opposed to
unauthorised migration, she may focus on other modes of migration in her
search.
In aspiration adaptation theory, the stop criterion in the search process is
the point where the first decision alternative is found that is as good or better
than the aspiration level. The ‘cue’ is implicit in this comparison between the
decision alternative and the aspiration level (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002).
If the individual is unable to find a strategy that matches their aspiration
level, they may adjust their aspiration level and continue the search.
At the point of stopping the search, the individual is said to have ‘satis-
ficed’ – or has opted for a feasible but likely sub-optimal strategy. This stop-
ping rule is less computationally intensive than a rule such as ‘stop search
when costs outweigh the benefits’, which would require a more complex cal-
culation (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999). However, there are many different
stopping rules that may apply to a boundedly rational search processes. In
these rules, search is generally stopped as soon as the individual finds the first
cue favouring an alternative in their choice set (Gigerenzer and Goldstein,
1999).
Bounded rationality has several adaptive functions. First, when respond-
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ing to a changing environment, a search strategy that allows for quick deci-
sions is beneficial. The boundedly-rational search process is quick and com-
putationally cheap, allowing individuals to make fast decisions under time
constraints, even if the decision itself is not optimal. Second, it conceives of
individuals as flexible and creative and, therefore, adaptive. In the aspira-
tion adaptation model, lowering aspiration levels allows individuals to achieve
their goals despite objective constraints (Selten, 1998). The implications of
such a model for migration are clear. When forming a choice set, a potential
migrant might search for several visa options and, if unable to include these
in their choice set, they may adjust their aspiration levels and consider sub-
optimal strategies such as those that forgo the law. These strategies, though
not the first choice, may be feasible.
Third, heuristics are adaptive because they exploit the environmental
structure. According to Gigerenzer and Selten (2002), “the heuristics in the
adaptive toolbox just ‘bet’ on the environment on the basis of past experience
and a little probing, without attempting a complete analysis and subsequent
optimisation” (p. 41). The heuristic is considered accurate if it is able to “fit
with reality” (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999, p. 5). Experience and probing in
the learning process need not be first-hand. Following the logic of bounded
rationality, learning from others’ experiences can provide a short-cut and lead
to quicker decisions than attempting each strategy personally, particularly if
probing the environment is very time consuming (e.g. applying for a visa).
For example, migrants may collect information on others’ experiences instead
of or before attempting migration themselves, as suggested in social network
theories. This extension can build a connection between the psychological
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search process of bounded rationality and Bourdieu’s concept of habitus.
That is, that individuals are socialised into adopting certain practices which
create and recreate the set of actionable alternatives (which Gigerenzer and
Selten (2002); Simon (1957); Selten (1998) term ‘choice sets’). Fourth, simple
heuristics can also easily generalise to new problems, which is particularly
important when environments are changing (for example, immigration pol-
icy). A complex model with many parameters may fit a given reality much
better than a simple one, but if this model is fed new data, it may not
function as well. For example, management and decision-making literature
often uses the term “analysis paralysis” to describe a situation in which the
decision-maker embarks in a complicated decision process with multiple de-
cision alternatives and scenarios. This process increases the length of time
until a decision is made and hampers decision-makers’ ability to respond to
crises or other abrupt changes in the environment (Burke and Miller, 1999;
Bonn and Rundle-Thiele, 2007). Simple intuition, on the other hand, can be
used to take quick action without much need to learn about the specifics of
new changes in the environment.
Cognitive biases can also further migration by distorting the probabilities
associated with success and failure. In contrast to bounded rationality as
conceived by Gigerenzer, Selten and Simon, biases may lead to behaviour
that is not only suboptimal but contrary to individuals’ self interest, while
reducing the speed with which a feasible alternative is discovered.
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2.2.2 Biases in Migrant Decision-Making
There are a multitude of reasons why positive and negative signals about the
odds of successful legal migration might be weighted differently. The first
culprit may be the sender. Many studies have documented that migrants
abroad tend to send positive signals about their migration experience, in-
cluding the journey and quality of life in the host country, while keeping
negative experiences to themselves (Ryo, 2015; Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2009;
Reyes et al., 2002; Herna´ndez-Carretero, 2008). Using qualitative data on
Ghana, Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2009) demonstrate that return migrants tend
to elevate expectations about life abroad by flaunting their wealth or telling
stories about the ease of life abroad. This bias in information sharing is also
present when migrants speak of the risks involved in making an unautho-
rised, often dangerous, journey abroad. Reyes et al. (2002) found migrants
will generally relate mostly positive experiences. One of their respondents,
for example, said: “Nobody talks about the crossing, nobody. The people I
heard from always talked about the money, Disneyland . . . ooh, wonderful
things. Out of 10, maybe one tells the truth.” Herna´ndez-Carretero’s 2008
study on West African boat migration to the Spanish Canary Islands, found
that unauthorised migrants in destination countries often conceal negative
experiences “to maintain a successful image in front of family and friends
back home.” This bias in information sharing can lead potential migrants –
the receivers – to make decisions that go against their own best interest. As
Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2009) suggests, “the mingling of reality and aspira-
tion can become problematic for prospective migrants when it leads them to
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base their search for better life chances on what are, in fact, meta-narratives
of success” (p. 753).
In these accounts, geographical distance affords the possibility of hiding
information one would rather not share. However, it is not clear whether
these findings apply to the full spectrum of migration scenarios. For example,
to “maintain a successful image” (Herna´ndez-Carretero, 2008), individuals
may hesitate to admit they have been denied a visa. However, applying for
a visa is, often, a lengthy and burdensome process. It is, therefore, more
difficult to hide – at least from household members or other geographically
close ties. As such, distance can play a moderating role in the sharing of
information.
A wealth of psychological research on motivated reasoning examines the
biases resulting from the active acquisition and processing of information
from the perspective of the (future) decision-maker (extensive reviews can be
found in Baron (2008) and Hahn and Harris (2014)). This body of research
would suggest that individuals who aspire to migrate, will tend to weight
positive information about their chances of being able to do so more highly
than they would negative information.
Wason’s seminal 1960 paper on confirmation bias, “On the failure to elim-
inate hypotheses in a conceptual task” assigned experimental participants the
task of correctly inferring the rule underlying a set of numerical triplets (i.e.
2-4-6). To do so, participants gave the experimenter query-triplets, which
the experimenter then confirmed whether or not they conformed to the rule.
Wason found that a large proportion of participants sought to obtain positive
evidence that confirmed their current hypothesis for the rule, as opposed to
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evidence that would dis-confirm it.
Similarly Hagen-Zanker and Mallett’s (2016) study of recently arrived mi-
grants, refugees and asylum seekers in four European cities (Berlin, London,
Madrid and Manchester) found that migration trajectories were influenced
more by opportunities inherent in immigration policies, instead of their re-
strictive aspects: “those we interviewed seemed more influenced by migration
policies that made life a little easier (faster asylum-processing procedures are
just one example).” At least among the subset of the population that made
it to the destination, individuals consistently searched for information that
would further their migration goals at the expense of objectivity.
This sort of confirmation bias has also been observed relating to risks
induced by immigration enforcement measures. Herna´ndez-Carretero (2008)
documents the existence of “tunnel vision” among West African aspiring
migrants, whereby information that would go against the hypothesis that
migration is possible, is ignored and discarded. Instead, individuals sought
positive information from their migrant ties.
Maintaining this kind of ‘tunnel vision’ about the realities of pirogue
migration might be a way to protect oneself from having to rec-
oncile the wish to emigrate with the awareness of serious dangers
on the chosen route... Sometimes, people who are considering the
pirogue journey simply do not enquire about the conditions of the
journey to others who have already attempted it (p. 52).
Individuals may also exhibit bias in the processing of information by over-
weighting positive instances and discrediting negative feedback on the odds
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of success. This type of bias has been termed “wishful thinking” or “unrealis-
tic optimism” (Hastie, 2001). Several studies document that in judgments of
health and medical risks, medical professionals tend to be unrealistically opti-
mistic (Taylor and Brown, 1988; Weinstein, 1980). Similarly, Gilovich (1983)
found that gamblers evaluate their losses differently from their gains. Suc-
cessful outcomes are often considered a reflection of gambling skill, whereas
losses are dismissed or discounted. This manner of processing information
may result in the perception that one has better odds of succeeding in an
enterprise by having skills or certain other qualities another individual does
not. In the case of migration, the odds of migrating legally to many ma-
jor destinations is, in fact, dependent on demographics, social ties or other
personal characteristics. As such, a perception that the odds are in one’s
favour can be reinforced by immigration systems that categorise and select
applicants based on personal characteristics. Some aspiring migrants may
also perceive themselves to be more capable of adopting a given illegal strat-
egy, despite the risks involved. For example, in Herna´ndez-Carretero (2008),
fishermen considered themselves more capable of taking pirogues due to their
experience navigating.
My second question – whether one weights personal opinions higher than
those of others – cannot be divorced from the content of that information. A
person that seeks confirmatory information, for example, may discard infor-
mation that does not fit this criteria, regardless of its provenance. However,
research on egocentric discounting (Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000), has found
that the source of information (i.e. ones own experience or others’) has an
influence in and of itself. This research has found that individuals often
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discount advice from others in favour of one’s personal opinions. It is com-
monly accepted that the psychological weight associated with a hypothesis
or an estimate is correlated with the amount of support that the individual
can access for that hypothesis or estimate (e.g., Tversky and Koehler, 1994).
Advisees will generally not have access to the basis for the advisers opinions,
while they, of course, have access to their own rationale, leading them to
weight the latter more heavily. As such, all things being equal, we should
expect aspiring migrants to discredit others’ assessment of the immigration
policy environment in favour of their own. This bias may actually reduce the
speed with which a feasible alternative is found. If individuals objectively
accumulate knowledge from their networks (given that the information itself
is objective), they are more likely to find a feasible alternative without having
to try each alternative themselves through trial and error.
However, every social tie is different and may carry a different weight.
Individuals’ ‘weighting policy’, Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000) suggest, may
also be mediated by the advisees’ impressions and perceived reputation of the
advisor. Potential migrants might perceive some sources, such as experienced
migrants or smugglers, to be more knowledgeable than others (Fazito and
Soares, 2013; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sorensen, 2013b). On the other hand,
they may distrust the source or suspect they have an ulterior motive. For
example, one of Herna´ndez-Carretero’s respondents, Ibrahim (25), explained
his reaction to those who tell him that pirogue migration is not worth the
risks: “... The way I see it, you are sabotaging me. That’s what it is” (p.
52).
Throughout this chapter, I have treated all migration strategies simply
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as alternatives and have depicted unauthorised migration as simply a sub-
optimal strategy (in the context of bounded rationality) or a special instance
of migration (in the context of functionalist theories of migration). However
migrating illegally is not one alternative, it is a grouping of various alterna-
tives that vary in terms of legal compliance, normative acceptability – as well
as in terms of risks and costs. This variation in strategies within unautho-
rised migration is the result of reflexivity and problem-solving and, therefore,
reflects aspiring migrants’ agency. The next section examines the spectrum
of illegality in migration from a theoretical perspective.
2.3 Degrees and Motivations of Non-compliance
in Unauthorised Migration
If migrants make decisions through rational calculation, then increasing the
costs of non-compliance should reduce unauthorized migration (Cornelius
and Rosenblum, 2005; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987). In the context of law-
breaking, this is commonly referred to as the deterrence model. However,
there is another aspect to compliance, and that is norms. Rational and nor-
mative deterrents complement each other. Levi’s (1989) seminal study of
compliance develops the term ‘quasi-voluntary compliance’ to describe the
interplay of norms and enforcement in driving adherence to rules.
Norms can take a variety of shapes. They can be “customs, conven-
tions, conceptions of right and wrong, notions of propriety, and regularities
of behaviour” (Young, 2015, p. 361). According to Gibbs (1965, p. 589), a
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definition of norms that encompasses the various types includes the following
three elements:
(1) a collective evaluation of behaviour in terms of what it ought
to be; (2) a collective expectation as to what behaviour will be;
and/or (3) particular reactions to behaviour, including attempts
to apply sanctions or otherwise induce a particular kind of con-
duct.
That is, norms may define the practices that should be carried out or the
ones that are typically carried out, and they are shaped by social context.
Additionally, the violation of norms may (or may not) be accompanied by
some type of punishment. Mackie et al. (2015) further define the catchment
of social influence as a local reference group. That is, norms may exist within
a very narrow social context – they are not necessarily widely held. This is
important because it permits the existence of norms, bounded in specific
social circles, that are atypical or extreme when considered at an aggregate
level. This is further discussed in Chapter 6.
While several scholars have examined the effects of rational deterrence
in unauthorised migration (e.g. Todaro and Maruszko, 1987; Donato et al.,
1992; Espenshade, 1994; Durand et al., 1999; Massey et al., 2016a), com-
paratively few scholars have examined the role of normative deterrents (e.g.
Ryo, 2013, 2015). Ryo’s research on unauthorised migrants focuses specifi-
cally on two dimensions of norms, personal morality and legitimacy (Tyler,
2006). Personal morality refers to behaviours an individual perceives to be
right and wrong. While morality and legality often intersect, there are laws
104
to prohibit behaviour that many would not consider immoral (Robinson and
Darley, 1995). There are also many moral issues that are not protected
by law (Krisch, 2002). Relatedly, legitimacy is associated with procedural
justice or fairness. Authorities applying laws equally and transparently, for
example, are perceived to be more legitimate and, consequently, yield greater
legal compliance (Paternoster et al., 1997; Hoffmann, 2005).
Unauthorised migration means breaking the law. Therefore it is highly
plausible that normative barriers play a role alongside any cost-benefit cal-
culations, as suggested in the above theory. Omitting this layer from our
understanding of migration decisions may lead to erroneous expectations on
the levels and types of unauthorised migration (I expand on this point fur-
ther in Chapter 6). In other words, the interplay between normative and
rational considerations has two implications. First, norms can be an addi-
tional barrier to migrating illegally despite prevailing risks. Second, norms
and risks jointly define the range of different strategies that exist under the
legal umbrella of unauthorised migration as well as their prevalence.
2.3.1 Full and Semi-Noncompliance
Within the domain of unauthorised migration, individuals have developed a
range of different migration practices, varying in terms of the degree to which
aspiring migrants engage, negotiate with, and reject political institutions and
laws. Within the actions considered to be illegal in receiving states, indi-
viduals perceive some actions to be more illegal than others (Engbersen and
Van der Leun, 2001). According to Ruhs and Anderson (2010), unauthorised
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migrants working in the UK believed they were “less deportable than oth-
ers” and considered their status as existing within a scale of illegality. For
example, even though working on a non-employment visa means breaking
the law, individuals believed it was less risky to do so for some types of non-
employment visa than for others. Individuals who had, what they perceived
to be a ‘lower-risk’ visa thought of themselves as having greater security of
status than other unauthorised migrants committing a very similar crime.
Unauthorised migration may not be the result of a deliberate decision:
some immigrants may fall out of status due to carelessness, lack of under-
standing, or administrative deficiency (Cornelius, 2004; Du¨vell, 2011). How-
ever, some individuals perceive immigration policy as an opportunity struc-
ture and actively engage with it (Castles, 2004b, p. 860) and others yet may,
deliberately, make no attempts to comply with immigration law. Ruhs and
Anderson’s study (2010) features individuals who commit very slight viola-
tions, such as students in the UK who work more than the hours allowed by
their visas and a young woman who is permitted to work as an au pair but
then takes a cleaning job on the side. These examples contrast with a case in
which a Dominican couple married each other’s siblings to bring them to the
United States, an action termed matrimonio de favor (Garrison and Weiss,
1979), and a caseworker who bought a National Insurance Number in order
to work (Du¨vell, 2004).
As these examples illustrate, many irregular migrants exist within a state
of “legal ambivalence,” where their status consists of both regular and ir-
regular aspects (Du¨vell, 2011, p. 292). As such, migration scholars have
described two principal classes of legal non-compliance: semi-noncompliance
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and full non-compliance (Du¨vell, 2006; Ruhs, 2010; Gammeltoft-Hansen and
Sorensen, 2013a). Although classification varies, in ?, we defined fully non-
compliant strategies as those operating wholly outside of the law. Clandes-
tine border crossings and forged entry documents, for instance, forgo all legal
processes. Here, there is no attempt to engage with immigration law or for-
mal authorities. Semi-noncompliant strategies, on the other hand, comply
with some aspects of immigration law. For the most part, semi-legal migrants
apply for and receive a legal visa, but they violate its conditions. Such strate-
gies may consist of a wide range of permit violations including matrimonio
de favour, working on a temporary visa, or violating other work restrictions.
Regardless of their legal classification, migrants may perceive these strategies
as bending rather than breaking immigration law (Ruhs, 2010, p. 205).
The scale of illegality has implications on an individual’s normative and
rational perspective on a given migration strategy (Schuck, 2000; Ruhs,
2010). Extant evidence suggests that individuals consider semi-noncompliance
to be more acceptable than full non-compliance This is clearly shown in Gar-
rison and Weiss’s (1979) account of a Dominican family’s range of migra-
tion strategies. Most family members opposed full non-compliance. Two
members, Raul and Virginia, migrated by overstaying their tourist visas – a
strategy the family believed to be within the “range of acceptability.” On
the other hand, another family member, Luz, entered the country with a pur-
chased passport and was considered to be strictly outside this range (Garrison
and Weiss, 1979, p.279).
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2.4 Theoretical Framework for this Thesis
The goal of this chapter was to critically review classical and actively evolving
theories and identify their application to the examination of immigration
policy effects. In this section I build on these theories to develop an agent-
focused theoretical framework to examine the effects of immigration policy,
which will form the backdrop of my thesis. An agency-centered perspective
is necessary to understanding migration behaviour under policy constraints.
This is because, in order to act within these constraints, individuals must be
reflexive, creative and adaptive (Giddens, 1984; Simon, 1972; Gigerenzer and
Selten, 2002). This framework will be based on the following premises:
1. Migration is a non-binary outcome. States define these migration chan-
nels and place barriers and conditions upon them, with the purpose of
categorising and selecting ‘wanted’ from ‘unwanted’ migrants and also
has implications in the realm of unauthorised migration. Individuals
may migrate through a series of legal channels – family reunification,
or political asylum, for example – or, as described in Section 2.3, they
may migrate through a series of channels consisting of legal and illegal
components, i.e. illegal and semi-legal migration (Ruhs, 2010; Du¨vell,
2006). This legal categorisation is not merely a set of labels. It creates
very real differences in the conditions of migration – namely, in the
degree of security a migrant can expect (Todaro and Maruszko, 1987).
The decision to migrate should, therefore, not be divorced from its legal
context.
2. The effects of policy are heterogeneous. The legal categorisation of mi-
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gration gives different individuals different options for migration. As
policy barriers are based on factors associated with demographics, mon-
etary resources and social networks, policies have uneven effects on het-
erogeneous populations (Carling, 2002; Borjas, 1989a). As discussed in
Section 2.1.2, by valuing migrants with particular sets of characteris-
tics, immigration policy affects the amount and relative importance of
different types of capital needed for migration.
3. Inequalities between aspiration and perceived ability can drive unau-
thorised migration. (a) Individuals may consider migrating through
unauthorised channels if policy constraints render them involuntarily
immobile. (b) A high aspiration to migrate and a low ability to do so
legally can generate involuntary immobility: those who wish to migrate
but are unable to do so legally (Carling, 2002). Individuals will not con-
sider unauthorised strategies if they, instead, abandon their migration
plans in the face of limited capabilities.
4. Potential migrants’ agency under policy constraints lies in their reflex-
ivity. The neoclassical model assumes migration ceases when policy-
induced costs outweigh benefits (Castles, 2004a, p. 858). Network
theorists have made the similarly deterministic assumption that policy
restrictions will necessarily divert potential migrants towards illegal
channels (Massey et al., 1998, p. 45). However, a migrant’s agency
lies in their ability to evaluate and choose across the set of options
available – legal or not – such that their action could potentially have
been different than it was in a given case (Cohen, 1989, p. 152). In
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other words, they do not respond to immigration policies in the way
these policies intend them to. Individuals also possess beliefs of what
is right, wrong and normal among a local reference group, which may
be not be correlated with the current law (Mackie et al., 2015), as dis-
cussed in Section 2.3. The macro-level implication of this premise is
that, while bureaucracies may design policies with the intention of cat-
egorising and regulating migrant admission and residence, these rules
will not perfectly determine aggregate behaviour (Castles, 2004a).
5. Individuals’ understanding of policy is limited. Individuals vary in their
awareness of legal constraints and will develop different perceptions of
opportunities depending on their social context (Bourdieu, 1977). In-
dividuals learn by probing their environment using simple heuristics
and will tend to simplify their decision as much as possible through,
for example, by accessing norms or emotions (Simon, 1972; Gigerenzer
and Selten, 2002). Individuals’ need not learn only through their own
experiences, however, they can also learn from their social networks
(Massey and Zenteno, 1999). Individuals also receive information that
may be biased (Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2009; Ryo, 2015) and process in-
formation in such a way that confirms their pre-existing views (Wason,
1960). It may also be weighted differently depending on whether the
learning experience is personal or second-hand (Yaniv and Kleinberger,
2000). The subject of bias in decision-making is tackled explicitly in
Chapter 8.
6. Potential migrants adapt to policy environments. Adaptation is a strate-
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gic adjustment to conditions that are negatively affecting well-being
According to De Haas (2011), restrictive policies may reorient flows
to different categories or countries; create time-clusters in migration
before policy change; or turn once temporary migrations into perma-
nent ones. These macro-level ‘substitution effects’ are the result of the
boundedly-rational learning and adaptation processes taking place at
the micro and meso levels described above. Immigration policies are
often described as having ‘unintended consequences’ or ‘externalities’
with illegal migration being a prominent example (e.g. Hansen and
Papademetriou, 2014). This is due to a poor theoretical understanding
of migrant agency under policy constraints. If we conceptualise po-
tential migrants as adaptive, we expand our expectations of possible
immigration policy effects. Reorientation, then, becomes an expected
consequence of policy change. It is important to note that a necessary
and sufficient condition for adaptation to immigration policy restriction
is the presence of opportunities – however small they may be. In the
real world, it is unlikely that an immigration system, however draco-
nian its entry and enforcement policies, will be devoid of opportunities
for migration. These opportunities can be deliberate or due to faults or
lack of resources in the implementation process (Hollifield et al., 2014).
7. Migration is a multi-level process. Migration theories have, as of yet,
failed to integrate processes occurring at multiple levels of aggregation
(Brettell and Hollifield, 2000; Massey et al., 1998; Castles, 2010; Haug,
2008).3 Theoretical integration is important to developing an agency-
3The neoclassical model operates on a micro and macro scale, but omits the meso level
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centred approach to the study of immigration policy. First, given the
level of government interference in global movement, individual deci-
sions to migrate cannot be divorced from their macro-level context. As
mentioned in point 1, policies define the modes and conditions of mi-
gration. Without legal classification, illegal migration would not exist.
Second, the effects of policy at the meso-level are significant, yet have
scarcely been theorised (De Haas, 2010, p. 1610-1612). Aside from the
effects already described, policy restrictions affect the size, legal com-
position and geographical distribution of the diaspora abroad, limiting
their ability to aid and stimulate further migration. This effect has, to
my knowledge, not been explored theoretically, but emerges inductively
from the agent-based model presented in Chapter 9.
Building such a multi-level theory of migration and immigration policy,
which follows the above premises is facilitated by the use of agent-based mod-
els. Agent-based modelling requires us to dig through a wide repertoire of
theoretical concepts, find ways to measure those which have been left vague,
attempt to straighten out logical inconsistencies, and piece the concepts to-
gether, allowing them to guide different parts of the model (Johnson and
Groff, 2014).
In the process of constructing the agent-based model of unauthorised
migration, several empirical questions were raised relating to the premises
above. These three questions were mentioned in Section 2.1.2 and are sum-
marised in Table 2.1. First, while the capabilities approach to migration
maintains that immigration policies lower individuals’ perceived ability to mi-
connecting the two: social context (Haug, 2008; Faist, 1997).
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grate, it is unclear whether they lower aspiration to migrate as well (Question
1). This is important because a gap between aspiration and ability to mi-
grate may drive individuals to consider unauthorised migration (Question 2).
Lastly, although premise 5 describes the experiential nature of learning from
a decision-theoretic perspective (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002), there is little
theoretical or empirical guidance as to how failures affect future attempts
from a migration perspective (Question 3). These questions are examined
using novel experimental and non-experimental items from the Migration
Decisions and Policy (MDP) survey to inform the design of the agent based
model of unauthorised migration presented in Chapter 7.
Table 2.1: Theoretical Questions for Modelling Choices and Reference Chap-
ter
Process Relevant Literature Source
Data
Examined
Chapter
or also aspiration?
perceived ability only?
Does policy decrease
Carling (2002)
Faist (1997)
Massey et al. (1998)
Lee (1966)
Survey data.
experiment,
Policy
Chapter 5
strategies?
support for illegal
ability gap drive
Does the aspiration/
De Haas(2013)
Czaika and
Castles (2004b)
Survey data
experiments,
List
Chapter 6
ability to migrate?
migrate decrease perceived
Do past failures to
increase perceived ability?
migration of networks
migration and successful
Does successful past
Zenteno(1999)
Massey and
Mallett (2016)
Hagen-Zanker and
Pinkerton (2002)
Koser and
Massey et al. (1993)
Boyd (1989)
Leblang et al. (2009)
Survey data Chapter 5
Chapter 9 of this thesis presents an agent-based model which examines
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another type of adaptation to policy restriction: spatial reorientation. This
agent-based model, like the ABM of unauthorised migration, was also mo-
tivated by a theoretical puzzle. As mentioned in Section 2.1.2, migration
forms spatial clusters of individuals from a given origin country in a certain
destination. This is a highly salient feature of both domestic and interna-
tional migration. The existence of social networks as an important driver in
the perpetuation of migration corridors have emerged as the most recognised
theoretical explanation for this pattern (Epstein, 2008). Social network the-
ories suggest that migration – driven by risk and cost reducing social capital
embedded in social networks – is path-dependent and will persist despite pol-
icy restrictions. This means that destinations with a large diaspora of a given
origin will continue to attract more migrants from the same origin, regard-
less of policy conditions. This expectation precludes the idea that aspiring
migrants may choose an alternative destination when movement into that
destination is restricted. However, spatial reorientation has been observed
to take place both across and within destinations (Collyer, 2005; Ellis et al.,
2014). This is an outstanding empirical question, which I address in Chapter
8. In this chapter, I formalise the mechanisms underlying social network the-
ory and explore whether this theory could, under certain conditions, predict
the spatial reorientation of migration despite the seemingly contradictory
expectation that spatial corridors are stable and robust. This theoretical ex-
ploration sets the stage for future work integrating various forms of migrant
response to immigration policy.
In the next chapters, I describe the state of the art in agent-based mod-
elling of migration and how empirics are used to specify and calibrate model
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processes. I also describe the MDP survey in its entirety. Chapters 3 and 4
serve as a backdrop to the analyses considered in Table 2.1.
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Chapter 3
Use of Empirics in Agent-Based
Models of Migration
Agent-based models are often thought of as artificial laboratories where hy-
potheses are formulated rather than tested. As such, ABMs and their find-
ings are often pidgeonholed in the realm of the artificial; proofs of concept
with little substantive impact outside the modelling community. As Boero
and Squazzoni (2005) suggest, “ABMs are often conceived as a kind of self-
referential autonomous method of doing science, a new promise, something
completely different” (par. 1.2).
In recent years, modellers have increasingly incorporated empirical data in
an effort to explain or predict processes occurring in the real world (Hassan
et al., 2010). The synergy between agent-based modelling and empirical
methods is vast and, as of yet, insufficiently explored. ABM is a flexible
method, which can integrate information from many types of qualitative or
quantitative instruments (Tubaro and Casilli, 2010; Duffy, 2006; Janssen and
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Ostrom, 2006). However, ABMs are something completely different, and this
remains true regardless of whether or not we use data.
Agent-based modelling seeks to explain observed aspects of the real world
or predict future scenarios by generating the hypothesised underlying mech-
anisms (Epstein, 1999). This means that results are produced by the model,
rather than ‘found’ in the real world. In a strict sense, ABM outcomes are
the result of explicitly defined processes in the source code (Waldherr and
Wijermans, 2013, par. 3.10). This is the case regardless of the amount of in-
teractions or stochasticity the model includes. Morton et al. (2010) contrasts
computational models such as ABM to empirical research, which extracts
“‘real’ decisions and choices [that] are independent of the researcher” (Mor-
ton et al., 2010, p. 55). This quote hints at an important point of scrutiny
that arises from the distinction between ABM and empirical research and,
likely, contributes to its isolation: computational models are often conceived
as “extensions of the researcher’s brain” (Morton et al., 2010, p. 55) and,
therefore, their results are considered to be dependent on the choices of that
researcher.
Admittedly, all scholars, regardless of their method, make choices when
constructing a model. Empirical researchers cannot be certain that the rela-
tionships they posit are true explanations for the results obtained. The iden-
tification of causal relationships, for example, is an important point of con-
tention when evaluating any quantitative model. However, empirical results
are obtained directly from real observations. That is, empirical researchers
identify relationships in real-world data, which are open to interpretation by
other researchers who may, in turn, offer alternative models to explain obser-
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vational findings. Because results from agent-based models are generated by
the model itself, they are not open to alternative interpretations.1 Further-
more, many different models can generate similar results and it is difficult to
know for certain whether the model we are testing is the correct one (Axtell
and Epstein, 1994). Understandably, this places a greater burden on mod-
ellers to justify the choices they make and hampers their efforts to break out
of the ABM niche.
The relatively new practice of using empirical evidence to construct and
evaluate the quality of a model should increase confidence amongst the aca-
demic community that an artificial model can resemble real world data gen-
erating processes (Windrum et al., 2007; Berk, 2008). Modellers have devel-
oped new and exciting ways to combine computational and empirical meth-
ods (Janssen and Ostrom, 2006). However, these efforts at greater data
embeddedness have not yet translated ABM findings into broadly citeable
evidence. I argue that as migration models – like other areas of study – be-
come more data-driven, we need to return to the question of whether data-
driven ABMs are appropriately addressing concerns about arbitrariness and
researcher judgement in model construction and evaluation. If so, are they
conveying this in their articles? If we want to break out of our self-referential
loop; we need to communicate with academics using different techniques, and
this requires effectively targetting their concerns about our unique method.2
1To be clear, I do not mean that the models themselves cannot be evaluated by other
researchers. Here, I am referring specifically to ABM results.
2Modellers often address concerns about results being driven by the researcher by
citing the model’s ‘emergent behaviour’ (Waldherr and Wijermans, 2013). That is, that
interactions in the model generate output that the modeller does not expect (Railsback
and Grimm, 2011). Model emergence helps us make a statement about the added value
of an ABM approach over empirical research but it does not address concerns that model
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In this chapter, I aim to review the nascent literature using data-driven
agent-based modelling to predict or explain migration processes occurring in
the real world. This is done in an effort to understand the ways in which
migration modellers use and incorporate data into their models, and what
lessons may be learned for researchers who wish to broaden their contribu-
tion. The present chapter does not consider the extensive benefits of using
agent-based modelling in research; these are considered in the introductory
chapter of this thesis. Instead, it focuses exclusively on improving empiri-
cal embeddedness practices in agent-based models of migration. Drawing on
some of the findings of this review, I, then, propose a ‘proactive approach
to empirical embeddedness’ for researchers collecting primary data for their
ABMs. The ‘proactive’ approach relies on the co-evolution of empirical and
ABM designs to generate data collection strategies that pre-empt specific
challenges in empirical embeddedness before going into the field. This ap-
proach guided the manner in which data was collected and used in the agent-
based model of unauthorised migration presented in Chapter 7.
Modellers can use data in three main processes: model calibration, vali-
dation and specification. In this chapter, I consider all three processes. As
mentioned in Chapter 1, model calibration is the use of numerical evidence
to set the features of a model component. Modellers may, for instance, set
agent characteristics such as age or aspiration to migrate, by inputting val-
ues from a survey dataset. They may also employ data more sparingly by
rules may be based on ungrounded assumptions and, therefore, not reflect real-world
mechanisms. It is also worth noting that individuals unfamiliar with complexity may not
be able to appreciate the value of ‘emergent behaviour’ and may find it to be purely a
curiosity.
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using stylised distributions (e.g. a normal or exponential distribution), with
measures of centrality and dispersion derived from empirical data to assign
numerical values to model characteristics (Gilbert, 2008). Empirical valida-
tion is the qualitative or quantitative comparison of computational outputs
with empirical patterns (i.e. migration stocks or flows over time) to assess
whether the model is sufficient to explain a particular natural process. The
highest standard for validation is that the model is able to reproduce multiple
empirical patterns and that this comparison be assessed with some goodness-
of-fit statistic (Axtell and Epstein, 1994). Using a validation dataset that is
independent of the input dataset is an even tougher test. However, an overall
comparison of model outcomes with empirical patterns on its own may not be
enough to make a convincing case for the model architecture as a whole, as
many different sets of agent rules can produce the same output at the macro
level. In other words, “mapping from micro-rules to macro- structures may
be many-to-one” (Axtell and Epstein, 1994, p. 28). Evidence-based model
specification can allow us to substantiate individual rules. Model specifica-
tion refers to the selection of appropriate model components (e.g. types of
agents, micro decision processes) and the relationship between them. This
aspect is often guided by theory. However, modellers have used a wide range
of quantitative and qualitative data sources (first- or second-hand) to obtain
evidence that certain relationships are present in their selected case. Follow-
ing Boero and Squazzoni (2005, par. 2.6), “to empirically specify the model
components it means to use empirical evidences to choose the appropriate
model components.”
Assisted, in part, by the corpus of literature identified in Klabunde and
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Willekens’s (2016) review of decision-making models in migration ABMs, I
identify agent-based models that are either primarily about migration or,
at least, include a migration routine in a suite of behaviours. This pro-
vides me with an initial set of 29 studies (two more than those identified in
Klabunde and Willekens, 2016). Out of the 27 models captured in Klabunde
and Willekens (2016), only 5 are not published in peer reviewed journals or
in books. Because fully developing an ABM is a lengthy process and can
involve various iterations (Railsback and Grimm, 2011), models published as
working papers may not be fully specified or tested and reviewing them may
lead to premature conclusions about authors’ use of empirics. I, therefore, I
omit these models.3
In line with the aim of this chapter, I restrict my review to agent-based
models which aim to produce evidence about the real world. As a search
indicator, I select all models which use data as inputs, even if some param-
eters are left uncalibrated or ‘free.’ Some migration ABMs use sensitivity
analyses to explore possible values for all parameters and may find suitable
ranges for these parameters by comparing model outputs to empirical pat-
terns. These models are not falsifiable using standard validation techniques
because data is used to set model parameters, not to test the outcomes of the
model. As such, these models may be extremely valuable for building theory
and asking novel research questions (e.g. Biondo et al., 2013; Garc´ıa-Dı´az
and Moreno-Monroy, 2012; Ichinose et al., 2013) but do not aim to produce
evidence about the real world and, therefore, are not within the remit of this
3I also exclude one study, Massey and Zenteno (1999), which is not strictly an agent-
based model.
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chapter.
Little more than half of all studies captured in Klabunde and Willekens
(2016) use empirical data to directly calibrate the model.4 This leaves me
with a set of 12 models, published between 2003 and 2017. It is important
to note that not all empirically calibrated models seek to explain or predict
something about the real world: The model presented in Chapter 9 of this
thesis is an abstract, theoretical model, where calibration serves purely as a
way to anchor parameters and minimise modeller discretion. However, I did
not find any models that could be considered abstract within the empirically-
calibrated sample – in fact, they are all context-driven facsimile models with
a heavy use of data (Gilbert, 2008).
An overwhelming majority of the final subset of models primarily deal
with climate change-induced migration. Only one model (Suleimenova et al.,
2017) examines conflict-driven migration and only one model examines labour
migration absent of climate drivers (Heiland, 2003). Out of 12 models, 6 ex-
amine migration as part of a set of additional behaviours resulting from
adaptation to a changing environment (Naivinit et al., 2010; Berman et al.,
2004; Mena et al., 2011; Smajgl and Bohensky, 2013; Naqvi and Rehm, 2014).
In my review, I focus specifically on aspects of empirical embeddedness that
relate directly to migration decision-making. All models included in the sam-
ple are based on a specific case, ranging from a country (Hassani-Mahmooei
and Parris, 2012) to a region within a country (e.g. Naivinit et al., 2010; En-
twisle et al., 2016; Walsh et al., 2013). Only one article studies and simulates
4Out of the 12 models that do not use data as inputs, 5 use sensitivity tests to derive
parameter values.
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cases in multiple countries (Suleimenova et al., 2017).
I find that one-third of the studies reviewed do not validate their mod-
els by comparing simulated to empirical outputs. Most of the ones that
do, do not examine more than one pattern, rarely use independent empiri-
cal datasets, and use only qualitative measures of comparison. This reflects
Janssen and Ostrom’s (2006) general evaluation, “although most models have
been inspired by observation of real biological and social systems, many of
them have not been rigorously tested using empirical data.” (p. 37). Fur-
thermore, for some models, authors are unable to calibrate the components
of their decision models with data that adequately reflects the migration de-
cision model used. Instead, many of the studies reviewed resort to simplified
migration decision processes that can be adequately calibrated with existing
demographic or socioeconomic surveys, but may be too simple to be realis-
tic. An example could be making migration a simple function of wealth (e.g.
Mena et al. (2011)). This indicates the existence of a possible trade-off be-
tween priorities: implementing a detailed psychological decision model and
the ability to calibrate it to the fullest extent. A simple decision model may,
of course, be adequate for the case studied, but it is difficult to tell in the lit-
erature reviewed. Some studies cite having accessed an extensive amount of
qualitative and quantitative evidence to substantiate decision rules prior to
model specification or re-specification. However, these studies are, generally,
not transparent about the evidence obtained – aside from its source – and
how it was translated into the rules eventually formalised. This is an impor-
tant omission because it places doubt on the model and, consequently, on the
generation of the data itself. Furthermore, it does not allow an independent
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or critical evaluation of the model.
In the following section I examine the use of data in ABMs of migration.
I, then, outline how a proactive approach to data embeddedness may mitigate
some of the issues identified. A proactive approach to empirical embedded-
ness aims to make empirical design, analysis and presentation an intrinsic
aspect of the initial stages of the modelling cycle, thereby anticipating the
data and empirical analysis that is best suited for specifying, calibrating and
validating the ABM.
3.1 The Use of Data in Models of Migration
The models reviewed in this chapter are of two types: case studies and par-
ticipative approaches such as role playing or companion modelling. In the
case-study approach, researchers may use tools such as ethnography or sur-
veys (Tubaro and Casilli, 2010), among many others to calibrate (if data
are numeric), specify or validate the model. In role-playing, the researcher
develops a game based on the research question at hand, with subjects main-
taining their real-life roles. From this game, researchers are able to see how
the population of interest behaves in different conditions and can use this in-
formation to design their model. Companion modelling involves many kinds
of interaction between the subjects and the model or modellers. For exam-
ple, it may involve workshops where the subjects (which are represented by
agents in the ABM) evaluate and provide feedback on the decision model
that researchers have designed. This information is then used to refine the
ABM architecture. Researchers may also combine any of these approaches
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to inform, calibrate or validate a model.
Only 2 out of 12 studies use companion modelling or role-playing. These
approaches may start off with a theory-driven model, but are distinguished
by their inductive nature, where the model is defined and redefined across
multiple cycles as researchers learn more about the system. That is, for
these models, specification and validation is often indistinguishable. Case-
study approaches may also be purely inductive, but theory often takes centre
stage in model specification.
3.1.1 Specification and Validation: Case Studies
It is important that modellers use empirical evidence to select model com-
ponents (specify the model), as well as to validate their model. Specification
lends evidence to individual rules, while validation tests whether the combi-
nation of rules forming the model architecture resemble the real-life aggregate
pattern the model aims to generate. In terms of model specification, we can
further subset the ABM case studies reviewed into three types: theory-led,
theory- and evidence-led, and purely evidence-led models. Out of the ten
models adopting a case study approach, seven use existing theory to specify
the migration decision.5 Most of the models that use theory for specification
draw on migration theory to specify their migration decision model – pri-
marily neoclassical and push-pull theories, but also social network theories
5Two studies, Kniveton et al. (2011) and Kniveton et al. (2012) examine the same
topic and use a the same or a very similar decision model (Klabunde and Willekens,
2016). Kniveton et al. (2012) was published as a letter to the journal Nature Climate
Change, while Kniveton et al. (2011) was published as an article in the journal Global
Environmental Change. Therefore it is unclear whether the two papers are based on the
same model. However, I am distinguishing them as two separate studies for the purpose
of this review.
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and the New Economics of Labour Migration – all of which are described in
Chapter 2 (Heiland, 2003; Naqvi and Rehm, 2014; Hassani-Mahmooei and
Parris, 2012; Entwisle et al., 2016).
Kniveton et al. (2011, 2012) use a general psychological model to guide
their migration decisions: the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985,
1991). In this theory, individuals’ attitudes towards a certain behaviour
(evaluations of the behaviour), their subjective norms (relevant others’ be-
liefs that he or she should or should not perform such behaviour) and their
perceived behavioural control (perceived ease of personally carrying out the
behaviour), all form an individual’s behavioural intentions and this, in turn,
leads to the behaviour itself. In Kniveton et al.’s application, variations in
climate are shown to influence five other drivers of migration through the in-
teraction of agents. For example, communicating about rainfall conditions,
a driver of emigration, can affect the later choices of another. Conceptually,
a ‘behavioural intention’ is first developed, composed of the individual’s atti-
tude towards a behaviour and a consideration of the opinion of a significant
other, as well as their capacity for adaptation (behavioural control). Hence,
changes in rainfall or a positive attitude towards migration do not entail dis-
placement; migration is a result of a complex combination of stressors and
the opportunities perceived. Smith (2014) is unique among the studies pre-
sented here, in that it develops a multi-level conceptual framework, which is
then formalised as the ABM architecture. In this study, changes in rainfall
affect a range of socio-economic conditions, in turn, affecting household vul-
nerability, which may or may not result in migration. At the individual level,
migration is driven by demographic characteristics: age, gender, migration
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experience and the social network, variables that are consistent with social
network theory.
Simply formalising a theory may not be sufficient to convince readers
that the model reflects the real underlying mechanism approximated by the
model. While the migration theories cited enjoy decades of accumulated evi-
dence, they both rival and complement each other. A single theory does not
explain migration across all migration corridors – in fact, evidence pointing
to more than one theory is often found to coexist within a single migra-
tion context (see, for example, Massey and Espinosa’s (1997) analysis of the
determinants of migration in Mexican communities, which finds support for
indicators corresponding to multiple migration theories). Psychological mod-
els have had limited application to migration (however, see Lu, 1998, 1999,
for applications of the theory of planned behaviour and Kley, 2011, for an
application of Gollwitzer’s 1990 Rubicon model, to residential mobility).
Modellers can show case-specific empirical evidence, or test more than
one alternative mechanism to substantiate the use of their theory. How-
ever, out of the six studies adopting a theoretical approach, only half do
(Heiland, 2003; Hassani-Mahmooei and Parris, 2012; Entwisle et al., 2016).
Heiland (2003) examines migration flows from five East German states to
West Germany from 1989 to 1998. Drawing on the human capital approach
in neoclassical theory (Sjaastad, 1962), agents act based on the incentives
provided by current and expected unemployment and income differentials
between German states, in addition to the cost of moving and job search.
The study is able to replicate migration patterns after the fall of the Berlin
wall quite closely. Heiland (2003) devotes a section of his chapter to provid-
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ing qualitative historical evidence of how the human capital approach applies
to the German case. Hassani-Mahmooei and Parris (2012) succinctly identify
how their model rules – which relate to push, pull and intervening factors in
migration, are substantiated by existing micro-level studies on Bangladesh.
Entwisle et al. (2016) adopts a unique approach among the studies presented
here. The aim is to test different pathways by which climate change may
affect migration. To do so, the authors formalise a range of theoretical
mechanisms, including push-pull theories, social network theories and the
New Economics of Labour Migration. Smith’s (2014) article on Tanzania is
couched on a local case study and logistic regression analyses used to identify
the variables that are significant predictors of migration in Tanzania.
The remaining theory-driven studies cite the wider applicability of the
theory but do not provide clear evidence of the applicability of the model
to their case. Kniveton et al. (2011, 2012) cite the relevance of the theory
of planned behaviour for a range of decisions, but does not cite literature
showing how it might apply to migration. The authors do conduct analyses
on data from Burkina Faso for the purposes of calibration. However, mea-
sures do not always match up nicely with the theory of planned behaviour’s
nuanced concepts (as I will discuss later). Naqvi and Rehm (2014) models
various responses to natural disasters, including migration in the Punjab, a
low income region in Pakistan that was hit by floods in 2010. They find that
migration to the cities following drought leads to a decline in urban incomes.
The study draws on neoclassical theory and the closely associated gravity or
push-pull model, which places a greater emphasis on geographical distance
(Greenwood, 1975). Specifically, workers’ decision to migrate depends on
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the joint probability distribution of income differentials and distance. The
authors do substantiate the rules and assumptions they make using exist-
ing literature. However, the authors are not clear whether citations refer
to micro-level studies of their region (many of them do not) and, relatedly,
whether they lend evidence to the applicability of push-pull theory to their
case.
Four of the articles using a case-study approach do not explicitly use
a migration or psychological theory to specify the components and relation-
ships of the migration decision (Berman et al., 2004; Walsh et al., 2013; Mena
et al., 2011; Suleimenova et al., 2017). To be clear, these studies use discrete
choice models, which are rooted in random utility theory, to establish how
choices are made. However, theory does not explicitly guide the aspects of
the decision that are to be included or excluded. Instead, these articles draw
on micro-level case studies to specify agent rules. Most of these studies are
not primarily about migration. Migration is simply one of many adaptive
behaviours, and migration decisions are highly simplified.
Berman et al. (2004) studies the case of arctic communities in the Cana-
dian territory of Yukon, which are adapting their livelihood strategies due to
distinct global forces. Climate change is affecting wildlife and fishing, which
indigenous communities have relied upon for subsistence, while government
retrenchment of the welfare system and changes in the tourism markets are
affecting the local cash economy. The model generates projections for eight
scenarios, where aspects of the cash and subsistence economy are altered.
Migration is one possible outcome, and will take place if no other local sub-
sistence strategy is possible. The model is constructed based on research data
130
and local knowledge from experts in the communities studied, however, it is
unclear what evidence informed this specification of the migration decision;
or whether the assumption that migration is the least valued of all possible
adaptive strategies is empirically founded.
Mena et al. (2011) simulates economic decisions of altering land use on
household farms in the Northern Ecuadorian Amazon (NEA). Migration oc-
curs simply if the farm has zero or negative assets. Although the study relies
on a longitudinal, socio-economic and demographic survey of colonist house-
holds conducted in 1990 and 1999, it is unclear how this data informed the
specification of the migration decision. Similarly, Walsh et al. (2013) use
a range of data sources collected over two decades of work to inform model
rules. Their migration decision may not be considered a decision at all, but a
probability based on demographic factors. The process of analysing empirical
data, however, helped identify the factors that significantly affect migration
and, therefore, which to include or exclude in the model. This strategy is
useful to specify a behaviour that may be too complex to model fully, partic-
ularly when this behaviour is of minor importance to the article. However,
it is unclear whether the researchers relied on existing theory to determine
which variables to include in the empirical model. Suleimenova et al. (2017),
the only study within this set that examines conflict-driven migration has
a more simplistic decision model than the previous three papers (a simple
probability set by the authors). This paper does not cite either theory or
empirical evidence in their decision model specification.
Out of the ten articles using a case-study approach, 40% did not use any
form of qualitative or quantitative measure to validate model outputs (Smith,
131
2014; Mena et al., 2011; Walsh et al., 2013; Entwisle et al., 2016). The ones
that do, do not offer statistical goodness-of-fit measures. These studies do
not compare model outputs to more than one empirical pattern and, except
for Berman et al. (2004) and Hassani-Mahmooei and Parris (2012), do not
use independent datasets for the purposes of comparison. However, some
studies compare outputs at multiple time-points to empirical panel data (e.g.
Heiland, 2003) – a higher threshold for precision.
3.1.2 Specification and Validation: Role-playing and
Companion Modelling
Naivinit et al. (2010) uses both role-playing and companion modelling to
continually specify and validate an evolving model. The research was carried
out over the span of four years. This study examines the adaptive behaviour
of rice farmers in lower Northeastern Thailand (Ban Mak Mai village, in
the south of Ubon Ratchathani province) when affected by harsh climactic
and soil conditions. The authors examine four adaptive behaviours: i) rice
nursery establishment, ii) rice transplanting, iii) rice harvesting, and iv) mi-
gration of household members. Their model specification was driven by their
careful and extensive qualitative research. In a series of field workshops, the
research team probed different components of their research question with
stakeholders – in this case, 22 farmers – using a site-specific, spatially-explicit
agent-based model.
According to the authors, the modelling process served both the modellers
and the stakeholders well. Continuous communication with the participat-
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ing farmers increased the model’s ability to represent their rice farming and
migration activities. At the same time, farmers were able to “strengthen
their adaptive management ability” (p. 1345). If so, this is a rare exam-
ple of academic research directly and immediately impacting the subjects of
their study, and demonstrates the use of agent-based modelling in economic
development activities. However, the lack of a clear, transparent metric
for validation (qualitative or quantitative) significantly affects its academic
contribution. The authors do not summarise the outcomes of companion
modelling and role-playing activities – their only source of validation. As
such, readers are forced to take the authors at their word.
Smajgl and Bohensky (2013) examines the effects of fuel price changes on
poverty, deforestation and migration to peri-urban areas in East Kalimantan,
Indonesia. The model finds that poverty increases in response to fuel price
reductions, but this does not trigger a change in migration. This study used a
variety of data collection strategies for model specification, following Smajgl
et al. (2011). These strategies followed a set sequence of six steps and served
different purposes. First, a survey elicited information on household charac-
teristics, which were processed in a cluster analysis in a second step. The
resulting household types were, then, presented to experts and stakehold-
ers for confirmation. Behavioural responses were elicited through in-depth
interviews asking about hypothetical scenarios, targetting households that
represented each of the types identified earlier. This was followed by another
‘validation’ workshop. The authors then used household-level census data
to determine the ratio of agent-types in the total agent population. Unlike
Naivinit et al. (2010), the authors did construct a metric based on the fi-
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nal discussion round with stakeholders, which was directly relevant to model
outcomes. However, it was conducted prior to model construction and was,
then, used to “specify and clarify agent rules” (p. 11). The authors did not
provide a separate test of model outcomes using an in- or out-of-sample data
source.
In summary, modellers use a range of quantitative and qualitative meth-
ods to specify different aspects of a model. However, the amount of descrip-
tion that authors provide regarding how these methods are translated into
model rules is inadequate; particularly given the importance of model specifi-
cation. One-third of the models presented do not use any form of qualitative
or quantitative validation. The ones that do, limit themselves to compar-
ing model outputs to only one empirical pattern and, generally, do not use
independent empirical datasets.
3.1.3 Calibration
These empirically-calibrated models showcase agent-based modelling’s flex-
ibility with data types, allowing modellers to depict multiple scales and
dimensions with the aim of achieving a “natural description of a system”
(Bonabeau, 2002, p. 7281). Studies use GIS data (e.g. Mena et al., 2011;
Suleimenova et al., 2017), measures of rainfall (e.g. Smith, 2014; Entwisle
et al., 2016), a range of aggregated data from governments and international
organisations (e.g. Naqvi and Rehm, 2014; Suleimenova et al., 2017; Hassani-
Mahmooei and Parris, 2012; Naivinit et al., 2010; Heiland, 2003), and even
satellite imagery (e.g. Walsh et al., 2013; Mena et al., 2011).
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Many scholars use data they have collected themselves in addition to
secondary data (Smajgl and Bohensky, 2013; Entwisle et al., 2016; Naivinit
et al., 2010; Berman et al., 2004; Walsh et al., 2013). It is unclear whether the
primary data was collected for constructing or validating their agent-based
model. Others make sole use of available data (Hassani-Mahmooei and Par-
ris, 2012; Heiland, 2003; Kniveton et al., 2011, 2012; Smith, 2014; Suleimen-
ova et al., 2017; Naqvi and Rehm, 2014). It is often difficult to find second
hand empirical data that is completely adequate for model calibration (Boero
and Squazzoni, 2005, par. 2.20). Some studies, for example, have struggled to
obtain data that is sufficiently disaggregated. Hassani-Mahmooei and Parris
(2012) examine the migration patterns that result from climate change im-
pacts – particularly droughts, floods and cyclones in Bangladesh. They find
that climate change will drive migration towards specific areas of the coun-
try, as well as environmentally vulnerable cities. The migration decision is a
function of (1) push factors; in this case climate change and socio-economic
factors, (2) pull factors; in this case the socio-economic conditions of the
destination, and (3) intervening factors; land ownership and employment
conditions. The authors employ census data for model calibration. As this
data is disaggregated only at the district level, individuals with unique demo-
graphic characteristics could not be represented. Instead, the model initiates
with 12,317 agents distributed across the 64 districts of Bangladesh, each
representing 10,000 members of the total population. According to the au-
thors, this level of abstraction means that all attributes characterising more
than 1 percent of the population have one or more agents to represent them
in the agent-based model. It is unclear whether this level of abstraction takes
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into account each unique combination of demographic characteristics present
in the population, or whether examining joint distributions is possible given
the data. In any case, this method of dealing with aggregated official data
sources could prove useful to modellers who wish to depict the migration of
large populations.
In other cases, data is obtained at the individual level but may not be per-
fectly appropriate for the model the researcher looks to build. For example,
Kniveton et al. (2011, 2012) construct their decision model by formalising the
theory of planned behaviour. To reiterate, in this theory, attitudes, norms
and perceived behavioural control, all feed into an individual’s behavioural
intentions and this, in turn, can result in the behaviour itself. The survey
data the authors use is not wholly adequate for calibrating such a model.
The attitude towards migration behaviour is represented as the “probabil-
ity of migration from one model zone to another, based on their personal
attributes and according to the rainfall variability they have experienced in
the previous three years” (Kniveton et al., 2012, p. 444). Using probability
of migration as a proxy for attitudes masks the sequential and nuanced form
of the decision model as migration is the expected outcome of the decision
model. Smith (2014) encounters a similar problem; this model consists of
many parts, not all of which can be parametrised with the data available
to the author, rendering it “only as indicative of the potential that future
applications may have” (p. 90).
Many of the studies presented here do not use psychological variables.
This may be due to the difficulties in finding adequate data, or simply due to
disciplinary idiosyncrasies Migration is sometimes considered to be a direct
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function of demographic or socio-economic characteristics (e.g. Walsh et al.,
2013). In other studies, migration is an economic, utility maximising deci-
sion, and is therefore easier to calibrate using more readily-available socio-
economic data (e.g. Heiland, 2003; Naqvi and Rehm, 2014). Suleimenova
et al. (2017) is unique in that it does not use any data to specify the param-
eters of the decision to migrate aside from geographic location. This study
aims to predict refugee flows sparked by three different crises: the 2015–2016
civil war in Burundi, the 2013–2016 conflict in the Central African Republic
(CAR), and the Northern Mali conflict in 2012–2013. Each time step, a num-
ber of refugees are inserted into the simulation based on the daily increase in
the total UNHCR refugee registration count. The probability of movement
of refugees from the conflict location to the refugee camps or between refugee
camps are set to values determined by the intuition of the authors (p. 10).
Through additional robustness checks, the authors find results to be insen-
sitive to these probabilities. However, setting the probability of movement
without empirical guidance raises questions of modeller discretion.
Multiple studies do not parametrise the effect of a given migration deter-
minant (e.g. income) on migration or some intermediary factor (e.g. Mena
et al., 2011), and the ones that do are unclear about how these coefficients
were estimated or obtained (e.g. Berman et al., 2004; Naqvi and Rehm,
2014). Some studies use the coefficients of regression models to parametrise
key relationships or variables. Kniveton et al. (2012) regress various demo-
graphics and experiences of rainfall variability in the past on the probabil-
ity of migration to calibrate migration attitudes; in Entwisle et al. (2016),
regression coefficients are used in the ABM to calculate individual-specific
137
migration probabilities, based on existing literature. Smith (2014) uses uni-
variate logistic regression models to find the effects of variables relevant to
his theory in existing data, and uses these effect sizes to calibrate variables
and relationships in his ABM.
However, while traditional quantitative studies devote a significant amount
of effort to identifying causal relationships in empirical data, agent-based
models of migration do not appear to place the same amount of emphasis
on causality. None of these studies mentioned using experiments or quasi-
experiments for model calibration (or specification), which would alleviate
the threat of omitted variables biasing estimates. Given that several studies
already collect primary data for specification or calibration, this may not be
a very difficult task. However, some studies use innovative calibration tech-
niques worth noting; even if they are not necessarily related to the migration
decision. Smajgl and Bohensky (2013), for example, obtains quantitative
metrics for behavioural responses under different “what-if” scenarios through
in-depth interviews. Walsh et al.’s (2013) model is used to assess household
income in the Nang Rong District in Thailand from several sources: agricul-
tural production of lowland, rain-fed paddy rice and upland field crops as well
as remittances from family members working in cities. This study integrates
data from widely used software applications, which forecast crop growth –
the intermediary variable in this study – under different climate scenarios6
and a general purpose method to estimate land suitability for growing rice.
This allows them to use reliable, direct, estimates of the effects of their pri-
mary explanatory variable on an important intermediary variable, and to do
6Decision Support for Agrotechnology Transfer, https://dssat.net/about
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so for a variety of hypothetical scenarios.
In summary, migration studies use a range of data sources to calibrate
components of the model. However, calibration is often a struggle, as data
that is adequate for the micro-level processes the researcher wishes to depict
is often not available. Model relationships – for instance, the effect of income
on migration – is not always parametrised. Furthermore, despite the fact that
several studies collect primary data, they do not mention using experimental
or quasi-experimental methods for calibration or discuss measures taken to
remediate common empirical issues such as omitted variable bias. Table 3.1
summarises the use of data in all models reviewed. Please note that these
percentages are derived from a small set of studies.
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Table 3.1: Empirical embeddedness across all studies reviewed
Process Description Publications
Specification
Theory only 25%
Theory and evidence 25%
Evidence only 42%
Neither 8%
Validation
Multiple patterns 0%
Use statistical tests 0%
Independent dataset 17%
No independent dataset 33%
No validation 50%
migration decision
Calibration of
Primary data collected 42%
Used existing data 50%
(Other aspects were calibrated)
No calibration of migration decision
8%
3.2 A Proactive Approach to Empirical Em-
beddedness
Empirical embeddedness does not only serve to help modellers make their
research more applicable to the real world; empirical researchers can also
benefit from pairing empirical designs with agent-based models. Researchers
studying populations at a micro-level through, for example, a survey are
able to observe attitudes and opinions but they are not often able to observe
actual behaviour. This is often a struggle for migration scholars who can
survey return migrants in origin countries or current migrants in destination
countries, but are not often able to observe individuals’ migratory behaviour.
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As I will discuss in Chapter 4, this means micro-level data on migration is
often severely affected by selection biases relating to the types of individuals
who migrate to a given location and the types of individuals who return home.
Researchers may, therefore, find it appealing to combine survey data that
targets several aspects of individuals’ decision process with an agent-based
model. Given an inability to observe behaviour, embedding this data in an
ABM decision model can allow us to simulate it. This approach also allows us
to consider how our sample may act given alternative scenarios – for example,
policy. As mentioned in Chapter 1, ABMs allow us to observe counterfactual
scenarios – that is, conditions that are identical, albeit with the addition
of the policy or exogenous influence we are interested in. Observing true
counterfactuals in the real world is impossible. Therefore, pairing ABMs
with carefully designed empirical instruments not only allow us to study
behaviour that is difficult to observe at present, but also the effects of various
alternative states of the world.
However, as I have argued in this chapter, this symbiotic relationship
can only be fully realised if ABMs are considered to provide us with findings
that the wider scholarly community can trust to reflect real-life empirical pro-
cesses. Therefore, the push towards greater credibility must come from the
modelling community. In this chapter, I have argued that greater credibility
can only be achieved with a more thorough and purposeful use of empirics.
This means using empirics to inform all components and relationships de-
scribed in the model’s architecture and to falsify model outcomes.7 This is a
7To be clear, I am referring only to models of the facsimile type, as are the ones
reviewed in this chapter.
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challenge for modellers because, as Boero and Squazzoni (2005) suggest, it is
often impossible to find existing data with sufficient micro-level detail to em-
bed into our unique models. This, perhaps, explains the apparent appetite
among migration modellers to use primary data. According to Table 3.1,
42% of empirically-driven models do so. However, collecting original data
will not be useful unless the data provides what the model needs.
In this section, I propose a practical, systematic process for designing a
survey that can be fully utilised to feed into all aspects of data embeddedness
identified above: (1) the specification of the model using empirical analyses
(e.g. a regression model to identify whether a relationship is likely to exist
within our population of interest); (2) the numerical calibration of model
components; (3) the validation of model outcomes by comparing them to
real, observational patterns of the same or a comparable system. This process
leverages the extensive similarities that exist between the conception of an
empirical research design and an agent-based model to harmonise the two
processes such that they can benefit one another. I focus on survey design,
which most often yields quantitative results, as quantitative data is useful
for calibration. However, this approach could also be extended to qualitative
data collection or a mixed methods approach (see Tubaro and Casilli, 2010
for a explanation of the various applications of qualitative data in ABM
research). From the perspective of the modeller, this approach is practical.
Acknowledging that it is often impossible to return to the field after we
obtain simulation results, the purpose of this process is to anticipate data
needs. It is labelled proactive because it involves careful, iterative, planning
to prepare for the possibility that aspects of the model may change and plan
142
future extensions to the model. For non-modellers, a ‘proactive approach’
can result in a more thorough and well designed survey instrument and can
carry our findings further by allowing us to combine several designs. As
I will show, the process of designing an ABM can help us visualise and
refine our empirical design by: (1) forcing us to clarify theory and concepts;
(2) helping us naturally detect gaps in existing knowledge; (3) increasing
our creativity by helping us visualise respondents as thoughtful, creative and
able to change their responses and behaviours in different states of the world;
and (4) helping us to identify and address challenges in measurement and
statistical inference. This approach is beneficial for research groups with an
interest in generating traditional empirical work that can stand on its own
as well as simulation pieces. This approach can help empirical researchers
avoid relying overly on the existing customs of the community studying their
research topic, both in terms of research questions and survey design.
The proactive approach to empirical embeddedness involves 4 stages which
may be iterated in the manner the researcher considers necessary (i.e. re-
searchers may do full loops or a series of smaller ones). Each step increases
in complexity, from conception to practical implementation. The thread con-
necting all stages is that the overview and details of data collection emerge
from and mirror the design of an ABM. That is, the concepts used in the
data collection instrument should also be included in the ABM design; the
hypotheses informing the questions included and the statistical tests we plan
to run should be the same as those informing the relationships eventually
formalised as computer algorithms. To allow for data collection to be carried
out in one go, I consider the iterations to be focused more intensely around
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the conceptualisation of the model, not its testing. Careful planning and
anticipation are core to the proactive approach.
The proactive approach to empirical embeddedness guided the manner
in which data was collected and used in the agent-based model of unau-
thorised migration presented in Chapter 7 but also includes lessons learned.
The empirical and simulated outcomes of this process will be documented in
chapters 4 to 8. A preliminary version of this approach was proposed as part
of the Leverhulme Trust grant I co-authored with my supervisors, Shane D.
Johnson and David Hudson, and substantially refined with the addition of
Research Associate Cassilde Schwartz to the project.
3.2.1 Stage 1: Defining the project
The first stage of the process involves defining the scope and components of
the research project. It consists of the following steps:
A. Defining the research question and purpose. The modelling cycle begins in
the same place as any empirical research project. It begins with defining
its purpose, usually in the form of a research question. This research
question “serves as a primary compass and filter” for designing an ABM
(Railsback and Grimm, 2011, p. 8). The research question is usually
couched on theory and/ or substantive evidence. As part of the iterative
process, the research question may splinter into several more focused
questions. I explain how this can happen in point E below.
B. Finding existing theory and evidence. The formulation of the research
question may be preceded or succeeded by the possible identification of
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theory, or set of theories, to frame the project. An ABM is often a formal-
isation of existing theory in the form of computer algorithms (Johnson
and Groff, 2014). As such, examining existing theoretical literature can
help the researcher identify the concepts that may become part of the
ABM in some way or another. These concepts will also be important to
the design of the empirical data collection instrument. When choosing
theories, it is helpful to find ones that can help the researcher understand
the micro-level behaviour of the population of interest, which would be
reflected in the behaviour of the artificial agents. As discussed in Chapter
1, agent-based modelling is a bottom-up approach. That is, behaviour
is naively and directly represented. Theories that consider relationships
between abstract macro-level concepts such macroeconomic indicators or
demographic rates will not be as helpful in building the ABM (although
they may become useful for forming expectations on macro-level outputs
later on) (Railsback and Grimm, 2011). Qualitative evidence is partic-
ularly useful for complementing the theory at hand or may even take
centre stage if theory is not available. Qualitative research, which may
include ethnographic research, focus groups and interviews, aims to iden-
tify micro-level processes or mechanisms guiding behaviour, including in-
teractions between individuals and is, like ABM, a bottom-up approach
(Johnson and Groff, 2014; Tubaro and Casilli, 2010). It is useful to ex-
amine more than one theory, particularly if there are competing theories
speaking to our research question, and as much existing micro-level evi-
dence as possible. This will help us form an extensive set of hypotheses
and make sure we have our bases covered for data collection. I return to
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this in point D.
C. Outlining the model components and the relationships between them. In
this first stage, theoretical concepts need not yet be specified or refined
to the point where we are able to measure them. However, it is useful
to have a clear inventory of concepts and to be able to connect them in
the form of a rough decision model. This can be done as a flow chart or
any other simple diagram. In the process, we might formulate a set of
directional hypotheses. For example, we may have a theory that states
that a perception of economic need and perceived opportunity makes
individuals more likely to burgle homes. In that case, we could build a
very simple decision model connecting these two explanatory concepts to
the action of burglary. The formation of hypotheses is as essential to the
design of an ABM (Railsback and Grimm, 2011, p. 8) as it is to empirical
data collection (Babbie, 2010).
D. Prepare for getting empirical results that are different to those expected.
Part of the empirical embeddedness process can involve the testing of hy-
potheses using observational data. This is part of the model specification
process, as it indicates whether a hypothesised relationship expressed in
the ABM is likely present the population we are examining. Regression
coefficients, for example, can also help us set ABM parameters associ-
ated with this relationship numerically. When thinking of hypotheses
one might wish to test, it is particularly important that the researcher
draws an extensive inventory of alternative hypotheses to anticipate the
possibility that the data does not tell the story we expected it to and
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leads us to alter our ABM design. It is important to strike the right
balance between precision and flexibility such that we can adapt if the
model needs to change. Relatedly, as I will expand on in points E and
F, it is important to have a simple core model with separate extensions.
This type of model design is more likely to adapt well to the empirical
results we obtain. Just like a high-degree polynomial equation may only
be able to explain the relationship between a narrow set of data points,
a complex model may not fare well when exposed to our original data.
The separate extensions that should make the model more complex may
or may not be included in the final model, depending on the empirical
results we get.
E. Defining a core and a periphery in our research aims. Building an ABM
requires we simplify as much as we can. Railsback and Grimm (2011, p.
8) explain that “a common mistake of beginners is to throw too much
into the first model version – usually arguing that these factors are well
known and can’t possibly be ignored.” Because of the extensive inter-
dependencies and feedbacks that exist between model processes, ABMs
can become very complicated very quickly. Over complication has two
important implications on the ABM and the data collection that accom-
panies it. First, overcomplicating the model causes us to lose focus of our
aims, which can be costly when that model is guiding our data collection
efforts. The second point refers to the ABM itself. Agent-based models
are there to help us understand underlying mechanisms and overcompli-
cating it will hamper our ability to understand why our model is behaving
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the way it is. Railsback and Grimm (2011) suggest that modellers note
ancillary factors in a wish list and check their importance later. In the
same vein, I suggest that researchers define a simple core model and pe-
ripheral extensions. For example, we may be interested in understanding
how a set of factors X leads to a behaviours Y and Z. A simple core model
could look at the influence of X on Y, while the influence of X on Z can be
relegated to the periphery. The periphery is simply a part of the decision
model that will be tackled later.
F. Develop both core and peripheral hypotheses before the field to increase
yield. As mentioned earlier in this section, it is not often cost-effective
to return to the field several times to collect additional data. As such,
it is a good idea for researchers to develop hypotheses in the periphery
in subsequent iterations of this process before heading to the field. This
can allow researchers to produce several models or versions of a model
with the same original data source. If the processes are sufficiently re-
lated, researchers may find that they are inadvertently better able to
tackle peripheral processes if they return to Stage 1 after having finished
conceptualising the core model.
3.2.2 Stage 2: Attempting to formalise the decision
model
Once we have an outline of the theoretical model process, modellers usually
begin to formalise it by translating it into computer algorithms in the soft-
ware they are intending to use (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Since we have
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not yet collected the data, we may not be able to adequately program and
test the model. As such, writing the model out in pseudocode (simplified
programming notation that is not executed), or as a series of textual descrip-
tions of each model process with its component equations may suffice. Some
researchers may find they are able to test some aspects of the hypothesised
model before collecting data by, for example, varying loose parameter values
across plausible ranges. This process may help researchers detect interesting
behaviour for further investigation.
Regardless of how it is done, the process of formalisation accomplishes
several aims that are essential to conducting any type of research. They
facilitate:
A. Concept specification. As Johnson and Groff (2014, p. 514) explain,
“theories expressed in natural languages are often vague, ambiguous, and
open to interpretation.” When putting together an empirical research
design, scholars often refine imprecise notions into precise concepts. For
example, if we are interested in the idea of compassion, we would want
to understand what is meant by compassion, and identify different kinds
of compassion that may exist (Babbie, 2010, p. 126 - 128). The process
of formalising a theory in computer code or, simply, equations, forces a
logical structure on imprecise theoretical constructs. Because the totality
of the model should be formalised, this process helps us apply the same
rigour to all concepts.
B. Identifying the micro-components of a decision. In the case of the ABM of
unauthorised migration presented in Chapter 7, the process of putting to-
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gether a decision sequence that was theorised to result in actual behaviour
required devoting thought to what might constitute serious intentions for
action and what obstacles may lie in the way of actual behaviour. At
this point it is useful to return to the micro-level theory and qualitative
evidence we examined in Stage 1 and identify the micro-components of a
decision, particularly specific drivers and barriers to behaviour. We can
then use this information to refine our model rules and make sure we
include the appropriate items in our survey questionnaire.
C. Identification of theoretical gaps that need to be addressed. As part of for-
malisation and the development of an agent-based model, we will likely
identify parts of the theory that cannot be formalised (Eck and Liu, 2008;
Johnson and Groff, 2014). These aspects may require special attention
in the data collection process. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the process of
formalising the ABMs presented in this thesis identified several questions
that were ambiguous in existing theory: Does immigration policy restric-
tion decrease perceived ability only? or also aspiration?; Do past failures
to migrate decrease perceived ability to migrate? (examined in Chapter
5); Do individuals consider unauthorised migration when the gap between
perceived ability and their aspiration to migrate is large? (examined in
Chapter 6); How do individuals weight failures relative to successes and
does it affect aggregate outcomes? (examined in Chapter 8); If, according
to social network theory, individuals migrate where their network ties are
established, how can individuals move to alternative destinations (where
their network ties are not established) if policy in the primary destination
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is restricted? (examined in Chapter 9).
3.2.3 Stage 3: Identifying the dynamic aspects of the
decision model
Up to now, we have used theory and evidence to draw a static picture of a
decision process and its components. However, adaptive agents, just like real
individuals, change their response under different conditions. As such, in
preparation for embedding data into our model, we may want our concepts
to generalise to situations other than the current state of the world. In other
words, we may want to add a dynamic layer to our static decision model. To
do so we need to:
A. Identify key external influences and what components of the decision they
affect. Exogenous factors may constitute scenarios one may wish to ex-
amine in an agent-based model by implementing them exogenously as
part of an in-silico experiment. In this stage, we identify what these
factors are and form expectations about precisely what components of
the decision they may affect. Exogenous events can change individuals’
decision to support a political party and we may theorise that it does so
by targetting individuals’ subjective policy priorities. For example, indi-
viduals may not prioritise policies relating to global warming until they
experience an abnormal rate of flooding in their home town. If we believe
that issue priorities will determine people’s political behaviour, we may
expect that individuals who experience global warming first-hand will be
more likely to vote for parties with a strong environmentalist stance. We
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may also want to treat certain factors as exogenous in order to identify
their likely causal effects by using experiments or similar techniques. It
is outside the scope of this chapter to describe these techniques but Cook
et al. (2002) provides a helpful review. I return to this point in Stage 4.
B. Identify endogenous feedback mechanisms. Often the actions of others
– or of one’s past – may affect future actions. Granovetter’s seminal
‘Threshold Models of Collective Behaviour’ suggests that individuals have
different thresholds for a given action, which may be surpassed if they see
sufficient others carrying out this action. Potential refugees may leave
their home if they see sufficient others fleeing, individuals may join a
protest if they see sufficient others protesting. In an ABM these feedback
processes are reflected in the spread of information through networks or
observation of geographically-close others. As such, if we want to add
a dynamic component to our model we might want to also identify how
these endogenous factors affect decision components. For example, do
individuals follow the actions of others because they learn that the action
is feasible? Or simply because they feel protected when being part of a
crowd?
C. Identify how individuals are exposed to influences. Individuals are often
not directly exposed to any particular external influence. For example,
individuals are not hit on the head with the results of a referendum; they
hear about them from the news or from their network contacts. Simi-
larly, a competitive academic job market is experienced locally by send-
ing out many job applications and receiving few responses in return, or
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from hearing about others’ experiences in online forums. An agent-based
model represents this sort of information seeking and sending naively.
Agents actually send and receive micro-level information or signals that
reflect macro-level conditions. As argued in Chapter 2, this experiential
learning process allows agents/ individuals to adapt by learning about
new conditions and searching for decision alternatives that may allow
them to solve any problems caused by this change (Gigerenzer and Sel-
ten, 2002). We can incorporate information relevant to this point into
our data collection plan by considering what resources real-life individuals
gather information from (e.g. social networks, media).
3.2.4 Stage 4: Measurement
An indicator is an “observation that we choose to consider as a reflection
of the variable we want to study” (Babbie, 2010, p. 131) so that we can
identify its presence in our data. Stages 2 and 3 will likely have facilitated
this process by helping us understand the various meanings and dimensions
of a concept. At this point we can start drafting the questionnaire. In doing
so, however, we may identify a series of challenges and make some proactive
plans for the future.
A. Identify the appropriate design to measure components of decision as well
as various external stimuli. In the previous steps, we have identified the
components of decision, as well as components that are exogenous or that
we would like to treat as exogenous We have also identified how individ-
uals are likely to respond to these changes. This lays the groundwork
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for our choice of empirical design. There is an extensive literature on
types of questions and best practices for survey design: how to avoid
satisficing (respondents not answering correctly because they are tired),
how to make sure the context of the question is properly understood or
how to avoid leading the respondent, for example (Pasek and Krosnick,
2010). Similarly, a great deal of methodological research revolves around
overcoming threats to causality. It is outside the scope of this chapter to
consider this literature. However, it is useful to outline two points that
ABM can help with: adaptation and causality. Examining the various
forms in which individuals may react to changes in their environment
can help us make decisions about whether to present certain items as
trade-offs, a ranking of priorities, or like Smajgl and Bohensky (2013),
as “what-if scenarios.” As mentioned earlier in the chapter, researchers
will likely be interested in establishing whether certain effects are causal
or simply correlational. Agent-based models allow us to conduct in-silico
experimentation that can allow us to attribute changes in behaviour to
some exogenous factor. To adequately calibrate this effect, we may, there-
fore want to conduct a population-based experiment. In this experiment,
we may not be able to observe the behaviour of interest. However, we
may be able to observe the effect of the variable of interest on some inter-
mediary variable that, we theorised in Stage 2, will lead to the behaviour.
The experiment presented in Chapter 5 is an example.
B. Identify outputs and plan for validation. The final stage in the proactive
process is to identify the observable outputs of the ABM. This could
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be the aggregate behaviour of agents – for example unauthorised, legal
migration and non-migration, violent and non-violent protest, or voting
for political party A or party B. After identifying these outputs it is
important to search for existing data that may allow us to validate our
model by comparing simulated to real outputs. As I have argued in the
review, it is not sufficient to test the hypotheses relating to specifics of
the model architecture. We also have to evaluate the model as a whole.
The more independent data sources we can use to validate our model,
the better. However, we can also benefit from collecting our own data to
supplement these datasets and conduct within-sample validation. This
data cannot be used as part of the inputs of our model and must therefore
be set aside expressly for the purpose of validation.
At the end of this process, the researcher will have a plan for one or mul-
tiple agent-based models and an accompanying survey instrument targetting
all aspects of empirical embeddedness. The ABM design should make data
collection more thorough and precise; yet also flexible enough to allow for a
change in plans as we learn from our results, and to make inferences about
alternative states of the world.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter, I reviewed data-driven models which study migration primar-
ily or as part of a suite of possible agent behaviours, focusing on migration
decision-making. Agent-based models are a natural form of modelling which
allows us to depict complex processes and relationships. However, we have
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an important Achilles heel: our results are not interpreted from natural pro-
cesses; they are generated by the source code of our model. This generates
various concerns regarding researcher discretion. Several agent-based models
use empirical data and analysis for model specification or embed these data
as model inputs, in an effort to lend credence to the model. I argue that, in
order to broaden our contribution, we need to develop higher standards for
empirical embeddedness.
I find that modellers use a range of quantitative and qualitative methods
to specify and calibrate different aspects of a model. However, the process of
translating empirical findings into agent rules is often inadequate or obscure.
One-third of the models presented do not use any form of qualitative or quan-
titative validation. If the study does contain a form of empirical validation,
it only tests one output and, generally, does not use independent empirical
datasets. Calibration is often difficult, as micro-level data for the processes
the researcher wishes to model is often not available. Relationships are not
always parametrised. When they are, the manner in which these parameters
were estimated is not communicated and any measures taken to remediate
common empirical issues such as omitted variable bias are not discussed.
I then suggest a proactive approach to data embeddedness for agent-
based models for researchers who are looking to collect primary data. This
approach consists of designing an abstract agent-based model in conjunction
with one or a series of empirical instruments, which can improve our ability
to calibrate, specify and validate our models. This approach guided the
manner in which data was collected and used in the agent-based model of
unauthorised migration presented in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 4
Case Selection and Survey
Design
This thesis tailors a nationwide survey of Jamaica to inform and calibrate an
agent-based model of unauthorised migration, which examines how aspiring
migrants adapt to changes in immigration policy by adopting unauthorised
migration routes. The combination of empirics and agent-based modelling
allows us observe how individual decision-making, elicited empirically at the
individual-level, gives rise to complex migration patterns at an international
level.
This chapter describes the Migration Decisions and Policy survey (MDP),
which consists of a range of experimental and non-experimental questions.
Experimental designs allow us causally identify how micro-level decisions
and strategies respond to changes in immigration policy and provide us with
reliable measures for sensitive issues.
I was involved in all aspects of the inception, design and execution of the
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survey: I made contact with a professional survey team through a scoping
visit to Jamaica, managed all logistics, as well as contractual and funding
aspects, co-wrote all instruments in the questionnaire, trained enumerators,
and coordinated the survey in Jamaica.
The survey was designed to fit the needs of the data-driven ABM of
unauthorised migration presented in Chapter 7, following the proactive ap-
proach to empirical embeddedness. This approach, detailed in Chapter 3,
was proposed as part of the Leverhulme Trust grant, which I co-wrote with
my supervisors Shane D. Johnson and David Hudson, and refined throughout
the project. This the Leverhulme Trust grant funded data collection.
This chapter has the following aims: (1) to describe why Jamaica was
selected as the empirical case; (2) to explain how the ABM motivated the
design of experimental and non-experimental survey instruments; (3) to pro-
vide an overview of the survey, including the wording of questions, their the-
oretical underpinning, and descriptive statistics. This chapter is structured
to address each of these goals in turn.
4.1 Empirical case selection
With the exception of Chapter 9, which considers the case of Mexico-US
migration, this thesis uses Jamaica as the empirical case. This case was
selected using three criteria that would facilitate the research topic at hand.
The case had to be:
1. A migrant source country
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2. A country with a large number of aspiring migrants
3. A country where the drivers of migration are largely uniform and of an
economic nature
4. A country where unauthorised emigration is a viable and common strat-
egy
I explain the rationale for each of these points in turn relating specifically to
the survey.
1. A migrant source country. Eliciting information on migrant decision-
making under policy constraints is challenging. While a deep understanding
migration decisions requires that we observe individuals who migrate and
those who do not, this is very difficult to do in practice (Sana and Conway,
2013). Surveying individuals only at the destination does not allow us to
observe barriers to movement. The individuals who migrated are likely the
minority who had the capabilities to do so. Those who did not have the
ability to migrate legally and have migrated through illegal means tend to
remain hidden and are, therefore, often difficult to find or talk to. Given this
thesis’ focus on undocumented migration, this shortcoming is particularly
important.
Surveying individuals in an origin country is not a necessarily a solution
as it will yield information only on non-migrants. The Mexican Migration
Project, which is described further in Chapter 9, surveys return migrants
in the origin country in an attempt to obtain information on individuals
with migration experience. However, this strategy is also problematic as the
individuals that return are likely a biased subset of those who left. An origin
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country focus with an empirical strategy that takes seriously aspirations and
the individual-level effects of barriers to movement can prove to be a fruitful
alternative if paired with agent-based modelling. This alternative does not
allow us to observe both migration and non-migration but it does allow us
to simulate whether our sample might migrate or stay home. This approach
has the added benefit of allowing us to examine the effects of policies that
may be implemented in the future on this population, given the sample’s
responses at the time the survey was implemented. It is possible to compare
the outcomes of the ABM to existing estimates from destination country
datasets, as was discussed in Chapter 3, to assess whether the information
elicited on aspirations and the individual-level effects of barriers to movement
is likely to yield credible estimates of future migration when embedded into a
simulation model. Another source of validation, which can be implemented
in future work, is to follow-up on the sample surveyed during subsequent
years to observe whether they migrated or not. This would be an excellent
way to directly measure the predictive power of our survey instruments and
therefore also further validate the ABM architecture. This could be done by
offering a cash incentive to survey respondents for reporting their migratory
status, as is done in some experimental studies on migration (McKenzie and
Yang, 2010).
2. A country with a large number of aspiring migrants. This case selection
criterion has several advantages for the study of migration from an origin
country. First, it is likely that a – naturally – large proportion of our sample
will have explored opportunities for migration and received information about
opportunities and immigration policy constraints. As such, it is not necessary
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to use snowball sampling or quotas, which threaten the representativeness
of the sample, to get at our population of interest. Second, having a large
proportion of aspiring migrants provides us with the unique opportunity to
observe variation in decision-making amongst aspiring migrants.
Jamaica has a historically high propensity for migration. After becoming
a British colony, Jamaicans migrated en masse to Central America to work on
construction projects, or Cuba to work on sugar cane production. The United
States and the United Kingdom recruited Jamaicans and other Caribbean na-
tionals as part of the World War I and II efforts and post-war reconstruction.
Today, its migrant diaspora is concentrated in the United States, Canada and
the United Kingdom, but many Jamaicans migrate within the Caribbean to
countries such as the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, Bahamas, or Antigua and
Barbuda (Thomas-Hope, 1992; Glennie and Chappell, 2010). According to
the 2014 LAPOP survey, 58% of Jamaicans intend to move abroad within
the next three years (Zechmeister, 2014). This figure compares with 13.7%
of Mexicans, the most common case study for migration research. The short-
comings of using an island state as a case study are discussed in the next two
points and, in further detail, in Chapter 10.
3. A country where the drivers of migration are largely uniform and of
an economic nature. While there are countries with similarly high rates of
aspiring migrants, Jamaica is a particularly illustrative case because only a
very small proportion of these emigrants qualify as forced migrants. A study
of Jamaican migration from 2000 to 2010 found that, despite high rates of
emigration, only very small number of Jamaicans were asylum-seekers or
refugees. In 2010, only 6% of the Jamaicans who emigrated to the top three
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destination countries (the US, Canada, and the UK) did so as forced mi-
grants (Thomas-Hope et al., 2012). Individuals who are forced from their
homes are likely to make migration decisions under heightened constraints
compared to other aspiring migrants. Although there is great value in explor-
ing migrant decisions under different pressure scenarios, it is often difficult,
if not impossible, to classify and disaggregate refugee and voluntary migrant
populations. Therefore, in order to more clearly delineate the type of migra-
tion under study and generalise to other sources of economic migration the
survey sample would ideally minimise the number of such highly constrained
aspiring migrants.
However, it is important to note that island migration is different from
mainland migration in several respects, which places a limit on its gener-
alisability. First, generally islands have dense populations when compared
to adjacent mainland areas (King and Connell, 1999), which creates a large
pressure to migrate. As prominent geographer Ellen Churchill Semple wrote
in (1911), “a small cup soon overflows” (p. 416). Second, out-migration has
large effects on the demography of the country. Small islands are particularly
prone to large volatility in population due, partly, to emigration (Cleland and
Singh, 1980). This not only affects the size of the population but, due to the
selectivity of migration flows – favouring the young and highly educated or
those whose family has a history of emigrating – it also affects the demo-
graphic structure (King and Connell, 1999). This is certainly the case for
Jamaica. According to the 2015 Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica,
emigration creates the “greatest impact on [Jamaica’s] population size and
structure,” even compared to other basic demographic indicators such as
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birth and death rates (ESSJ, 2015).
4. A country where unauthorised emigration is a viable and common
strategy. Jamaicans’ main possibilities for legal migration are seasonal guest
worker programs for agricultural harvesting and the hotel industry in the US
and Canada. The large Jamaican diaspora abroad makes family reunification
another feasible alternative for migration (Thomas-Hope, 2003). According
to the US Department of State, 68% of Jamaican applicants for visitor visas
were accepted (U.S. Department of State, 2015a). Data for the UK shows a
lower acceptance rate of Jamaicans (57%) for that same year (?). Jamaicans
may be refused a government-issued visa because they cannot convince im-
migration authorities they will not overstay a tourist visa, because they were
deported before, or because they have a criminal conviction – among several
other reasons (US Department of State, nd). Therefore, some individuals
may only be able to live and work abroad if they do so through irregular
channels.
According to Elizabeth Thomas-Hope (2003, p.1), “Under dire circum-
stances, and as legal channels for entry into potential immigration coun-
tries (particularly those in North America and Europe) remain selective on
grounds of nationality, education and occupational status, there is likely to be
a continuing flow of [Caribbean] migrants trying to circumvent formal chan-
nels by resorting to informal ones.” According to Thomas-Hope, Jamaicans
employ two main irregular migration strategies: entering with a legal visa
but violating its conditions and entering with false documentation (Thomas-
Hope, 2003, p.9). Unlike the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Cuba, Jamaica
is not among the significant sources of irregular boat migration (Thomas-
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Hope, 2003). Instead, Jamaican unauthorised migration usually takes place
through regular airline routes, with the use of (violated) legal or falsified
visas. Another relevant strategy for Caribbean nationals also is crossing a
border illegally (Thomas-Hope, 2003). However, in the Caribbean, the only
international land border crossing of significance is between Haiti and the
Dominican Republic and, therefore, is not relevant to Jamaicans. As such,
Jamaica’s geography also sets it apart from mainland states in regard to
unauthorised migration – not only migration propensity, as discussed in the
previous point.
Irregular migration from Jamaica can be a significant proportion of the
island’s diaspora. The US has the most detailed estimates of the scale of
unauthorised migration from Jamaica. According to the augmented Ameri-
can Community Survey (ACS), collected by the US Census Bureau, and the
Jamaican census, there were approximately 34.13 Jamaican migrants in the
United States for every 100 Jamaican adults living on the island in 2011
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2000; STATIN, 2001).1 According to the Center for
Migration Studies using data from on the augmented ACS (Rosenblum and
Ruiz Soto, 2015; Warren, 2014; Center for Migration Studies, 2017), there
were approximately 100,000 unauthorised Jamaican migrants in the United
States in 2012, or 15% of all Jamaican migrants.2
1This translates to 680,845 migrants living in the US to 1,995,148 Jamaicans over 15
years old on the island.
2These estimates are calculated using the residual method, of subtracting the legal
foreign-born population from the total foreign-born population, discussed in more detail
in Chapter 1 (Warren, 2014).
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4.2 Survey overview
The Migration Decisions and Policy survey is a nationally representative sur-
vey of Jamaica. Jamaica is geographically subdivided into 14 large adminis-
trative units, called parishes. The sample includes all 14 parishes. In total,
our sample consists of 1,166 face-to-face interviews with Jamaican adults
from across the island. We used a multistage sampling strategy – blocked by
parish and clustered by enumeration district. Clusters were proportionally
allocated based on the latest (2011) census data and randomly selected.
Table 4.1 shows each parish, the area it occupies (columns 2 and 3), its
population and the number of respondents surveyed in each parish (Columns
4 and 5), show the correspondence between the population of that parish and
the sample respondents in that parish. Column 3 shows the spatial propor-
tion of the island each parish occupies, which was used to map Jamaica’s
geography onto the ABM of unauthorised migration’s square lattice (see
Chapter 1, Section 1.3, for more details on the spatial features of agent-based
models)
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Table 4.1: Correspondence between Jamaica’s geography and population with
the sample surveyed in each geographical subdivision
Parish Area (kmˆ2) Territory
Proportion
Population Sample
Agents/
Clarendon 1,196 0.109 245,103 119
Hanover 450 0.041 69,533 14
Kingston 22 0.002 89,057 40
Manchester 830 0.076 189,797 80
Portland 814 0.074 81,744 35
Saint Andrew 431 0.039 573,369 267
Saint Ann 1,213 0.110 172,362 62
Saint Catherine 1,192 0.108 516,218 217
Saint Elizabeth 1,212 0.110 150,205 70
Saint James 595 0.054 183,811 77
Saint Mary 611 0.056 113,615 47
Saint Thomas 743 0.068 93,902 35
Trelawny 875 0.080 75,164 38
Westmoreland 807 0.073 144,103 65
Source: Statistical Institute of Jamaica, 2011. http://statinja.gov.
jm/
The fieldwork was carried out by enumerators directly managed by the
University of the West Indies in the Kingston Metropolitan Area. I trav-
elled to Kingston, Jamaica in July 2015 to establish contact with the survey
contractors and had the opportunity to interview 10 return and deported
Jamaicans who had migrated to the United States and the United Kingdom.
I also interviewed Professor Elizabeth Thomas-Hope, a prominent expert
on Caribbean migration, who has written numerous books, articles and re-
ports for international organisations on the subject (e.g. Thomas-Hope, 1992,
2003, 2005; Thomas-Hope et al., 2009). This allowed me to gain knowledge
of the migration context. Before launching the survey, Cassilde Schwartz
(the Research Associate on the project) and I consulted with the survey
manager, who provided invaluable local knowledge, both on the relevance of
the questions we wished to ask, as well as their wording. We also accom-
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panied enumerators while they interviewed 50 respondents in the Kingston
Metropolitan Area for the pilot survey between November and December
2015. This allowed us to observe whether questions were effective and easy
to understand. We made several revisions to the survey using the knowledge
we gained from the pilot, and the final Migration Decisions and Policy survey
was fielded in April 2016. Data collection continued until June 2016.
4.2.1 The questionnaire
The survey was conducted on tablets using the Qualtrics off-line application
to allow randomisation and customisation of questions based on previous
responses. In this section, I will briefly describe all questions employed in
Chapters 5 to 8 of this thesis. Tables 4.2-4.5 provide details on question
wording and descriptive statistics on the survey data employed in Chapters
5 to 8. The study employed two experiments embedded in the survey: a
video experiment about immigration policy and a list experiment. I provide
a full description of the methods and materials used for these experiments in
Chapters 5 and 6, respectively.
The questionnaire was designed explicitly for the calibration, specification
and validation of an agent-based model of unauthorised migration and follows
the proactive approach to empirical embeddedness for ABMs laid out in the
last section of Chapter 3. This approach aims build an intrinsic relationship
between empirics and modelling from the start of a project by allowing the
two aspects to co-evolve. According to this approach, when designing an
empirical data collection instrument tailored to inform an agent-based model,
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we should:
1. Think of respondents as adaptive agents.
2. Consider indicators as part of a sequential decision-making process:
This allows us to increase precision in operationalisation.
3. Use relationships defined in the ABM to identify important empirical
challenges (e.g. endogeneity problems).
4. Design instruments that can be used for calibration and others that
can be set aside for model specification and validation.
5. Use the ABM model specification process to determine which topics to
include in the survey.
This process of empirical embeddedness begins with a sketch of an agent-
based model describing the system.
The main purpose of the survey was to understand how unauthorised
migration may arise. We use the non-compliance/ semi-noncompliance ty-
pology of unauthorised migration described in Chapter 2 to define two com-
mon illustrative cases to be used throughout the survey: entering a foreign
country using a false visa and working under the table on a visitor visa. We
identified these two cases because, as outlined above, they are quite com-
mon and relevant among Jamaicans (Thomas-Hope, 2005). Moreover, our
selected cases are also strategies that can be executed immediately upon en-
try. There are certainly instances where individuals enter legally but then
fall out of status – i.e., overstaying one’s visa. However, such decisions may
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be made many months after arriving in the destination country, and eliciting
support for these strategies would force respondents to make a cognitive leap
and, potentially, lead to incorrect estimates.
Migrating with fraudulent documents is a clear instance of full noncom-
pliance. Through this strategy, individuals move abroad without any con-
sent from immigration authorities. In the United States, it is considered a
criminal offense that can be punished with arrest, potentially long prison
sentences, civil money penalties, deportation, and a bar on re-admission (8
C.F.R. §270.3(b)(1)(ii)(B), 1270.3(b)(1)(ii)(B); 18 U.S.C. §1546). Much of
the literature refers to the case of undocumented border crossing as an illus-
tration of a fully non-compliant strategy (e.g. Espenshade, 1995; Ryo, 2013;
Massey and Espinosa, 1997). However, given the geography of the coun-
try, Jamaicans would find it difficult to cross a border without presenting
documentation (Thomas-Hope, 2005).
Working under the table on a tourist visa is a common semi-legal strategy,
containing a “mix of regular and irregular aspects” (Du¨vell, 2011). There
are strict terms associated with these visas, as visitors can only remain in-
country for a limited amount of time and are unconditionally prohibited from
working. Violating these conditions is certainly against the law (8 U.S. Code
§1227, INA §212(a)(9)(B), INA §222(g)), but in ?, we classify this strategy
as semi-legal because a government-issued visa is obtained.
For the purposes of this chapter, I will refer to these cases as illegal and
semi-legal migration.
The questionnaire was organised under the following broad topics:
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• Aspiration and ability. These set of questions relate to the third theo-
retical premise outlined in Chapter 2. This premise holds that limiting
individuals’ ability to migrate will not necessarily drive down their de-
sire to do so. In this manner, restrictive policies can drive a creative
search for alternative possibilities for migration (Carling, 2002; Castles,
2004b; Faist, 1997). This set of questions aimed to, independently, cap-
ture individuals’ real desire to migrate on the one hand and consider-
ations of feasibility and obstacles on the other, into three components:
aspiration, seriousness about migrating 3 and ability to migrate. These
three components can vary independently as part of a sequential deci-
sion process in an agent-based model. Agents in the ABM search for
and attempt different strategies. As such, it is important to capture the
ability to execute not only the primary strategy (i.e. legal migration),
but also secondary strategies that may be considered if the former is
not available to the agent. To prepare for this, we include variables on
the ability to migrate using an illegal and semi-legal strategy. These
set of questions advance on existing survey instruments which collapse
desire and feasibility into one indicator – ‘intention’ – and are therefore
unable to observe their interplay (Carling, 2002).
• Risks of unauthorised migration. Adopting an alternative unauthorised
strategy is not costless. It is important to take into account the risks
of unauthorised migration. However, while the odds of successful legal
migration can be estimated using different data sources (see Chapter 7,
3Individuals may have a superficial desire to migrate and never attempt to realise this
wish. This question aims to mitigate this issue.
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Section 7.3.1), data on the odds of successfully migrating illegally are
unavailable. We used a “wisdom of the crowds approach” and asked
respondents to provide their own estimates using an illegal or semi-legal
strategy. We used the average value to inform the global odds of success
in the ABM of unauthorised migration (see Chapter 7). According to
Herzog and Hertwig (2009, p. 231),
The average quantitative estimate of a group of individuals
is consistently more accurate than the typical estimate, and
is sometimes even the best estimate. Although individuals’
estimates may be riddled with errors, averaging them boosts
accuracy because both systematic and random errors tend to
cancel out across individuals.
• Support for unauthorised migration. Rational expectations of the risks
involved in unauthorised migration are not the only deterrents. In-
dividuals may choose to comply with the law for normative reasons,
regardless of risk or punishment (Ryo, 2013; ?). This set of questions
relates to this thesis’ fourth theoretical premise, laid out in Chapter
2. Methodologically, this topic presents an empirical challenge for es-
timation as it is likely to be sensitive and yield biased responses in a
face-to-face survey. To mitigate this issue, we employed an instrument
that respects respondents’ privacy, providing reliable aggregate-level
responses (Blair and Imai, 2012). This method – the list experiment –
is detailed in Chapter 6. However, briefly, the procedure is as follows:
respondents are randomly assigned a treatment or a control list (see
171
Table 4.3). The only difference between treatment and control lists is a
theoretically-relevant sensitive item – in our case, unauthorised migra-
tion. The list experiment can be analysed using a difference-in-means
test. The coefficient estimate for this test is equal to the proportion of
respondents who support the sensitive item. Separate list experiments
were used to elicit responses on illegal and semi-legal strategies. In
Chapter 6, I evaluate whether the list experiment worked as intended
by comparing results to the proportion of respondents supporting illegal
and semi-legal strategies when questioned directly.
• Immigration policy. Aspiration and ability to migrate are theoretically
linked to the same factors that drive immigration policy change: past
migration. On one hand, networks of family, friends and acquaintances
facilitate future migration (Massey et al., 1993; Haug, 2008; Garip and
Asad, 2016). On the other hand, migration in a previous time pe-
riod may signal to policymakers that migration needs to be restricted
(Hopkins, 2011). This presents an empirical challenge. To isolate the
effects of immigration policy on aspiration and ability to migrate, we
used a between-subjects video experiment. Briefly, participants were
randomly assigned to view a video about the real policy-induced dif-
ficulties Jamaicans may face when attempting to migrate or a control
condition. The unique causal effects of policy on Jamaicans’ aspira-
tion and perceived ability to migrate were estimated with a simple
t-test comparing treatment and control means. This video experiment
(the motivation, procedure, the video script and results) are detailed
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in Chapter 5.
• Migration history. We include an extensive battery on migration his-
tory in our survey. However, for the purposes of the work done here, we
only use one question relating to past legal migration attempts. Specif-
ically, we ask how many times respondents have applied for a visa and
been rejected in the past. This question is set aside as one of sev-
eral patterns by which to validate the agent-based model presented in
Chapter 7, following the proactive approach to empirical embeddedness
outlined in Chapter 3.
• Relationships abroad. As discussed in Chapter 2, social networks are a
key facilitator of migration (Massey et al., 1993; Haug, 2008; Garip and
Asad, 2016). We used a name generator instrument to elicit ego-centric
social network data (Pustejovsky and Spillane, 2009). That is, we asked
respondents to first identify relationships abroad and then asked fur-
ther questions about these contacts. These questions aimed to elicit the
following characteristics from individuals’ networks: (1) how many of
these networks are family members (2) how long ago these family mem-
bers migrated (3) which of these contacts can be considered a source
of support. Respondents were asked to provide first names or aliases
of their relations to protect their privacy. Characteristics 1 and 2 were
used to determine individuals’ eligibility to migrate under different pol-
icy conditions, as will be detailed in Chapter 7. Characteristic 3 is the
most theoretically-relevant measure of networks (see a description of
network theory in Chapter 2) and is, therefore used as a control vari-
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able in estimates for model specification and parametrisation presented
in Chapters 5 and 6.
• Life priorities. To reduce student migration, many governments re-
strict the work opportunities available to them after graduation (UK
Parliament, 2016, p. 12). We included a question on individuals’ life
priorities to help determine how important having a steady income is
for the respondent. This will help us estimate how much they might
be affected by this type of policy.
• Demographics. We elicited demographic characteristics for three rea-
sons: (1) to serve as control variables in estimates for model specifica-
tion and parametrisation presented in Chapters 5 and 6, (2) to specify
social networks in the ABM, and (3) to determine eligibility for policy
conditions, as in Relationships abroad and Life priorities. The use of
these individual-level variables allows us to simulate these individuals’
real changes of successful legal migration (as opposed to their percep-
tions), and allows for immigration restrictions to be heterogeneous.
The heterogeneity of legal restrictions is in line with this thesis’ second
theoretical premise, which follows livelihood or capabilities approach
to migration (Carling, 2002; De Haas, 2011; Czaika, 2011; Faist, 1997)
outlined in Chapter 2.
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Table 4.2: Survey Data, Part I
Variable Description Question Wording
Aspiration
Range = 1-7
SD = 2.04
µ = 5.09
N = 1,147
(6) Like a moderate amount (7) Like a great deal.
(4) Neither like nor dislike (5) Like a little
(2) Dislike a moderate amount (3) Dislike a little
move to another country? (1) Dislike a great deal
to move abroad, how much would you LIKE to
Whether or not you think you would be ABLE
Ability
Range = 1-7
SD = 2.04
µ = 3.19
N = 1,102
(6) Moderately easy (7) Extremely easy.
(4) Neither easy nor difficult (5) Slightly easy
(2) Moderately difficult (3) Slightly difficult
personally, to move abroad? (1) Extremely difficult
How easy do you think it would be for you,
Illegal
Ability
Range = 1-7
SD = 1.71
µ = 2.01
N = 1,058
(6) Moderately easy (7) Extremely easy.
(4) Neither easy nor difficult (5) Slightly easy
(2) Moderately difficult (3) Slightly difficult
obtain fake immigration documents? (1) Extremely difficult
How easy do you think it would be for you to
Semi-legal
Ability
Range = 1-7
SD = 1.95
µ = 3.04
N = 1,106
(6) Moderately easy (7) Extremely easy.
(4) Neither easy nor difficult (5) Slightly easy
(2) Moderately difficult (3) Slightly difficult
(1) Extremely difficult
A JOB UNDER THE TABLE in a foreign country?
How easy do you think it would be for you to FIND
Seriousness
Range = 1-4
SD = 1.21
µ = 2.38
N = 1,146
(3) Quite seriously (4) Extremely seriously
(1) Not at all seriously (2) Somewhat seriously
How seriously have you considered moving abroad?
Risks
Semi-legal
Range = 0-10
SD = 3.27
µ = 5.27
N = 1,031
is also listed and included in the mean):
to migrate to a country not on this list, that country
respondent indicated previously that they would like
UK, Canada, Cayman Islands, Sweden. If the
countries (mean is computed for responses to US,
authorities? Please respond for each of the given
How many of these 10 do you think will be caught by
in a foreign country WITHOUT DOCUMENTATION.
each country, suppose 10 people try to GET A JOB
I’m going to give you a small list of countries. For
Risks
Illegal
Range = 0-10
SD = 2.75
µ = 7.33
N = 1,017
is also listed and included in the mean):
to migrate to a country not on this list, that country
respondent indicated previously that they would like
UK, Canada, Cayman Islands, Sweden. If the
countries (mean is computed for responses to US,
authorities? Please respond for each of the given
many of these 10 do you think will be caught by
THE BORDER without legal documentation. How
each country, suppose 10 people try to CROSS
I’m going to give you a small list of countries. For
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Table 4.3: Survey Data Pt. II
Variable Description Question Wording
Illegal
Direct
Range = 1-7
SD = 1.21
pi = 1.85
N = 1,147
(5) Somewhat agree (6) Agree (7) Strongly agree
(3) Somewhat disagree (4) Neither agree nor disagree
(1) Strongly disagree (2) Disagree
documentation
It is OK to ENTER a foreign country without legal
Semi-legal
Direct
Range = 1-7
SD = 1.60
pi = 2.40
N = 1149
(5) Somewhat agree (6) Agree (7) Strongly agree
(3) Somewhat disagree (4) Neither agree nor disagree
(1) Strongly disagree (2) Disagree
documentation
It is OK to WORK a foreign country without legal
Experiment
List
Illegal
Indirect
Treatment: 1-5
Range = Control: 1-4
Treatment: 0.84
SD = Control: 0.70
Treatment: 2.45
µ = Control: 2.32;
Treatment: 593
N = Control: 569;
would personally support.
Please tell me HOW MANY of the following options you
(5) For treatment group only: Obtain a fake visa.
(4) be smuggled across the border
(2) ask family members abroad to sponsor you
(1) Apply to a university in the new country
do to move permanently to a foreign country:
I’m going to give you a list of things that people sometimes
Experiment
List
Semi-legal
Indirect
Treatment: 1-5
Range = Control: 1-4
Treatment: 0.87
SD = Control: 0.70
Treatment: 2.33
µ = Control: 2.19;
Treatment:581
N = Control: 573;
would personally support.
Please tell me HOW MANY of the following options you
on a tourist visa.
(4)For treatment group only: Work under the table while
(3) deal drugs
(2) build an online profile for recruiters
(1) get an employer to sponsor you
do to work in a foreign country:
I’m going to give you a list of things that people sometimes
Priorities
Life
“income”, (1)
Only used
Range = 0-1
pi = 0.8
N = 1,166
(10) To live in a place without wealth inequality
(9) To save money
not by social class or connections
(8) To be evaluated by merits,
(7) To learn useful entrepreneurial skills
(6) To live near your close family
(5) To live in a place where government is transparent and fair
(4) To study and get qualifications
(3) To live your life openly without fear of discrimination
(2) To feel safe from crime
(1) To have a steady income
that you consider to be your top priorities.
Please listen to this list carefully and select THREE items
priorities that many people have.
I’m going to give you a list of
Rejections
Visa
Range = 0-6
SD = 0.81
µ = 0.38
N = 1,158
(9) 9 times (10) 10 times (11) more than 10 times
(5) 5 times (6) 6 times (7) 7 times (8) 8 times
(1) 1 time (2) 2 times (3) 3 times (4) 4 times
application rejected?
How many times have you applied for a visa, but had your
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Table 4.4: Survey Data Pt. III
Variable Description Question Wording
Generator
Name
Network
questions.
which person you’re talking about as I ask you a few additional
up an alias. The only thing that matters is that you remember
If you feel uncomfortable giving me their names, feel free to make
SIX MONTHS. Could you give me their first names, please?
to in the last year and have been living abroad for MORE THAN
Now I want you to think about Jamaicans who you have spoken
Relationship
Network
(4) A neighbour (5) Something else
(1) Friend (2) A family member (3) An acquaintance,
categories, please select all that apply.
a neighbour, or something else? For people that fit into multiple
person? Are they a friend, a family member, an acquaintance,
Which of the following best describes your relationship with each
Departure
Network
(only family, year)
When did they move to [country]?
Network
Support
a place to live or find a job?
into a new country? For example, they could help you find
Do you think you could count on this person to help you settle
Frequency
Networks
Range = 0 - 20
SD = 3.5
µ = 3.1
N = 1,166
Responses were truncated at “More than 20”
those who you’ve spoken to IN THE LAST YEAR.
in other countries? Please only think about
How many Jamaicans do you know currently living
(Imputed)
USD
income,
Yearly
2,133 USD
Range = 0.00 -
SD = 476.92
µ = 368.55
N = 1,166
(16) $162,001-$216,000 (17) More than $216,000
(14) $90,001-$126,000 (15) $126,001-$162,000
(12) $54,001-$72,000 (13) $72,001-$90,000
(10) $36,001-$45,000 (11) $45,001-$54,000
(8) $27,001-$31,500 (9) $31,501-$36,000
(6) $18,001-$22,500 (7)$22,501-$27,000
(4) $9,001-$12,000 (5) $12,001-$18,000
(1) No income (2) Less than $6,000 (3) $6,000-$9,000
(Jamaican Dollars).
dividends, interest, remittances, and all other income
all sources, including salaries, wages, pensions,
household? This figure should include income from
represents the total monthly income for this entire
Which of the following income ranges best
Education
Range = 1 - 8
SD = 1.22
µ = 4.56
N = 1,161
(7) University (8) Graduate school
Vocational school (6) Associate degree
school (4) Secondary school (5) Technical school/
achieved? (1) None (2) Pre-Primary (3) Primary
What is the highest level of schooling you have
As often occurs with survey data, household income yielded a high proportion of non-response. More
than a quarter of the sample declined to provide this information. We imputed missing values by
modeling household income as a function of gender, age, education, marital status, employment status,
sector of employment, and household remittances received. The imputation did not substantively
influence findings. 177
Table 4.5: Survey Data, Pt. IV
Variable Description Question Wording
Religion
Range = 1-12
Mode = (4)
N = 1,102
but does not belong to a religion)
(9) Agnostic, atheist (10) None (believes in a supreme entity,
(5) Mormon (LDS) (6) Rastafarian (7) Jewish (8) Jehovah’s Witness
(3) Non-Christian Eastern religion (4) Evangelical and Pentecostal
What is your religion? (1) Catholic (2) Protestant
Sector
Range = 1-11
Mode = (11)
N = 721
(9) Education (10) Information and Technology (11) Other services
(5) Crafts (6) Government (7) Construction (8) Transportation
(1) Agriculture (2) Industry (3) Banking (4) Retail/ Commerce
In which of these economic sectors are you currently working?
Gender
Range = 0,1
Female = 608
Male = 558
N = 1,166
Enumerator observation
Age
Range = 18-88
SD = 14.37
µ = 37.32
N = 1,163
How old are you?
Status
Marital Mode = (1)
N = 1,162
(6) Separated (7) Civil union (8) Widowed
(3) Married (4) Divorced (5) Common law marriage (living together)
What is your marital status? (1) Single (2) Visiting relationship
Status
Employment
“working”,(1)
Only used
Range = 0,1
pi = 0.57
N = 1,166
(7) Not working and not looking for a job
(5) Retired or disabled (6) Not working but looking for a job
(3) A student (4) Taking care of the home
(1) Working (2) Not working, but have a job (seasonal)
Please select all of the following that best identify you:
Which of the following best describes your current employment?
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4.3 Summary
This thesis combines agent-based modelling with a wide range of empirical
instruments to understand how aspiring migrants adapt to changes in immi-
gration policy by adopting alternative migration strategies. This chapter in-
troduces the empirics: a nationally-representative sample survey of Jamaica.
This short chapter has the following aims: (1) to describe the selected case
for empirical data collection (Jamaica); (2) to explain how the ABM moti-
vated the design of experimental and non-experimental survey instruments;
(3) To provide an overview of the survey, including the wording of questions
and descriptive statistics. The survey was tailored to fit the needs of the
ABM of unauthorised migration, following the proactive approach to em-
pirical embeddedness. The next two short chapters analyse the empirical
findings corresponding to some of the key junctures of this model.
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Chapter 5
The Effects of Immigration
Policy at the Micro-Level
Students of migration have paid little attention to the effects of immigra-
tion policy on population movements (Massey, 1999) and much less on how
policies exert their effects at the individual level (Hagen-Zanker and Mallett,
2016). Understanding how entry policies influence decision-making is cru-
cial for understanding how they shape migration flows at the macro level.
As (Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2016, p. 2) suggests, “in order to under-
stand the role that policy may (or may not) play in shaping the dynamics
of international migration, it is first important to understand the ways in
which individuals process information, think through their options, and se-
lect courses of action.”
This thesis examines the effects of immigration policy on migration sys-
tems by building a multi-level artificial system of potential migrants con-
nected through social ties. Policy change, propagated through these ties,
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influences agent decision-making and shapes emergent legal and unautho-
rised migration patterns at the system level. This short chapter and the
next zoom in on key processes of this agent-based model and the empiri-
cal evidence substantiating their specification. This chapter focuses on the
micro-level mechanism by which immigration policy affects individuals’ as-
pirations and perceived ability to migrate.
As examined in Chapter 2, authors have defined the effects of immigration
policy at the individual level as an ‘intervening obstacle’ (Lee, 1966) that
thwarts individuals’ migration projects (e.g. Carling, 2002; Faist, 1997:247;
Massey et al., 1998:12; Castles, 2004a; de Haas, 2010). Policy restrictions can
drive a wedge between individuals’ aspirations to migrate and their ability to
do so, as suggested in this thesis’ third theoretical premise. This is important
because, as will be examined in the next chapter, ‘involuntary immobility’
can motivate individuals to seek alternative, often illegal means to migrate.
However, the effects of policy on an individual are not so straight forward. As
Hagen-Zanker and Mallett (2016) suggest, immigration policy at the micro
level consists of a series of information signals, which define the set of options
for migration potential migrants perceive themselves to have. As theoretical
premise 4 of this thesis suggests, individuals are boundedly rational and
learn about policy from their own encounters with it (Carling, 2002; Epstein,
2003a) as well as from their social context (Massey and Zenteno, 1999). Taken
together, these premises guide the model relationship in question, which is
highlighted in blue on Figure 5.1.
Specifying and calibrating these model processes brought about empiri-
cal questions and measurement challenges. Existing literature is clear that
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Figure 5.1: Portions of the ABM Considered in Chapter 5
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immigration policies affect ability to migrate, however it has ambivalent ex-
pectations about the effect of immigration policy on aspirations. For ex-
ample, Castles et al. (2013b) suggest that, beyond a certain level of eco-
nomic development, “we can expect that migration aspirations are likely to
decrease... particularly when opportunity gaps with destination countries
decrease significantly” (p. 50, emphasis in the original). At the same time,
Castles (2004a) suggests that policies affect ability to migrate exclusively:
“potential migrants do not cancel migration just because the receiving state
says they are not welcome – especially if the labor market tells a different
story” (p. 860). Carling (2002) draws a clear relationship between policy
constraints and ability to migrate but does not clarify whether destination
policies also dampen the desire to migrate, leading to what he calls ‘volun-
tary non-migration’, or whether this type of non-migration is independent of
policy effects.
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Settling this ambiguity is theoretically important and is also essential
to the design of the ABM of unauthorised migration, as this programming
decision can affect the volume of unauthorised migration that emerges. To
explain, if we conceptualise policies as affecting both aspiration and ability
in equal measure, we are implying that individuals become content with
remaining home when immigration policies thwart their plans for migration.
If only perceived ability is affected by immigration policy – or is affected to
a higher degree than aspirations – we would conclude that policy creates a
large population of individuals who would like to migrate but are unable to
do so. Following premise 3(b), we would expect this group of individuals
– the “involuntary non-migrants” (Carling, 2002) – to consider migrating
through unauthorised channels with some, as of yet, undefined probability
(however, see Chapter 6).
So, does information about policy restrictions only affect individuals’ per-
ceived ability to migrate or does it affect both at the same time? Answer-
ing this question is methologically challenging, as aspiration and ability to
migrate are theoretically linked to the same factors that may be driving im-
migration policy change: past migration. Networks of family, friends and
acquaintances are a known facilitator of future migration (see Chapter 2)
and, by the same token, migration may drive more restrictive policies A
salient example of this is Lebanon’s January 2015 response to the ongoing
Syrian refugee crisis. To limit the influx of Syrian refugees into the country
and incentivize repatriation, the Government of Lebanon established restric-
tive border policies, followed by a freeze on registering refugees (UNHCR,
2017).
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To mitigate this endogeneity concern, the effect of policy on aspiration
and ability is measured using a between-subjects experiment, in which we
randomly assign individuals to receive audiovisual information about immi-
gration policy. Many experimental designs provide information to partici-
pants using written cues. We opted for a video cue as the information we
needed to convey was both lengthy and complex. Researchers have found that
a dual-modality (audio and visual) presentation can increase working mem-
ory capacity (Baddeley, 2013; Penney, 1989; Sweller, 2011). An experimental
approach helps us identify the causal effects of immigration policy on aspi-
ration and ability to migrate at the micro-level, independent of confounders,
allowing us to address this theoretical ambiguity and properly specify this
key process in the ABM. The experimental results are also used to set numer-
ical parameters of the ABM relating to the effects of receiving information
about immigration policy on decision-making.
A second design question arises from the manner in which policy informa-
tion is transmitted to agents throughout the system. As specified previously,
agents in the ABM receive information about immigration policy through
their own experiences and the experiences of their networks (Epstein, 2003a;
Massey and Zenteno, 1999). However, this mechanism is only partially ex-
amined in existing literature. Studies often find that previous migratory
experience and networks abroad are good predictors of migration propen-
sity (Massey, 1986; Piore, 1979; Garip and Asad, 2016; Carrington et al.,
1996), but do not often examine the effects of previous, unsuccessful, mi-
gration attempts (De Haas, 2010). That is, according to existing work, we
may expect that first or second-hand positive experiences may lead to a more
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positive perception of perceived odds of success, but we have little evidence
on whether the opposite is true. Immigration policy exerts its effects by
barring the entry of some and not others. Therefore, overlooking migration
failures inhibits our understanding of the effects of immigration policy at the
micro level. Our original survey questions allow us to examine the effects
of personal past experiences – both positive and negative – as well as the
number of ego-centric social ties who have successfully migrated abroad, on
perceived migration ability. This allows us to more adequately test whether
this information diffusion mechanism is likely to be present in our sample,
thereby completing the empirical specification of this portion of the model.
This short chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will describe the video
experiment procedure, including the script. I, then, describe the analysis and
results of two empirical tests: The effects of the video experiment on aspi-
ration and perceived ability to migrate, and a multivariate regression model
examining the effects of past migration experiences (positive and negative)
and the effect of successful networks on perceived ability to migrate. I then
conclude the chapter by discussing specifically how these empirical tests are
used in the ABM of unauthorised migration.
5.1 Materials and Methods: The Video Ex-
periment
Participants. The video experiment was embedded into the MDP survey (de-
tails on the survey items, the demographics of respondents, and the sampling
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procedure are detailed in Chapter 4).
After about 40 minutes of standard survey questions on migration, one-
third of the 1,166 survey respondents were randomly assigned to a treatment
group and one-third were randomly assigned to a control group. The remain-
ing third received a different, independent treatment, which is not part of
this thesis.
Materials. The treatment consisted of a 4-minute information video, focusing
on restrictions within the most common visa routes for the top three destina-
tion countries for Jamaicans – United States, United Kingdom and Canada
– specifically geared towards the Jamaican context. The video (script re-
produced below) emphasised the strict nature of quotas and requirements.
Given the Jamaican context, we believed it would be unethical to present
policy information as if it were easy to migrate. The video consisted of il-
lustrated animations we created using the online software Moovly and was
narrated by British Broadcast Corporation presenter Nick Ross.
The control group received a short message read by the enumerator,
thanking them for their time and telling them the survey will be finished
shortly. We decided not to include a control-version of the video for two
main reasons. First, a placebo video would have controlled for the extra
time it takes the respondent to watch a video. However, we did not be-
lieve this would be necessary in our case given the structure of our survey.
The treatment took place approximately forty minutes into our survey, and
the extra time taken to watch the video would have had a negligible effect.
Second, content that is unrelated to migration can inadvertently send mes-
sages about a location (Jamaica or any destination) that may encourage the
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respondent to want to stay in or leave Jamaica, particularly as they were
prompted to think about migration throughout the preceding survey ques-
tions. Therefore, we did not believe it was worth the risk of introducing a
new bias to control for the expected negligible effect of having seen a video.
The video script for the treatment group is reproduced below:
According to a recent study, almost 60% of all Jamaicans would
like to move to a new country in the next three years.
The United States, the United Kingdom and Canada are among
the top destinations. But Jamaicans who want to migrate often
find their possibilities for entry restricted.
There are VISITOR permits for each of these countries. You
might hear these visas referred to as 3, 5, or 10-year visas because
they expire after a certain number of years. But they do not let
you stay that long. You can stay in the US, UK and Canada for a
maximum of 6 months. These permits are for short-term visitors
only. What’s more, they don’t, under any circumstances, allow
you to work.
But there are some ways to move to a foreign country, find a
job, and create long-term opportunities for you and your family.
There are four common legal categories to enter the top desti-
nation countries: employment, family ties, lotteries, and asylum.
Each of these paths has its own obstacles and restrictions. In
fact, only a small fraction of those who would like to migrate to
these countries will be able to do so.
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Employment
Let’s take employment opportunities first. If you want to migrate
to earn a better living, one option is to secure an employment-
based visa. For high-skilled workers - such as university re-
searchers and high-level business professionals - these visas are
very competitive. In fact, a sponsoring employer in that country
must demonstrate that no local worker can do the job as well as
you, the foreign candidate. That is pretty tough.
For low-skilled workers, it can be nearly impossible to get employ-
ment visas. In some countries, like the UK, it is NOT possible to
get a permit for low-skilled work. The UK has so many people ar-
riving from European countries that it doesn’t recruit low-skilled
labour from anywhere else. For the US, there are only 5,000 per-
manent visas a year for low skilled workers. Those 5,000 visas
must be distributed among applicants from all over the world,
so you may find yourself on a waiting list for up to 6 years. In
Canada, the only programme that accepts low-skilled permanent
migrants is the Provincial Nominee Program, where geographic
regions nominate migrants who fit their exact needs and qualifi-
cations.
Family
Another option is to migrate through family ties. For these visas,
you can apply to live in a country where someone in your fam-
ily has already migrated legally. These visas are also extremely
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restrictive because the family member living abroad must show
that they have an income level high enough to allow them to
support the new arrivals. Also, in some cases, family members
who use these visas do not have access to government benefits.
In the U.S., with millions of family members applying each year,
wait times for these visas can last from 6 months to ten years,
and there are currently tens of thousands of Jamaicans on the
waitlist.
Lotteries
Some countries have immigration lotteries. Jamaicans are not
eligible for the US lottery, and many countries - like the UK – do
not have lotteries at all.
Refugees
People can sometimes migrate as refugees, but the process is dif-
ficult and the burden of proof is extremely high. Refugees must
prove that they simply can’t remain in their home countries due
to life-threatening persecution. Individuals suffering from poverty
or difficult economic conditions do NOT qualify as refugees.
Conclusion
So, many Jamaicans look to the rest of the world for opportunities
only to find their plans ground to a halt by restrictive policies.
The borders erected by foreign governments prevent the ebb and
flow of individuals across the world, along with their dreams of a
better life.
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Design. The experiment used a between-subjects design. The dependent
variables were aspiration and ability to migrate. See Chapter 4 for question-
naire wording.
Procedure. Enumerators received a prompt with the random group assign-
ment of the respondent through the Qualtrics oﬄine application on their
electronic tablets. If the respondent was assigned to the treatment group,
the enumerator showed respondent the 4-minute video on their tablet. The
respondent used a headset, which the enumerator disinfected in front of him
or her, such that no one but the participant could hear the video. Enumer-
ators were instructed not to let any other individuals view the video when a
participant was viewing it. Enumerators were also instructed not to discuss
any of the contents of the video with the participant to avoid contaminating
the treatment. Immediately after, all respondents were then asked about
their aspiration and ability to migrate.
A manipulation check suggests the video was an effective treatment. On
a scale of one to seven, where one is strongly agree and seven is strongly
disagree, 97% of respondents reported they somewhat agreed, agreed, or
strongly agreed that the video was informative. Due to the brevity of the
video, treated respondents were read a post-survey disclaimer stating that the
information presented in the video represented a brief and stylized account
of immigration policies. Respondents were encouraged to seek additional
information if they had any intention to migrate.
In the following section, I discuss the analysis and results of this experi-
ment.
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5.2 Analysis and Results
I begin by examining whether policy restriction affects perceived ability and
aspiration to migrate. Table 5.1 shows the effect of having received infor-
mation on policy restriction on ability and aspiration to migrate, depicted
in models 1 and 2, respectively. Policy Treatment is a dichotomous variable
indicating that the respondent received the policy treatment. The associ-
ated coefficient can be interpreted as a simple difference in the mean value
of the dependent variable across treatment and control groups. Each model
includes parish fixed effects and clustered standard errors by enumeration
district. As mentioned in the previous section, these models only contain
2/3 of the total sample (1,166).
Table 5.1: Average Treatment Effects: The Effect of Policy Information on
Ability and Aspiration to Migrate
Ability Aspiration
(1) (2)
Policy Treatment −0.550∗∗∗ −0.098
(0.140) (0.130)
Constant 3.100∗∗∗ 5.600∗∗∗
(0.240) (0.250)
Fixed Effects YES YES
Observations 775 785
R2 0.080 0.046
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.029
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors adjusted for sample design
As shown in Table 5.1, the policy treatment had a substantial effect on
perceived ability to migrate. Receiving a negative signal about immigration
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policy lowers one’s perceived ability to migrate by little over half a point on
the scale (both perceived ability to migrate and aspiration to migrate are
measured on a 7-point scale). This effect is also significant, with a p-value
lower than 0.01. Meanwhile, exposure to policy information did not have
a significant effect on aspiration to migrate. Methodologically, these results
demonstrate the need to conceptualize aspiration and ability as two separate
concepts in order to fully understand the effects of immigration policy, as
Carling (2002) suggests. The oft used ‘intent to migrate’ measure conflates
these two very distinct concepts. Substantively, they support the hypothesis
that immigration policy has an non-ambivalent effect on individuals – it
lowers perceived ability to migrate while desire remains unaltered. In other
words, restrictive policies appear to create involuntary, not voluntary, non-
migrants. These findings guide model architecture and the treatment effect
of the video experiment on perceived ability to migrate (0.55) is used to
calibrate relevant parameters (see the Discussion section of this chapter for
details).
In the ABM of unauthorised migration, individuals learn about the policy
environment through feedback resulting from personal migratory experiences
and the experiences of network ties, will inform expectations about the odds
of future success – or the perceived ability to migrate (Massey et al., 1998;
Massey and Zenteno, 1999; Leblang et al., 2009; Boyd, 1989; Massey et al.,
1993; Massey and Zenteno, 1999). In the analysis that follows, I will show
evidence of this mechanism.
Table 5.2 provides some multivariate linear regression models, using our
original MDP survey. These tests show the association between perceived
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ability to migrate and the migratory experience of oneself and of one’s net-
works. Table 5.2 includes two variables for personal migration experience:
past migration and past visa denial. The first is a dichotomous indicator
which equals one when the respondent has successfully migrated in the past
(Past Migration), and the second is a dichotomous indicator that equals one
when the respondent previously applied for a visa but was rejected (Past
Visa Denial). It also includes a variable, Network Migration, for the number
of Jamaicans the respondent knows who are living abroad, and a standard
set of control variables: gender, age, education and income.
These results show that respondents who have successfully migrated in
the past perceive a 0.48 points higher ability to migrate, and respondents
who have failed to migrate in the past perceive a 0.69 points lower ability
to migrate. These results suggest that individuals are likely evaluating their
odds of success in line with their own migratory history. Individuals also
learn from the experiences of their networks. With every additional network
contact living abroad, individuals’ perceived ability to migrate grows by 0.04
points.
5.3 Discussion
The aim of this chapter was to inform the programming choices made in the
agent-based model of unauthorized migration presented in Chapter 7. In
this chapter, I have described and analysed the results of a video experiment
which treated respondents with information about a restrictive immigration
environment. The average treatment effect estimate on perceived ability
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Table 5.2: The effect of migration experiences on ability to migrate
Dependent variable: Perceived Ability to Migrate
Male −0.092
(0.130)
Age −0.008∗
(0.005)
Education 0.160∗∗∗
(0.058)
Income 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001)
Network Migration 0.037∗
(0.022)
Past Migration 0.480∗
(0.250)
Past Visa Denial −0.690∗∗∗
(0.150)
Constant 2.700∗∗∗
(0.470)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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shown in Figure 5.1 (0.55) is incorporated into the ABM of unauthorised
migration as pi – the effect of a signal, from any source, on an individuals’
perceived ability to migrate. When the signal is positive, the coefficient’s
sign is flipped (pi = ±0.55). In real life, the effect of a signal about im-
migration policy on ability may vary depending on the source (Yaniv and
Kleinberger, 2000), or whether the information is positive or negative (Hahn
and Harris, 2014), among a myriad of different factors. In Chapter 8, I relax
the assumption of objectivity by varying the magnitude of pi in accordance
with theoretical expectations on cognitive bias from Psychology. In other
words, I examine migration outcomes when individuals alter their perceived
ability to migrate by different amounts depending on the source or valence
of the signal.
In the second portion of the analysis, I examined the effects of personal
and network migration experiences on perceived ability to migrate. These
results showed that, as expected, negative migration experiences lower in-
dividuals’ perceived ability to migrate, while positive first or second-hand
experiences increase it. These tests were not used for model calibration. In-
stead, they were used to substantiate the assumption that individuals’ past
experiences – as they relate to immigration policy – transmit signals to po-
tential migrants and that these signals affect individuals’ perceived ability to
migrate.
The next chapter examines the effect of aspiration and perceived ability
on support for unauthorised migration with the aim to specify and calibrate
a related model process.
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Chapter 6
Unauthorised Migration and
Norms
Prevailing explanations of migration conceive of aspiring migrants as util-
ity maximisers who will choose undocumented migration strategies if it is
cost-beneficial. As argued in Chapter 2, the neo-classical perspective allows
migrant decisions to be entirely subsumed to government enforcement poli-
cies, which can control the costs and risks of migrating (Massey et al., 1993).
Social-network theory takes the opposing view: governments cannot control
migration because social networks can mitigate these same factors and allow
migration to continue (Massey et al., 1998, p. 45).
This thesis does not dispute that individuals make rational evaluations
when choosing a migration strategy; it disputes that migrant decision-making
is just that. Unauthorised migration means breaking the law and, beneath
any cost-benefit calculations, there is a deeply personal barrier to migrant
decision-making that relates to norms – what individuals perceive to be so-
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cially acceptable or normal actions within their reference group (Mackie et al.
(2015); Gibbs (1965); Cialdini et al. (1991) also see Chapter 2 2.3). Omit-
ting this layer from our models of decision-making may lead to erroneous
expectations on the volume of unauthorised migration. If we assume that
all aspiring migrants will attempt an unauthorised strategy simply because
it is cost-beneficial, we will likely over-estimate the incidence of this type of
migration.
This thesis presents a data-driven agent-based model of unauthorised mi-
gration, where individuals’ beliefs about social expectations are a key feature
of its design. This chapter focuses on the model process that defines whether
an agent will or will not consider an unauthorised strategy, based on social
expectations. As is shown in Figure 6.1, agents define the set of migration
strategies they will consider early in their decision-making process. This
strategy set, S, will include an unauthorised strategy if the individual is
supportive of unauthorised migration. Only after they have included this
strategy in strategy set S, will they make a rational judgement on whether
to attempt unauthorised migration. Support for unauthorised migration, in
this model, is driven by a sense of ‘involuntary immobility’ – that is, when
the desire to migrate is high, but the ability to do so is lowered by prevailing
policy conditions (Carling, 2002; Castles, 2004a). We find evidence for this
policy effect in the preceding chapter.
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Figure 6.1: Portions of the ABM Considered in Chapter 6
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There are is a significant challenge associated with measuring individuals’
support of unauthorised migration and social norms more generally. Norms
rely on perceptions of approval or disapproval within a reference group. In a
natural, every day environment, individuals may express support for unau-
thorised migration if they believe their local reference group would also ap-
prove of this action. However, the belief that unauthorised migration is OK
is not necessarily held outside individuals’ reference group and is therefore
a sensitive topic for an outsider, such as an enumerator, to enquire about
(Mackie et al., 2015). When asked by an enumerator, individuals may down-
play their support for unauthorised strategies because they fear being judged.
Studies have shown that social desirability bias affects estimates on a wide
range of sensitive topics including voting (Silver et al., 1986), racial attitudes
(Kuklinski et al., 1997) and anti-semitism (Kane et al., 2004). Similarly,
social desirability may lead individuals to under-report support for unautho-
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rised migration and bias our estimates.
To elicit support for unauthorised migration we use list experiments, a
novel approach to measurement designed to limit the effects of social desir-
ability by protecting individuals’ privacy. Unauthorised migration is defined
using the full-noncompliance/ semi-noncompliance typology introduced in
Chapter 2. Briefly, full noncompliance includes strategies that circumvent
immigration law entirely, (e.g. migrating with no documents or fraudulent
documents) and semi-noncompliance comply with some aspect of the law
(e.g. strategies where migrants obtain legal documents but violate migra-
tory restrictions). This classification allowed us to define two very distinct,
common cases of unauthorised migration, which were used throughout the
survey described in Chapter 4 as well as in the list experiments: violating
the work conditions of a tourist visa (semi-noncompliance) and obtaining a
fake visa (full-noncompliance).
This chapter describes the list experiment and presents results compar-
ing list experiment estimates to responses obtained by direct questions to
evaluate the performance of the list experiment in mitigating the effects of
social desirability and, therefore, provide sound estimates to be used in cali-
bration. It then examines the relationship between ‘involuntary immobility’
and support for unauthorised migration through further analysis of the list
experiment, lending evidence to this key model relationship. It concludes by
outlining how these results guide the specification of the model process in
question and the numerical estimates used to calibrate relevant parameters.
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6.1 List Experiments
To mitigate issues of social desirability bias, researchers have used aggre-
gation techniques, where respondents are asked how many items from a list
they support instead of enquiring about the item of interest directly. The list
experiment is one such aggregation technique (Glynn, 2013). The sensitive
item of interest is added to a list of non-sensitive items. A control group is
randomly assigned to receive a list that consists solely of non-sensitive items
while the treatment group is randomly assigned to receive the same list with
the sensitive item included. Respondents are instructed to tell the enumer-
ator how many items they would support instead of which ones. This way,
respondents do not reveal their personal opinion about the item of interest to
the enumerator and their privacy is respected. If there are no systematic dif-
ferences between treatment and control groups, the difference in average item
counts reported between groups provides the overall proportion of support
for the sensitive item of interest (Blair and Imai, 2012; Glynn, 2013).
Though the list experiment is conceptually simple, there are certain con-
siderations that must be taken into account when designing it. To obtain
accurate results from list experiments, there must be no design effects, ceiling
effects, or floor effects (Blair and Imai, 2012). Researchers using list experi-
ments must assume that the only difference between the control list (or the
list of purely non-sensitive items) and the treatment list is the inclusion of
a sensitive item. However, when design effects are present, respondents are
evaluating list items relative to one another and the inclusion of the sensitive
item may affect their evaluation of the control items on the list. If this is the
201
case, treatment and control groups cannot be compared because the sensitive
item is no longer the only difference between treatment and control lists.
In the presence of ceiling effects, respondents would honestly support all
non-sensitive items. This means that treatment respondents do not have
the privacy protection needed for the list experiment to work. That is, if a
treatment group respondent supports all items on the list, she may expect
the enumerator will know she supports the sensitive item. Floor effects occur
when the respondent is not likely to support any of the control list items. If
respondents perceive that all non-sensitive items have low prevalence, they
may be concerned about their preferences being revealed to the enumerator
and under-report the number of items they support.
Design effects are difficult to mitigate, although there are ways to correct
them at the analysis stage (see Blair and Imai (2012)). However, researchers
may follow three pieces of generally accepted design advice to mitigate ceiling
and floor effects (Glynn, 2013): First, researchers should avoid including too
many high-prevalence items, or items that will likely be supported by all or
most respondents (Droitcour et al., 2004). Lists should also not be too short
to avoid ceiling effects (Kuklinski et al., 1997). Lastly, researchers should
avoid including too many low-prevalence, non-sensitive items to avoid floor
effects (Tsuchiya et al., 2007).
List experiments can also fail at the elicitation stage. List experiments
protect respondent anonymity insofar as it is impossible for the survey enu-
merator to know which items the individual supports. In practice, however,
improper implementation of list experiments can threaten anonymity. First,
respondents may not understand the instructions of the list experiment, par-
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ticularly if they are used to responding to questions directly. As such, rather
than reporting the number of items they would support, they may vocalize
which item they support the most. Alternatively, they may respond to each
item on the list individually, despite instructions not to do so. This im-
plementation failure is particularly likely if the list experiment is embedded
into a survey containing standard questions (as ours was), as respondents
may have entered into the habit of responding directly. We observed all of
these patterns while conducting pilot tests in Kingston.
To protect respondent privacy at the elicitation stage, we implemented
some practical solutions prior to fielding the survey. First, we devoted a
substantial portion of enumerator training to the use and purpose of list
experiments. We conducted several mock interviews and highlighted which
respondent behaviours are incorrect. Second, we explained our instructions
in greater detail in the survey instrument and specifically stated that the
appropriate response would be a numerical sum. Third, we included a dry-
run list experiment in the survey instrument, which walked the respondent
through a simple example. Fourth, we used show cards to identify the list
items and response options, and we specifically instructed enumerators not
to read any of the lists aloud unless the respondent required assistance. If
reading items on the list out loud, enumerators may inadvertently intonate
the sensitive item differently from the rest, making clear what they believe
is the appropriate response. This is likely to make respondents feel uncom-
fortable and exposed. To mitigate this issue, enumerators read the prompt,
presented the show card to the respondent, and the respondents considered
the items printed on the show card privately until they gave their answer.
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6.1.1 Materials and Methods: The List Experiments
Participants. Our list experiments were embedded into the MDP survey. De-
tails on the survey items, the demographics of respondents, and the sampling
procedure are detailed in Chapter 4. The survey sample consisted of 1,166
valid respondents. Respondents received three list experiments: a practice
list experiment, a list experiment on full noncompliance and a list exper-
iment on semi-noncompliance. All respondents received the same practice
list experiment as this was a dry-run intended only to instruct participants
on how to respond to this type of instrument. For the remaining two list
experiments, half of the respondents were randomly assigned to a treatment
group and the other half were assigned to a control group. Randomisation
for one list experiment was independent of the randomisation of the other.
That is, treatment and control groups did not consist of the same individuals
for both list experiments.
Materials. The practice or dry-run ‘experiment’ consisted of the following
list:
Now I’m going to ask you a new type of question. For this type
of question, I’ll give you a certain number of options, and I’m
going to ask you HOW MANY of these options you like or would
support. Please DO NOT tell me if you support each option
individually, but only tell me how many options from the list
you would support. In other words, your response should be a
number. This means we won’t know if you like each item, so you
are free to report what you truly believe without us knowing.
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Before we start the questions, I’m going to walk through an ex-
ample with you. I’m going to show you 5 possible foods you might
like to eat during the week. I want you to tell me HOW MANY
of these foods you would like to eat during the week.
• Curry goat
• Mangoes
• Jerk chicken
• Ice cream
• Steak
Now, on your own, think about which options you would choose
to eat. You may like curry goat, jerk chicken, and mangoes, but
please do NOT tell me that. KEEP THAT INFORMATION TO
YOURSELF. Then count the number of answers you support,
and tell me the TOTAL NUMBER. So if you would eat curry
goat, jerk chicken, and mangoes, then you would tell me the
answer is 3.
So tell me, how many choices would you select?
• I would select 0 options
• I would select 1 option
• I would select 2 options
• I would select 3 options
• I would select 4 options
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• I would select 5 options
• Don’t know
• No response
The unauthorised migration list experiments were designed to measure
support for a clear case of semi-noncompliance, and for a clear case of full
noncompliance. As specified, for the former, we chose the case of violating
the work conditions of a tourist visa and, for the latter, obtaining a fake
visa. For each list, the first two items are high-prevalence. The third item
is designed to be low-prevalence so that most respondents do not necessarily
respond affirmatively to all three control items. This was done to avoid
ceiling and floor effects, where participants respond affirmatively to or reject
all items.
The experiment on full noncompliance consisted of the following list. The
items in bold apply to list assigned to the treatment group.
I’m going to show you a list of 3/4 things that people sometimes
do to MOVE PERMANENTLY TO a foreign country. Please tell
me HOW MANY of the following options you would personally
support.
• Apply to a university in the new country
• Obtain a fake visa
• Ask family members abroad to sponsor you
• Be smuggled across the border
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How many choices would you select?
• I would support 0 options
• I would support 1 option
• I would support 2 options
• I would support 3 options
• I would support 4 options
• Don’t know
• No response
The experiment on semi-noncompliance consisted of the following list.
The items in bold were apply to the list assigned to the treatment group.
I’m going to show you a list of 3/4 things that people sometimes
do to WORK in a foreign country. Please tell me HOW MANY
of the following options you would personally support.
• Get an employer to sponsor you
• Work under the table while on a tourist visa
• Build an online profile for recruiters
• Deal drugs
How many choices would you select?
• I would support 0 options
• I would support 1 option
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• I would support 2 options
• I would support 3 options
• I would support 4 options
• Don’t know
• No response
Procedure. The practice or dry-run ‘experiment’ was provided to all respon-
dents approximately 10 minutes into the survey to introduce respondents to
the format. Directly after the practice list, half of respondents were ran-
domly assigned to a treatment or control group to receive the experiment on
semi-noncompliance. As with the video experiment in the preceding chapter,
randomisation was facilitated by the Qualtrics oﬄine survey platform on the
enumerator’s tablet. The treatment group were shown the same list as the
control group, albeit for the inclusion of the sensitive item highlighted in
bold above. Enumerators were instructed to provide respondents with the
show card containing the list relevant to the respondent’s group assignment.
Enumerators were told not to read the choices out loud unless the respondent
cannot or refuses to read the show card. The enumerator then recorded the
number of items the respondent supported.
Immediately after the semi-noncompliance list, respondents were ran-
domly re-assigned to treatment or control groups to receive the full non-
compliance list experiment. The same procedure was followed as for the
semi-noncompliance list experiment.
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6.2 Analysis and Results
In this section, I examine support for the two unauthorized migration strate-
gies by analysing the list experiments. I then compare responses to those
elicited through direct questions to evaluate whether list experiments im-
prove upon direct measures of support for unauthorized migration. In the
last set of tests, I examine whether, as hypothesised, a gap between aspiration
to migrate and perceived ability drives support for unauthorised migration.
However, before presenting the results of the list experiments, I show
tests for design effects using the ict.test function in the R list package
(Imai, 2011). With a Bonferroni correction for multiple testing, our mini-
mum p-values (1 and 0.95 for full noncompliance and semi-noncompliance
list experiments, respectively) fail to reject the null hypothesis of no design
effects for both experiments. This suggests that the list experiments were
well designed to capture support for unauthorised migration.
Table 6.1 shows the average treatment effects for both list experiments.
Differences between the groups – the average treatment effect – may be in-
terpreted as the proportion of respondents who support an unauthorised
migration strategy. The models estimate item count as a linear function of
group assignment, and we adjust each model to account for the sample de-
sign by including fixed effects for parishes and clustering standard errors by
enumeration district.
Each model is run for two samples: the full sample and a subsample of
aspiring migrants. Results on the full sample – the level at which random-
ization took place – are included to compare list experiment estimates with
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direct survey responses and evaluate possible effects of social desirability.
However, aspiring migrants are more likely to have deliberated on the mi-
gration process or attempted migration and their responses will, therefore,
contain less noise than those of individuals who do not wish to migrate. In
total, 801 respondents (69% of the total) are included in the aspiring migrant
subsample. Aspiration to migrate is based on the 7-point item, “Whether or
not you think you would be ABLE to move abroad, how much would you
LIKE to move to another country?” Aspiring migrants would like to migrate
at least “a little.” Because models based on this sample will have unbalanced
treatment assignment (as this is not the level at which randomisation took
place), control variables gender, age, education, income, networks abroad
are included in estimates of average treatment effects. These variables are
detailed in Chapter 4.
Table 6.1: Average Treatment Effects for Illegal and Semi-legal List Experi-
ments, Amongst Full and Aspiring Migrant Sample
Illegal Semi-legal
Full Sample Aspiring Migrants Full Sample Aspiring Migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.138 0.162 0.145 0.145
(0.052) (0.056) (0.046) (0.054)
p = 0.008 p = 0.004 p = 0.002 p = 0.008
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1,162 797 1,154 793
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for sample design
As is shown in Table 6.1, all list experiment treatment effects are statis-
tically significant below an alpha level of 0.05. Models 1 and 3 show that
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13.8% of the full sample supports the illegal strategy and 14.5% support the
semi-legal strategy. Within the subsample of aspiring migrants (Models 2
and 4), 16.2% of respondents support the illegal strategy, and 14.5% support
the semi-legal strategy. This suggests that levels of support are very close
for both types of unauthorised migration in both full and aspiring migrant
samples.
To evaluate the list experiment, we asked direct questions that were meant
to capture support for each strategy with slightly modified question wording.
Our direct questions asked how strongly the respondent agreed or disagreed
with the following statements: “It is OK to work in a foreign country without
legal documentation” and “It is OK to enter a foreign country without legal
documentation.” In response to these statements, 16% of the full sample
(17% of the aspiring migrant subsample) supported working without valid
documentation, and 6.3% of the full sample (7.2% of the aspiring migrant
subsample) supported entering without documents. The difference between
direct and indirect responses for semi-noncompliance is quite small, indi-
cating that this type of unauthorised migration may not be very sensitive
compared to full noncompliance. Furthermore, these results indicate that
list experiments are an improvement over standard measures of unautho-
rized migration and imply that, if direct measures of support were used in
the ABM of unauthorised migration, we would likely be under-estimating
levels of support for full-noncompliance.
But does a gap between aspiration and ability drive support, as expected
in literature? In the ABM of unauthorised migration, agents will only eval-
uate this process if they aspire to migrate. As such, Table 6.2 shows list
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experiment estimates for both strategies, conditional on the perceived gap
between aspiration and ability, among the aspiring migrant subsample. These
tests include the same control variables as in the direct effect tests among
the aspiring migrant subsample shown above.
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Table 6.2: List experiment treatment effects conditional on the gap between
aspiration and ability
Full Noncompliance Semi-noncompliance
(1) (2)
Treat 0.020 0.029
(0.068) (0.071)
Aspiration/ Ability Gap 0.0004 0.016
(0.014) (0.014)
Aspiration/ Ability Gap
Treat x
0.051∗∗ 0.035∗
(0.020) (0.020)
Male −0.123∗∗∗ 0.047
(0.041) (0.043)
Age −0.013∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Education −0.046∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022)
Income 0.0001 −0.00001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Network Migration 0.007 0.014
(0.008) (0.009)
Constant 2.120∗∗∗ 2.018∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.153)
Fixed Effects YES YES
Observations 1,078 1,071
R2 0.108 0.125
Adjusted R2 0.090 0.108
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors adjusted for sample design
A one-unit increase in the aspiration/ ability gap leads to a 5.1% increase
in individuals’ support for full non-compliance. This conditional effect is
slightly larger than for semi-noncompliance where the a one-unit increase in
the aspiration/ ability gap leads to a 3.5% increase in individuals’ support for
semi-noncompliance. These results indicate that it is appropriate to consider
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agents’ probability of supporting both unauthorised strategies as conditional
on the agents’ aspiration/ability gap in the ABM of unauthorised migration.
6.3 Discussion
This thesis argues that it is important to consider social norms when it comes
to unauthorised migration in our models of migrant decision-making. Omit-
ting this important part of decision-making will lead to erroneous expecta-
tions on the incidence of unauthorised migration. This chapter is concerned
with the model process that defines whether agents will or will not consider
an unauthorised strategy based on beliefs of what is socially expected.
Measuring support of unauthorised migration is a challenge: Individuals
will tend to downplay their support for unauthorised strategies because they
fear being judged by the questioner. To mitigate issues of social desirabil-
ity, we used list experiments, which provide individual respondents with the
privacy to respond to sensitive questions while yielding reliable estimates at
the aggregate level.
Results lend further evidence to the full/ semi-noncompliance typology.
It appears that individuals are willing to openly report support for the semi-
legal strategy, given the closeness between direct and list experiment esti-
mates, but estimates of the illegal strategy may suffer from social desirability
bias. This indicates that disaggregating the spectrum of illegality is impor-
tant when eliciting information on unauthorised migration as individuals may
have had very different responses to the question depending on the type of
strategy that comes to mind. These results also lend credence to the list
214
experiment methodology as social desirability bias does appear to present a
significant challenge when inquiring about unauthorised migration. If sup-
port for full noncompliance were asked directly, we would be underestimating
support for this type of strategy by about half.
When this evidence is taken together, however, a new question arises.
Individuals clearly perceive semi- and full noncompliance to be different types
of unauthorised migration, which means it is important to elicit information
about these two types of migration separately. However, these differences
appear to be driven by factors related to social desirability. Given that the
preceding evidence suggests we may effectively overcome this hurdle using list
experiments, is the distinction between full and semi-noncompliance worth
making in the agent-based model if we use list experiment estimates for
calibration? To answer this question, we need to take a broader view of
the model. In Chapter 4, we can see that individuals do make distinctions
across these two strategies when it comes to perceived ability. This affects
the process directly after the one considered in this chapter (Figure 6.1). It is
important that this distinction is made throughout all interdependent model
processes.
As shown in Figure 6.1, the decision on whether or not to include unau-
thorised migration strategies in strategy set S is a function of aspiration
and perceived ability to migrate, following the third theoretical premise of
this thesis. To substantiate this design choice, I examine the effects of the
aspiration/ ability gap on support for unauthorised migration. The aspira-
tion/ ability model (Carling, 2002) suggests that a high aspiration to migrate
coupled with a low ability to do so may drive individuals to consider unau-
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thorised migration strategies. Results on the conditional effects of the aspira-
tion/ ability gap on support for unauthorised migration show that support is
highly contingent on perceptions of involuntary immobility. The conditional
effects, 0.051 and 0.035 for full-noncompliance and semi-noncompliance, re-
spectively, are used to calibrate the probability of agents considering each
of these strategies in their strategy set, βillegal and βsemi−legal. This process
is part of the ‘Define strategy S’ procedure (Figure 6.1). The next chapter
presents the ABM of unauthorised migration in its entirety.
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Chapter 7
An Agent-based Model of
Unauthorised Migration
Scholars have suggested that visa restrictions reorient individuals, who would
have otherwise migrated legally, toward illegal channels. This expectation
is difficult to test empirically for three reasons. First, empirical evalua-
tions of immigration policy are vulnerable to endogeneity and other issues
of causal inference. Second, unauthorized migration is often unobservable
and, due to its sensitive nature, is likely to yield biased responses in surveys.
Third, interpersonal ties between migrants and would-be migrants form a
self-perpetuating system, which adapts in ways that are difficult to observe.
This ABM is the outcome of an iterative process of theorization, empir-
ical data collection, in-silico data generation and testing. The first stage of
development consisted of the following three steps: (a) building a theoretical
framework from existing theory, (b) finding gaps in the literature that needed
to be investigated (c) developing a sketch of the ABM. The set of theories
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that framed the ABM are described in Chapter 2. Theory was transformed
into to rules telling the ABM what operations to perform. In the process of
formalisation, certain gaps in the literature were highlighted (Johnson and
Groff, 2014). Formalisation also identified the parameters in the model that
needed to be quantified. To address these modelling needs, an original survey
was designed and fielded. This survey is described in Chapter 4. The anal-
yses, described in Chapters 5 and 6, were used to substantiate assumptions
and answer empirical questions; and to quantify parameters in model rules
and agent characteristics. Once the ABM was finalised and calibrated, it was
analysed. Analysis involved running several in-silico experiments examining
the effects of different immigration policies where the number and sociode-
mographic characteristics of migrants admitted into the destination country
was examined. These analyses can be found in this chapter.
Preceding chapters have tackled the first two challenges empirically. In
Chapter 5, I presented the results of a video experiment, which allowed us to
isolate the causal effect of receiving information about immigration policy at
the individual level. The results of this experiment showed that restrictive
immigration policy create a gap between individuals wish to migrate and
their desire to do so. In Chapter 6, I examined how this gap drove support
for unauthorised migration using a novel experimental technique to improve
the measurement of sensitive issues. This chapter embeds these empirical
findings into a dynamic agent-based computational model, which focuses on
the effects of immigration policy on decisions to migrate illegally and how
these effects are propagated across adaptive social systems.
The architecture of the model, shown in Figure 7.1, is based on the the-
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oretical framework developed in Chapter 2, Section 2.4. This theoretical
framework consists of eight premises, drawn from literature across the social
and behavioural sciences, regarding the conceptualisation of migration, the
effects of policy, the drivers of unauthorised migration as well as individ-
ual cognition, learning and decision-making. As shown in Table 7.1, specific
model design choices can be traced back to these premises.
Figure 7.1: System diagram showing agent decisions, feedback processes, and
data types used for calibration
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This ABM examines the effect of policy by “naturally” connecting pro-
cesses occurring at various levels of aggregation (Bonabeau, 2002; Brettell
and Hollifield, 2000): The effect of immigration policy trickles down from
the macro-level to the decision-maker and her social context. Migration is
composed of a wide range of strategies defined by individuals’ interaction
with the ‘immigration interface’ (Carling, 2002; Borjas, 1989a). The legal
categorization of migration places obstacles in individuals’ migration plans,
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which will vary depending on how their demographic and other character-
istics complement the labour or political needs of the receiving state (Lee,
1966; Massey et al., 1998; Faist, 1997; Carling, 2002; Sen, 2001; Castles et al.,
2013b; De Haas, 2003, 2010). Receiving state’s preferred level of immigration
control may be constrained by norms, such as the sanctity of the family unit
(Money, 1997; Hollifield and Wong, 2000), but opportunities are generally
skewed towards the skilled and wealthy (Thomas-Hope, 2005).
Individuals who do not meet the requirements of the receiving state do
not automatically become illegal migrants, however. First, like its legal coun-
terpart, unauthorised migration is an opportunity structure. As discussed in
Chapter 2, several studies have shown that individuals perceive unauthorised
migration as a continuum; each unauthorised strategy differs depending on
the degree to which it bypasses the laws of the receiving state (Ruhs, 2010;
Du¨vell, 2006). As such, individuals may adopt certain unauthorised strate-
gies and not others depending on the risks associated with them or, in other
words, their perceived ability to execute it successfully. Second, as discussed
in the previous chapter, unauthorised migration carries a normative barrier,
leading individuals to reject this form of migration regardless of whether it
is cost-beneficial. However, as empirical evidence presented in Chapter 6
suggests, agents do become increasingly likely to support migrating through
unauthorised channels as the gap between aspiration and ability widens (Car-
ling, 2002; Herna´ndez-Carretero and Carling, 2012).
These relationships can be observed in Figure 7.1, reproduced in previous
chapters, which depicts the ABM architecture. Following the evidence pre-
sented in Chapter 5, policy affects ability to migrate but not aspiration. As
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such, when policy is restricted, a gap between aspiration and ability should
emerge at the micro-level. Agents’ willingness to include an unauthorised
strategy into Strategy Set S, indicating their normative preferences, is driven
by a dynamically-adjusting ability to migrate on one hand, and a desire to
migrate – unaffected by policy – on the other. Agents use simple heuristics
in the ‘Choose Strategy S∗’ procedure: they select the strategy they believe
they are most able to execute (i.e. they “take the best” (Goldstein et al.,
1996)) and abandon the other choices. Their probability of attempting the
strategy is a second simple calculation, driven by the actual probability of
success for their chosen strategy. As in real life, policy affects agents through
local information signals. Agents learn about their environment through first
and second-hand experiences (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002; Epstein, 2003b;
Massey et al., 1998; Massey and Zenteno, 1999), as is shown in the rela-
tionships coded with red arrows in Figure 7.1. This process of learning and
deciding is adaptive, allowing individuals to quickly understand and gener-
alise to changing policy conditions (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002; Gigerenzer
and Goldstein, 1999).
To evaluate whether the model is a likely candidate for the real-life mech-
anisms underlying illegal migration, we took a two-stage approach. First, we
found empirical support for key theoretically-defined intermediary processes
in order to lend credence to agent rules. Some of these intermediary processes
also presented empirical questions that needed to be examined in relation to
the case at hand – Jamaica. This stage of the validation process is the sub-
ject of the two previous chapters. In this chapter, I examine whether the
model is able to reproduce key empirical regularities by comparing the sim-
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ulated output to independent government estimates as well as data from the
survey that has not been used to calibrate or specify the model. I, then,
present the results of in-silico policy experiments in which I examine the
counterfactual impact of restricting four common channels for legal volun-
tary migration – low-skilled, high-skilled, family-based and student visas – on
the legal composition of migration. The reorientation of otherwise legal mi-
grants to unauthorised channels may, of course, be mitigated by border and
interior enforcement. Therefore, I also examine the efficiency of increasing
the rate of apprehension for all immigration policy scenarios depicted.
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Table 7.1: Theoretical Questions for Modelling Choices and Reference Chapter
Premise Programming Decision (Chapter 2)
Conceptualization
1. Migration is non-binary
distinguishes between fully- and semi-noncompliant strategies.
low-skilled, family reunification and student migration (2) This model
(1) Legal migration can consist of four common legal categories: high-skilled,
2.3
Sections 2.1,
are heterogeneous
2. The effects of policy
different opportunities for migration
Agents with different characteristic profiles have
2.3
Sections 2.1,
aspiration and ability
3a. Policy drives a wedge between
but not desire to migrate
Receiving a signal about the policy environment affects perceived ability Section 2.1
unauthorised migration
3b. Aspiration and ability gap drives
unauthorised migration in strategy set S
Gap between aspiration and ability makes agents are more likely to include Section 2.1
of ability
choices based on norms and perceptions
4. Individuals make highly personal
when defining S
Agents consider norms against lawbreaking and perceived ability to migrate Section 2.3
limited
5. Individuals’ understanding of policy is
of others
Agents are boundedly rational and learn from experiences and experiences Section 2.2.1
6. Individuals adapt to changing policies
options are constrained.
Agents define feasible alternatives dynamically and move across them when Section 2.2.1
7. Migration systems are multi-level
are propagated through social contexts.
Individuals exist and learn how to act within social contexts. Policy effects Section 2.2.1
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7.1 Model Setup
The model consists of an environment, representing an origin country, au-
tonomous agents connected with each other through network ties, and con-
dition action rules that guide agent behaviour (Railsback and Grimm, 2011).
In this section, I describe the elements of the model that are generated at
the start of the simulation. The next section will describe the rules guiding
agent behaviour throughout a simulation run.
Geography: The island of Jamaica is represented by a grid of 11,881 cells.
It is divided into 14 subsections, each representing a Jamaican parish or
census administrative unit. To map the size of administrative boundaries
onto the grid space, I compute the proportion of the Jamaican territory
occupied by that parish. Table 4.1 in Chapter 4, shows how this calculation
was carried out as well as the correspondence between the sample and the
population. Informed by trends in the literature and our survey finding that
over 90% of the MDP sample were committed to a single destination country,
we depict a single corridor. Given that the model aims to isolate the effects of
immigration policy, the destination country is abstract of all characteristics
aside from its policy profile.
Agents and their characteristics: Each agent is allocated a profile of charac-
teristics belonging to an individual respondent from the MDP survey, includ-
ing parish of residence. Within this parish, each agent occupies a separate
cell. Modelling always involves some trade-offs. Our survey data are cross-
sectional, and this model operates under the assumption that agents do not
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change over time and are not replaced if they migrate. This allows us to
maintain the correlation structure of our data, as realistic demographic pro-
files are essential in determining agent eligibility for specific visa channels.
Social network: Concurrent with extant work (McPherson et al., 2001), social
tie formation is modelled as a function of agent similarity (homophily) and
geographical distance. No additional assumptions are made on the types of
relationships agents have with one another. McPherson et al. (2001) find that
individuals connected to one another are generally similar in the following
characteristics, in order of importance: Ethnicity, age, religion and education.
Because 89% of the MDP survey sample is of the same ethnicity (black), we
construct a homophily index based on the latter three characteristics.
For religion, agents are considered to be either strictly alike or distinct.
Hence, for this characteristic c, we compute an index of similarity, sci,j, for
each pair of agents i and j as follows,
sci,j =

0, if ci 6= cj,
1, if ci = cj
(7.1)
As age (range = 18-88) and education (range = 1-8) can be treated as
continuous (see Chapter 4 for details), they are constructed differently. For
these characteristics, sci,j is computed as,
sci,j = 1−
|ci − cj|
rc
, (7.2)
where rc is the full range of the demographic.
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Total demographic similarity si,j is given by computing a weighted sum
of values across all demographic characteristics considered.
si,j =
C∑
c=1
wcs
c
i,j (7.3)
The weight, wc is the relative theoretical importance of a demographic c
for tie formation, following McPherson et al. (2001). Age is weighted highest
(wage =
3
6
), followed by religion (wreligion =
2
6
) and education (weducation =
1
6
),
such that
C∑
c=1
wc = 1.
The probability of two agents being connected (p(i, j)) is defined as fol-
lows:
p(i, j) =
si,j
exp(λ(di,j − f)) , (7.4)
where di,j is the spatial distance between agent i and agent j, normalised
by the maximum distance possible between any agent i and j, and f is
the minimum possible distance between two agents in the grid space (as
mentioned above, only one agent occupies a given cell). This constant is
subtracted from di,j, shifting the function such that p(i, j) = 1 only if two
agents are at a minimum distance from each other, and are identical on all
characteristics as captured by si,j. The rate at which interactions decay with
increased distance will generally follow an exponential curve (Taylor, 1983).
Parameter λ controls the rate of exponential decay. Ongoing data collection
aims to determine the value of λ in the case of Jamaica. In the meantime,
due to lack of data, we assume that a person living at the centroid of an
average-sized parish has a roughly 0.5 probability of knowing anyone at the
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edge of the parish adjacent, assuming they are identical on all characteristics
captured by si,j.
Time scales and updating. The duration of a migration decision, from an
initial desire to migration attempt, is considered to be one year, following
theoretical evidence (Rossi, 1955; Lansing and Mueller, 1967) and estimates
on immigrant visa processing times (Visa Journey, 2017). As agents’ actions
are dependent on those of others, agent variables are updated synchronously
at the end of a procedure (Railsback and Grimm, 2011). This ensures that the
only factor limiting agents’ access to information is the boundedness imposed
by network structure and not the time at which the agent is called to act
(and how much information it was able to accumulate up to this point). This
design mimics information seeking in uncertain decision scenarios, of which
international migration is an example.
Data embeddedness. Although most aspects of empirical specification and
calibration for this model have been examined in previous chapters, there are
a few key points worth reiterating briefly. First, we measure aspiration and
ability to migrate as distinct indicators and operationalise perceived ability
to migrate as strategy-specific. We also measure support for illegal strate-
gies separately from the ability to migrate irregularly, as many individuals
would like to move abroad but are unwilling to consider irregular channels
(see Chapter 4 for more details). We used a video experiment and a list
experiment to estimate the influence of policy on migrant decision-making,
and support for unauthorised strategies, respectively. Full details on these
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analyses and how they inform the model can be found in Chapters 5 and 6.
Table 7.2 below shows the types of data collected and Figure 7.1, shown at
the beginning of this chapter, illustrates where they feed into the model.
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Table 7.2: Data collected or used to calibrate the model
Type Estimate
Variable/
Values Source
across
Vary
Variables
Individual
D = L ∩ Se
Desire to migrate,
1 ≤ Se ≤ 4
1 ≤ L ≤ 7 Survey item
agents
S = {Legal
a strategy, AS
Ability to execute 1 ≤ AS ≤ 7
updated
endogenously
Survey item,
Semi-legal, Illegal}
Family}
Sector, Income,
d = {Education,
demographics, αd
Visa eligibility
0 ≤ αf ≤ 20
0 ≤ αi ≤ 2, 130
αs = {0, 1}
1 ≤ αe ≤ 8 Survey items
Fixed
Effects
Aggregate
pi
(positive/ negative),
policy information
Effect of receiving pi = ±0.55
experiment
Policy
ability on θSill
aspiration and
Effect of gap in
βsemi = 0.04
βillegal = 0.05
experiment
List
setting
model
Varies by
Policy
border detection, r
Prob. avoiding
Figs. 3-5: r = 0.3
0 ≤ r ≤ 1 Survey item
migration, p
semi-legal
Prob. successful
Figs. 3-5: p = 0.32
0 ≤ p ≤ 1
Survey item
US State Dept.,
Family}
Low-Skilled,
Student,
{High Skilled,
Visa quotas, vq
0 ≤ vq ≤ 1
Survey items
DHS Yearbook,
This table shows policy settings for the validation model. Details on policy
values for in-silico experiments can be found in Table 7.4. Income is in US$.
p is a product of visitor visa acceptance rates and internal enforcement. We
approximate this probability using two variables: 1) the 2015 acceptance rate
for Jamaicans applying for visitor permits to the US (68%) (U.S. Department of
State, 2015b), and 2) the mean perceived probability of avoiding apprehension
while working in a foreign country with a visitor permit (47%, see Chapter 4,
Table 4.2). The product of these two variables results in an overall probability
of success of 32%, (68% probability of failure).
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7.2 Main Procedures: Individual Decisions
To engage in migration, individuals must both desire and perceive themselves
capable of migrating (Lee, 1966; Massey et al., 1998; Faist, 1997; Carling,
2002).1 In the MDP sample, aspiring migrants are defined as those surveyed
who would like to migrate at least “a little,” and have considered migrating at
least “quite seriously”. As such, desire to migrate is defined by the intersect
of two variables: L, “like”, and Se, “seriousness” (see Chapter 4 for more
details on variable scales). As such, absent the desire to migrate, agents
choose to stay home. If they wish to migrate, individuals choose a channel.
Most broadly, there are two types of migratory channels: legal and illegal.
All strategies or channels are denoted as S, where {Sleg, Sill} ⊂ S. Legal
channels include common visa routes.
This model distinguishes between full non-compliance, or strategies that
circumvent immigration law entirely (e.g. migrating with no documents or
fraudulent documents) and non-compliance (e.g. strategies where migrants
obtain legal documents but violate migratory restrictions). This typology is
discussed in Chapter 2.
Agents evaluate their willingness to consider each unauthorised strategy
separately because it is possible that they will be willing to consider one, but
not the other. Not all migrants will view one or either of these strategies
favourably. Individuals are more likely to consider irregular channels as the
gap grows between their desire to migrate, D, and their ability to migrate
legally, Aleg (Massey et al., 1998; Castles, 2004b). Therefore, the probability
1This model focuses on voluntary migration.
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that agents will be willing to consider each irregular option, θSill , is con-
ditional on this gap (see Chapter 6). This process creates the individual’s
strategy choice set.
Each agent has a different perception of their ability to migrate through
a given channel. Agents choose the (legal, semi-legal or fully illegal) strategy
they will attempt, S∗, through a weighted random draw, with each strategy
weighted by the agent’s perceived ability to execute it.2 The agent will only
attempt S∗ with a probability P (Attempt) defined by:
P (Attempt) = 1/1 + e(k(T−AS∗ )), (7.5)
where T is the middle category in the 7-point ability scale3 and k is the
curvature of the logistic function. For the most of this chapter, k is left
at 1. I show alternative specifications of k when testing the quality of the
model, later in this chapter. I also display alternative results for our main
empirical finding in Appendix A.1. We find that, while k affects overall levels
of migration, it does not substantially change its legal composition.
An agent’s perceived ability to migrate may or may not coincide with
current policy conditions. If an individual has chosen to attempt a legal
strategy (S∗ = Sleg), they will evaluate their demographics according to the
requirements of the receiving state. Common legal migration routes include
student, low-skilled, high-skilled and family-based visas. An individual may
2Note that the strategy set may be reduced if the agent is unwilling to consider one
or both of the irregular strategies.
3This question asks: How easy do you think it would be for you, personally, to move
abroad? The middle category – “ neither easy nor difficult” – is considered the point
of indifference, where the probability of attempt is 50/50. More details can be found in
Chapter 4.
231
Figure 7.2: P(Attempt) with alternative curvatures, k
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be prevented from migrating legally simply because they do not meet the
classification criteria for any legal categories (hereafter, baseline eligibility
criteria). For instance, an individual with no family abroad cannot migrate
through family reunification, regardless of quotas or restrictions. We define
the set of legal migration categories for which a given migrant is eligible
as Vi, where Vi ⊂ Sleg. In addition, a series of requisites and quotas may
be placed on each of the channels exogenously, thereby excluding otherwise
eligible individuals. This information is summarised in Table 7.4, along with
the details of each policy experiment, described in Section 7.4. Agents are
assumed to be indifferent about available legal channels. That is, if the
individuals’ optimal migration strategy is legal migration, they will migrate
legally if they are eligible for at least one visa.
For agents whose optimal strategy is an illegal one, the rules are much
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simpler. The overall probability of success through each of the two illegal
strategies is applied uniformly. Individuals will migrate if they successfully
avoid enforcement. In real life, undocumented migrants may regularise their
status in the destination, or legal migrants may become undocumented af-
ter entering legally. As this model focuses exclusively on migrant entry, no
assumptions or generalizations are made about shifts in legal status after
entry.
In a simulated year, an individual may attempt only one strategy S, legal
or otherwise, to account for the time necessary to prepare for migration,
possibly through an alternate channel, in the next year. Agents that have
migrated are excluded from subsequent model processes, but influence the
decisions of their network.
7.2.1 Interaction and Learning
Potential migrants are not immediately or uniformly aware of immigration
policies; they learn through interaction with immigration authorities and the
experiences of others. In this model, agents update their perceived ability to
migrate by aggregating this information. The ability to migrate is dynamic,
but aspiration is not. Specifically, individuals accumulate information from
their network contacts, ηj, and from their own experiences, ηi. These signals
are strategy-specific, and may be positive or negative. For simplicity, all in-
formation sources are assumed to affect agents’ perceived ability to migrate
through any strategy by the same magnitude, pi. Tests examining the effects
of alternative weights on positive and negative signals, as well as signals ob-
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tained directly and indirectly are examined in the next chapter. The impact
of omitting network effects is also explicitly examined.
C is defined to be the unique effect of the cumulative information an indi-
vidual obtains from network contacts, ηj, on their ability to migrate through
a given strategy. Each additional signal about the policy environment is
assumed to have a decreasing marginal effect on agents’ perceived ability
to migrate through that strategy. Following established literature on the
learning curve (Estes, 1950; Heathcote et al., 2000), we take the natural log
of the sum of contacts, j ∈ J , who relay an experience with immigration
policy. Agent i computes C separately for positive (C+) and negative (C−)
information at time t. The only difference is the direction of pi.
Cti,± = ±pi(1 + log
J∑
j=1
ηj) (7.6)
Individuals also learn from personal experiences with immigration policy.
These experiences are necessarily negative, as a positive experience would
entail a successful migration, after which no learning is necessary. B is defined
as the unique effect of an agent’s own experience with immigration policy on
the ability to migrate through a given strategy. Similar to Equation 7.6, the
effect of one additional migration failure, f , for agent i, is considered to be
marginally decreasing.
Bti = −pi(1 + log
F∑
f=1
ηi,f ) (7.7)
Finally, each simulated year, agent i updates its ability to migrate for
each strategy S as follows:
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Ati,S = A
t−1
i,S + ∆Bi + ∆Ci,+ + ∆Ci,−, (7.8)
where Ati,S is censored to maintain the range of the original survey scale.
To evaluate whether the model architecture described above might ap-
proximate the real life mechanism connecting immigration policy to unau-
thorised migration outcomes, it is important not only to evaluate model rules
empirically but also to compare simulated to real world outcomes.
7.3 Comparing the Model to Real World Out-
comes
In this section, I demonstrate that our model is fairly accurate in simulat-
ing: (i) migrant volume (ii) proportion of migrants who are unauthorised
and (iii) number of migration attempts – a measure of the rate of learning
about policy across agents. We focus on the case of Jamaica-US migration
for these tests because it is possible to obtain independent estimates of US
unauthorised migration that are disaggregated at the origin country level.
When comparing migrant volume and composition, we use independent data
from the Jamaican census and the US Census Bureau. To evaluate migrant
learning, we employ survey data not used in model calibration. I will show
that, despite data limitations some close comparisons can be drawn between
the model output and empirical data.
However, in order to compare model outputs to real world scenarios, we
must construct a realistic, artificial legal entry policy. We do this by lever-
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aging agent-based modelling’s natural ability to combine data from different
sources. As such, before comparing the model output to real-life estimates,
I explain how this legal entry policy was constructed and tested.
7.3.1 Constructing a Realistic ‘Immigration Interface’
We operationalise immigration policy as consisting of a series of success prob-
abilities associated with each of four visa channels – student, high-skilled
work, low-skilled work and family reunification. To construct these proba-
bilities, we need two quantities: (1) applicants for visa v and (2) number of
individuals who either succeeded or failed in attaining visa v.
We define subset Av as consisting of respondents that are likely to apply
for v. More specifically, agents/ respondents belonging to the subset Av must
satisfy all of the following conditions: (1) consider migration to be at least
“slightly easy” for them (2) they would like to migrate at least “a little” (3)
have thought “quite seriously” about migrating and (4) meet the baseline
eligibility requirements for a given visa. Details on the baseline eligibility
criteria can be found in Table 7.4 below.
Agents can only attempt one migration strategy per year, t. To avoid
counting the same respondent in more than one visa applicant pool, Av,
agents randomly select one visa option across those for which they are eligible
at the baseline. Specifically, each agent chooses a random number ranging
from zero to the length of their set Vt=0, indexing the selected visa. The
agent will then be counted in the applicant pool associated with the selected
visa.
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Because the MDP survey is a random, representative, sample of Jamaica,
we assume the proportion of the MDP sample belonging to subset Av is
similar to the proportion of adult Jamaican citizens, N , that are likely to
apply for a visa. This allows us to estimate a number of applicants that
can be paired with official statistics from the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security on the yearly number of visas v granted to Jamaican applicants, Svt ,
from 2000 to 2012 (Department of Homeland Security, 2000).
We define the probability of obtaining a visa v in a given year as,
P vt =
Svt(
Av
n
) ∗N , (7.9)
where Svt is the raw number of visas given to citizens of Jamaica in year
t. We multiply the proportion of the MDP sample n belonging to set Av
(or proportion of applicants) by N , the adult population of Jamaica in 2001.
Note that while the number of visas granted vary per year, the set of appli-
cants (the denominator) is maintained constant at 2001 levels as the survey
data is cross-sectional.
Figure 7.3 verifies that simulated migrant entries for all four visa cate-
gories were similar to official data. To take into account differences in scale, I
present the relative proportion of entries for each visa category. The left panel
shows simulated output and the right panel shows Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) data.
The proportions of entries for each visa category are very similar. Stu-
dents and low-skilled workers receive comparable proportions of visas, and
these two channels make up the majority of visas. The smallest visa category
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Figure 7.3: Verification of Artificial Entry Policy using Data From the De-
partment of Homeland Security
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for all years is the high-skilled visa category, which consistently represents
approximately 10% of all visas received in both panels. This result indicates
that the applicant pool for each visa, Av, in the MDP sample is similar to
that in the real Jamaican population. However, the simulated outputs are
smoother than their empirical counterparts. This is due to the fact that the
probability of success for all visa categories has a constant denominator (see
Equation 7.9), which has the effect of smoothing out changes across years.
This policy is used in tests comparing several three simulated outputs to
empirical data. In the next section, I present validation results for alternative
specifications of the curvature of the logistic function (k) which transforms
an individuals’ perceived ability to migrate through the chosen strategy into
the probability of attempting migration (see Equation 7.5). Figure 7.2, which
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can be found in Section 7.2, displays the curves resulting from alternative
specifications of k.
7.3.2 Comparing Volume and Composition To Real
World
First, I compare simulated outcomes on migrant volume and legal composi-
tion to census estimates. The model is initialised with a proportion of agents
abroad equal to the proportion of the Jamaican adult population present in
the US in the year 2000. As our survey sample is residing in Jamaica at
the start of the simulation (representing potential migrants), the migrants
placed abroad at the start of the simulation do not come from the MDP sam-
ple of 1,166. To construct this proportion, we use data from the US Census
Bureau (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000; Warren, 2003) and the Jamaican census
(STATIN, 2001). A proportion of these agents is defined as undocumented
using estimates from the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (the
former office of the DHS) on the illegal Jamaican migrant population in the
US (Warren, 2003). The model is run 1,000 times for twelve simulated years.
The results of these validation tests, shown in Figure 7.4, indicate that the
model simulates real migrant volume and composition fairly accurately. The
left panel presents displays results for volume and the right panel presents
results for legal composition. To assess migrant volume, we compare the pro-
portion of agents abroad at the end of 12 simulated years to the proportion
of the Jamaican adult population present in the US in the year 2012 (Passel
and Cohn, 2014). According to the augmented American Community Survey
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(ACS), collected by the US Census Bureau, and the Jamaican census, there
were approximately 34.13 Jamaican migrants in the United States for every
100 Jamaican adults living on the island, or 680,845 migrants living in the US
to 1,995,148 Jamaicans over 15 years old on the island in 2011. Figure 7.4.a.
shows the simulated mean in green and the associated 2.75 and 97.5 percentile
error across the 1,000 model runs, next to the census estimates in grey. One
thousand simulation runs yielded means of 38.9% (P2.75 = 37.3, P97.5 = 40.6),
35.7% (P2.75 = 34.2, P97.5 = 37.2) and 34.7% (P2.75 = 33.2, P97.5 = 36.3), mi-
grant agents for every 100 Jamaicans on the island, for k = 1, k = 2 and
k = 3, respectively. Rates for all three specifications of k are similar to the
census-based estimates. However, it is clear that the larger the value of k,
the smaller the resulting migrant volume. This difference in volume across
settings of k is due to the underlying distribution of the variables in question.
Figure 7.4: Validating with Census Data: Average Composition and Volume
with 2.75 and 97.5 Percentile Error
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As mentioned above, the probability of attempting migration is a function
of individuals’ perceived ability to migrate using their chosen strategy S∗. As
can be seen in Figure 7.2, agents’ probability of attempting migration in the
left-most half of the figure increases at a higher rate for k = 1 than for the
functions displaying curvatures of k = 2 and k = 3. The same relationship
can, of course, be observed when comparing k = 2 to k = 3. This would not
have a biasing effect if the sample distribution of ability were symmetrical.
However, as shown in Table 4.2, Chapter 4, the sample distribution of the
three ability variables is skewed towards lower values, with the mean resting
on the “slightly difficult” (legal and semi-legal) or “moderately difficult”
(illegal) categories. These categories correspond to ‘2’ and ‘3’ on the 7 point-
scale, respectively. Therefore, because the distribution of ability to migrate
is not symmetrical, the majority of agents will have a higher probability of
attempting migration when the curvature of P (Attempt) is smaller.
Figure 7.4.b. shows comparisons for composition of migrants in terms
of their legal status in 2012. Composition is defined as the number of
(real/simulated) unauthorised Jamaican migrants in the US divided by the
total number of (real/simulated) Jamaican migrants. It is important to note
that data on unauthorised migration are limited and often inaccessible. As
mentioned, to our knowledge, the US is the only top Jamaican migrant des-
tination, for which estimates of unauthorised migrants can be disaggregated
by country of origin.
Figures on the unauthorised Jamaican migrant population in the United
States in 2012 used here, were estimated and published by the Centre for
Migration Studies using data from on the augmented ACS (Rosenblum and
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Ruiz Soto, 2015; Warren, 2014; Center for Migration Studies, 2017). These
estimates are calculated using the residual method, where the legal foreign-
born population is subtracted from the total foreign-born population(Warren,
2014). These estimates indicated that there were approximately 100,000
unauthorised Jamaican migrants in the United States in 2012, or 15% of
all Jamaican migrants. In this computational model, 23.4% (P2.75 = 20.5,
P97.5 = 26.4), 23% (P2.75 = 20, P97.5 = 26) and 23% (P2.75 = 20.1, P97.5 = 26)
of migrant agents were unauthorised in 2012, for k = 1, k = 2 and k = 3,
respectively. The value of k does not meaningfully affect the proportion of
migrants who migrated through unauthorised channels.
These results indicate that the model produces outputs that are com-
parable to real world estimates of volume and composition. The value of
unknown parameter k, which affects the curvature of agents’ probability of
attempting migration through their chosen strategy, affects the volume of
migration but does not appear to affect its legal composition in a meaningful
way. In the next section, I consider an output that is not easily observed in
the real world.
7.3.3 Comparing Learning to Real World
Individuals stop attempting to migrate through a given channel once their
perceived ability to do so falls below a threshold. If the adaptive process
reflects reality, the distribution of unsuccessful visa applications for agents
should be comparable to survey estimates on Jamaican visa denials. To assess
this, the numbers of unsuccessful visa applications per agent were compared
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to the actual numbers of failed attempts in securing a visa among the MDP
survey sample. This data was not used to calibrate the model. These figures
include failed applications for all visas, including visitor permits. Whereas
the simulation has a defined period (12 years) within which individuals can
attempt to migrate, data on the time span within which respondents applied
and were denied visas is not available. The MDP survey asked respondents
how many times they had applied for a visa and been rejected any time in
the past. Despite these limitations, survey and simulated distributions are
qualitatively similar.
Figure 7.5 presents distributions of the empirical and simulated attempts
as a proportion of total agents/ respondents. Simulated values are averaged
over 1,000 model runs. As is clearly shown, the vast majority of survey
respondents and simulated agents are never denied a visa, either because
they did not apply or because they were successful on their first attempt.
243
Figure 7.5: Visa Denials, Average Distribution with 2.75 and 97.5 percentile
error
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In the MDP survey, slightly more individuals were never denied a visa,
relative to the simulated output for all values of k. On average, survey re-
spondents unsuccessfully attempted to secure a visa 0.38 times, relative to
0.81, 0.7 and 0.67 in the simulation, for k = 1, k = 2 and k = 3, respectively.
The median and mode rests at 0 for the survey as well as all simulation
settings. Simulated agents are somewhat more persistent than survey re-
spondents, with a small proportion of agents unsuccessfully attempting to
secure a visa up to 11 times. However, both the empirical and the average
simulated distributions display a clear exponential decay for which the model
parameters were similar for the empirical and simulated data.
The distributions were fitted using an exponential function of the form:
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y = a× exp(bx), (7.10)
where y is the proportion of failed attempts to obtain a visa, a is the
base and b is the decay factor. Table 7.3 shows the empirical and simulated
distribution fits (averaged across runs) are similar. As is clearly visible in
Figure 7.5, the decay factor amongst the survey sample is smaller than in the
simulation, for all values of k. This figure and the parameters for the best
fit curve indicate that a curvature of k = 1 yields a distribution of migration
attempts that is most similar to the empirical distribution.
Table 7.3: Parameters and 95% Confidence Intervals, Exponential Curve
Fitting to Simulated and Survey Data on Failed Attempts to Obtain Visa
Simulation
k Base Decay Factor R2
1 4.59 (2.93, 6.25) -1.84 (-2.19, -1.50) 0.99
2 6.79 (4.46, 9.13) -2.16 (-2.50, -1.82) 0.99
3 7.99 (5.19, 10.78) -2.30 (-2.64, -1.95) 0.99
Survey
3.58 (2.48, 4.68) -1.55 (-1.84, -1.27) 0.99
7.4 Experimenting with Policies
ABMs make it possible for us to isolate components of a policy package
and test their interactions, enabling controlled experiments that would be
impossible in real life. Our experiments examine restrictions on students,
high-skilled and low-skilled workers, as well as individuals who migrate to join
family members abroad. Additionally, we examine a policy of free movement
and a scenario where all the channels mentioned are restricted.
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In this section, I discuss these policies and how they were implemented
in the ABM. Table 7.4 at the end of this section, summarises the minimum
eligibility criteria for each visa channel as well as the additional quotas and
requirements implemented through the various policies we test.
7.4.1 Early Departures for International Students
Student migration has become politically problematic in many countries.
To reduce student migration, many governments restrict the opportunities
available to them after graduation. For example, one of the 2015 UK General
Election commitments was a net reduction in migration to under 100,000,
and in 2014, students made up the largest share of the non-EU migrant
population (British Future and Universities UK, 2014). The UK closed its
post-study work route to new applications from non-EU students in April
2012 (UK Parliament, 2016, p. 12). In this model, agents who intend to
work or save money while abroad will no longer be able to migrate if this
option is restricted.
7.4.2 Closing Doors to High-Skilled Workers
Although native populations are generally supportive of high-skilled migra-
tion relative to low-skilled migration (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010), many
politicians suggest that high-skilled jobs should prioritise native workers over
foreigners. During his campaign, Donald Trump said, “I will end forever the
use of the H-1B [high-skilled worker visa] as a cheap labour program, and
institute an absolute requirement to hire American workers first ... No ex-
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ceptions.” In the UK, a recent proposal from the immigration minister would
introduce a £1,000 levy on employers for each EU skilled worker recruited
after Brexit (Warrell and Parker, 2017). Because these penalties are imposed
on the employer rather than the potential migrant, high-skilled work restric-
tions are operationalised as a quota applied uniformly to all agents who meet
eligibility conditions for that channel.
7.4.3 Caps on Low-Skilled Workers
To compensate for low-skilled labour shortages without antagonizing domes-
tic workers, many countries implement quotas or caps on the number of
low-skilled migrants admitted. Often, these are sector-specific, and employ-
ers only recruit for sectors with the greatest domestic need (OECD, 2006).
After the UK voted to leave the EU, the immigration minister was quick to
propose sector and country caps to regulate and bring down low-skilled mi-
gration (Warrell and Parker, 2017). Consequently, quotas are used to restrict
eligible agents in in-silico experiments.
7.4.4 Thresholds for Family Reunification
Through family reunification visas, migrants may apply to have their family
members join them in the destination country. In the aftermath of Donald
Trump’s election, Republican senators proposed strict limits on family re-
unification visas, hoping that migrants would reorient towards employment
channels (Kim, 2017). The family reunification channel is often restricted
through requirements placed on the resident migrant. In the US, for example,
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the sponsor must demonstrate that they can financially support their family
and the incoming arrival at an annual income 125% above the poverty line
(Kandel, 2014). A similar threshold applies in the UK (U.K. Home Office,
2016). Income information about family abroad is not necessarily observable
for individuals at the origin country. However, the length of their absence is
observable and is also a well-established indicator of migrant earnings (e.g.
Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1989a). Consequently, in-silico experiments vary a
required ‘years since migration’ threshold. To facilitate the interpretation
of this proxy, we use 2016 estimates from the US Census Bureau (Ruggles
et al., 2017) to show the expected wage for Jamaicans who have been in the
United States for a number of years equivalent to the threshold.
7.4.5 Free Movement
In theory, free movement of people represents the absence of migratory chan-
nels. Individuals who desire to move abroad would be able to do so without
government-imposed restrictions. Free movement of people is one of the
main pillars of the European Union. All EU citizens can reside in any coun-
try within the Union for up to three months, and may stay for longer if they
fulfil basic conditions (EU Directive 2004/38/EC). To shift from a policy of
free movement to one with restrictions, a government would likely define and
impose migrant channels. The United Kingdom, upon leaving the EU, will
find itself in this position.
248
Table 7.4: Agent eligibility and thresholds for visa categories
Category
Visa
Conditions
Eligibility
Baseline
Eligible
Percent
Restrictions
Additional
Student
household income
90th percentile
Secondary school, 16%
abroad
earn or save money
who do not intend to
Accept only those
Work
High-Skilled University degree 10%
(randomly selected)
visa at the baseline
(quota) eligible for this
Accept a fixed %
Work
Low-Skilled
transportation
construction, or
agriculture,
Experience in 18%
(randomly selected)
visa at the baseline
(quota) eligible for this
Accept a fixed %
Reunification
Family
living abroad
family member
At least one 58%
for a fixed set of years
member living abroad
who have a family
Accept only those
Closed None 1.7% Aggregation of above
Free Movement None 100% Accept all
The student channel cannot be entirely closed, as individuals can still mi-
grate as students if they do not intend to earn or save money abroad. This
accounts for the small percentage of agents who can migrate in the closed
setting.
7.5 Results of Policy Experiments
In the first set of experiments (Figs. 7.7-7.10), I compare migration patterns
to a baseline setting. The baseline setting classifies agents into common
migrant channels absent of quotas and requirements, which can additionally
be imposed by the host government. Classifying potential migrants into
these channels has its own effect – limiting migration among individuals who
are not eligible (see Table 7.4). Thus, by comparing each policy setting to
the baseline, we isolate the unique marginal impact of quotas and restrictions
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among eligible migrants. In Figure 7.7, we fully restrict one channel at a time.
We then focus on the two visa routes that produced the most substantial
reorientation in these experiments, to observe the effects of more gradual
increases in these policy restrictions. In Figures 7.7- 7.10, we maintain a
constant level of enforcement for unauthorised channels (see Table 7.2 on
calibration of this value). Therefore, we conclude with experiments that
vary levels of enforcement for all immigration policy settings.
For each simulation run, we compute the migrant stock accumulated
across all simulated years. All figures present the mean across 1000 runs.
I report the results at the end of 20 simulated years, as agent learning about
entry policies consistently stabilises around that time. Figure 7.6 shows
change in the ability to migrate legally over time. For easier visualization,
we take the mean ability to migrate legally across all agents over 61 years
and average it over 1000 model runs. We then calculate first differences to
better observe change over time. We reach a first difference of approximately
0 at 20-21 simulated years, indicating a point at which we can expect the
average ability to migrate legally to remain stable. In other words, we can
expect a full adjustment to policy conditions to have taken place at year 20.
This is the case for the most liberal policy setting (free movement), the most
restrictive policy setting, and the baseline condition.
Each bar in Figure 7.7 shows changes (as a percentage of aspiring mi-
grants) from the baseline conditions in terms of legal migration (blue), unau-
thorised migration (red) and non-migration (black).4 In the baseline setting,
agents may migrate if they are eligible for any of the four visa channels (see
4Unauthorised migration includes illegal and semi-legal categories.
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Figure 7.6: Change in Average Ability to Migrate Legally Over Simulated
Years
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Table 7.4). In this condition, approximately 44% of aspiring migrants mi-
grate through legal channels, 18% migrate through unauthorised channels,
and 39% do not migrate. This shows that the mere existence of migratory
categories excludes many would-be migrants.
As is shown in the top two bars of Figure 7.7, full restrictions on students
or high-skilled workers lead to negligible changes in migration outcomes. Fig-
ure 7.7 indicates that full restrictions on student visas lead to 0.64% fewer as-
piring migrants entering legally, and a corresponding 0.51% and 0.13% more
aspiring migrants opting not to migrate and migrating through unauthorised
channels, respectively, compared to the baseline eligibility model. Closing
off the high-skilled work channel leads to a very small percentage of aspiring
migrants opting for the unauthorised route (0.54%), and a similarly small,
1.54%, increase in non-migration. These findings are rooted in the fact that
individuals in many developing countries, like Jamaica, are often not eligible
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Figure 7.7: Mean effects of policy restrictions on migration outcomes relative
to the baseline setting (where x=0)
Free
Movement
Closed
Family
Low−Skilled
High−Skilled
Student UnauthorizedNon Migrants
Legal
−60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60
Baseline
% of Aspiring Migrants
for these channels even in baseline conditions. Hence, additional quotas or
restrictions on these channels will have little to no effect on migration.
Next, we examine full restrictions on low-skilled visas and family-based
visas. In Figure 7.7, we see that closing off the low-skilled route would
lead to 10.64% fewer aspiring migrants entering legally than would have
done in baseline conditions. Instead, 2.50%, or approximately one quarter of
these individuals, will opt for unauthorised migration, with the remainder not
migrating. Compared to migration levels in the baseline setting, closing off
the low-skilled channel leads to a 13.73% growth in unauthorised migration
and a 21.23% growth in non-migration.
When the family route is closed, 16.82% fewer agents enter legally, as a
percentage of aspiring migrants. This shift corresponds with a 12.46% de-
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crease in migration among aspiring migrants and a 4.36% increase in unau-
thorised migration. In other words, approximately 26% of the individuals
prevented from migrating legally as the family reunification channel is closed,
reorient to unauthorised channels. Compared to migration levels at the base-
line, closing the family route results in a 32.35% growth in non-migration and
a 24.25% growth in unauthorised migration levels. Unauthorised migration
in this setting grows at more than double the rate of the low-skilled setting.
Reorientation to unauthorised channels is so high when family reunifica-
tion channels are restricted because the family-based channel is most easily
accessible at the baseline level, as Jamaica’s vast diaspora is helpful in con-
tinuing migrant flows. This is often the case for countries with a long history
of migration. Eligibility for low-skilled work permits generally require prior
work experience in a high-demand sector, making this channel less accessible
than the family route.
Finally, we consider two opposing scenarios: one in which all legal chan-
nels are fully restricted (the Closed scenario) and one in which all migratory
channels are completely removed (Free Movement). In Figure 7.7, we see
that, relative to the baseline setting, closing all channels would increase unau-
thorised migration by 9.76% and non-migration by 27.04%. As a percentage
of all aspiring migrants, the Free Movement setting decreases unauthorised
migration by 12.27% and increases legal migration by 49.64%. If a country
removed immigration channels in favour of free movement, total migration
would increase substantially, but unauthorised migration would also decrease
substantially. It is noteworthy that the removal of migratory channels has
the largest influence on migration of all of the policy settings examined. In
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effect, minimal baseline eligibility conditions are so restrictive that remov-
ing them changes the volume and composition of migration far more than
even the most draconian policy restrictions, as shown in a comparison of the
Closed and Free Movement settings.
In the figures above, we examined the effects of fully restricting visa
routes. Out of all visa channels considered, low-skilled and family restrictions
produced the most substantial reorientation towards unauthorised channels.
In Figure 7.8 and 7.10 we examine the relationship between policy restriction
and reorientation by looking at gradual increases in low-skilled and family
restrictions. Both figures present the migrant stock accumulated across all
20 simulated years, averaged across 1000 runs. The error bands in each figure
represent the 2.75 and 97.5 percentiles for each level of restriction.
Low-skilled visa restrictions are operationalised as quotas or the proba-
bility of failing to receive a visa. In practice, an agent eligible at the baseline
draws a number from a random uniform distribution. If this number is larger
than, for example, 0.1 (10% quota), the agent is not granted a visa. This
amounts to approximately 90% of agents not being able to get a low-skilled
work visa in this example.
Figure 7.8 gradually increases the probability of failing to secure a low-
skilled work visa, compared to the baseline, at intervals of 0.1. This, in effect,
estimates the impact of low-skilled work quotas among eligible agents. As
we increase the low-skilled visa quota, the percentage of aspiring migrants
migrating legally declines at what appears to be a much steeper rate than
illegal migration.
A closer examination shows that for the most part, we see relatively
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Figure 7.8: Mean effects of restricting low-skilled work visas on migration
outcomes relative to the baseline with 2.75 and 97.5 percentile error band, ra-
tio of illegal to legal migration, and rug indicating Pr(Failure) settings where
illegal migration is not significantly different from illegal migration in the
baseline setting.
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stable levels of illegal migration as a proportion of would-be legal migration
– approximately one-third. However, as the quota becomes highly restrictive
(Pr(Failure) = 0.7), we begin to see the ratio of illegal to would-be legal
migration decrease to less than one-quarter (2.34% / 10.58%). In other words,
highly restrictive quotas (Pr(Failure) geq 0.7) on low-skilled work decrease
legal migration at a much greater rate than they increase illegal migration.
As shown in Figure 7.8, average illegal migration for each setting of
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Pr(Failure) is not statistically different from the baseline at low levels. This
indicates that we do not see significantly greater levels of illegal migration
in these settings than in a case where no restrictions are imposed on the
low-skilled work channel. A one-sided Mann-Whitney test for each setting of
Pr(Failure), considering an alpha value of 0.05, finds significant differences
at all levels of Pr(Failure) larger than 0.2. In Figure 7.8, insignificant dif-
ferences are indicated with the presence of a rug line above the x-axis tick.
Although legal and illegal migration means across runs are distinct, the error
bands spanning the 2.75 and 97.5 percentiles show a large overlap. Signifi-
cantly higher levels of illegal migration at all intervals of Pr(Failure) ≥ 0.2
are confirmed by one-sided Mann-Whitney test.
As mentioned above, governments often restrict family migration by plac-
ing income requirements on sponsors. Although we cannot vary income re-
quirements, ‘years since migration’ (YSM ) is a strong predictor of migrant
income. Studies of immigrant labour market adjustment in the US and
Canada have shown that, upon arrival, migrants generally earn less than
native born citizens, but incomes rise rapidly with labour market experience.
These studies have shown that immigrant incomes tend to equal or surpass
native counterparts after a period of 10-15 years (Chiswick, 1978; Borjas,
1989b; Meng, 1987). As such, we can approximate a wage level with which
each YSM requirement corresponds. We use US wages, as this is the primary
destination for Jamaicans, but we should expect trends to be generalisable
to other destinations as well (e.g. Meng, 1987). Figure 7.9a shows the cor-
relation between time abroad and annual earnings according to the 2016
American Community Survey from the US Census Bureau (Ruggles et al.,
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(b) Closer View of Loess Fit
Figure 7.9: Effects of Years Since Migration on 2015 Yearly Earnings, Amer-
ican Community Survey 2016
2017). Figure 7.9b shows a closer view of the estimated polynomial fit.
Figure 7.10 shows the effect of restricting the YSM requirement for po-
tential family sponsors compared to the baseline. In order to migrate through
this channel, an individual must have at least one family member who has
lived abroad for a number of years larger than or equal to the YSM re-
quirement, as captured by the MDP survey data (at the baseline, the YSM
requirement ≥ 0). The top x-axis represents the wage accumulated in 2015
among American Community Survey respondents born in Jamaica living in
the US for the corresponding number of years (Ruggles et al., 2017). These
estimates, which correspond to those shown in Figure 7.9, shows wages rising
consistently before reaching a peak at YSM ≥ 48.
Restricting family sponsorship requirements from 2 to 18 years – which
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Figure 7.10: Mean effects of restricting family reunification channels on mi-
gration outcomes relative to the baseline with 2.75 and 97.5 percentile error
band and ratio of illegal to legal migration
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corresponds to estimated wage levels between US$23,000 to US$38,000 –
appears to have the largest effect in reducing legal and driving up illegal
migration, compared to baseline conditions. This trend becomes relatively
flat with sponsorship thresholds corresponding to yearly wages higher than
US$38,000. At a two-year YSM requirement (corresponding to an earn-
ings threshold of ≈ US$23,000), legal migration as a percentage of aspiring
migrants is 3.08% lower compared to the baseline. This corresponds with
a 0.75% reorientation of aspiring migrants towards illegal channels. At a
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10-year restriction (≈ US$31,000), almost 3% of aspiring migrants have re-
oriented towards illegal channels. At an 18-year restriction (≈ US$38,000),
14.8% of aspiring migrants who would have entered legally under baseline
conditions are no longer doing so. Approximately 28% of these individuals
are now adopting illegal channels. After this point, further restrictions have
only subtle effects on the composition of migrants. Across the full range of
settings, relative to the baseline, the ratio of illegal to legal migration os-
cillates around 0.26, increasing marginally from the lowest setting to larger
values (see also Fig. 7.7). A one-sided Mann-Whitney test comparing each
setting of YSM to baseline conditions finds that levels of illegal migration in
all settings are significantly greater than the baseline.
Some might argue that governments could enforce border controls or in-
crease apprehension rates to reduce the threat of undocumented movement.
We examine this argument explicitly in the ABM and we find that enforce-
ment may not be a very efficient solution to the problem of unauthorised
migration. In the experiment shown in Figure 7.11, the rate of apprehen-
sion for both illegal strategies was varied jointly from 10% to 90% to show
the percentage of aspiring migrants who migrate irregularly for each policy
setting, except for the Free Movement setting.5
For all policy settings, the percentage of aspiring migrants entering through
irregular channels (including full non-compliance and non-compliance) re-
mains quite high even at the very highest levels of enforcement. For instance,
when authorities are able to capture seven out of ten irregular migrants, we
5We do not include the Free Movement setting because it is impossible to migrate
illegally in a setting where, strictly speaking, they can cross the border freely.
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Figure 7.11: Mean effect of increasing levels of enforcement on illegal migra-
tion. Levels of enforcement used in prior tests (Probability of Apprehension
= 0.7) indicated by the vertical line
see approximately 27.71%, 22.30% and 20.43% of aspiring migrants migrat-
ing illegally for the Closed, Family and Low-Skilled settings respectively. At
lower levels of apprehension, for example Probability of Apprehension = 0.5,
more than a quarter of all aspiring migrants use irregular channels for all
policy settings. When all legal channels are fully restricted (the Closed set-
ting), 42.52% of all aspiring migrants enter the destination country through
irregular channels.
The effectiveness of apprehension is non-linear. In the baseline setting,
increasing the rate of enforcement from Probability of Apprehension = 0.1 to
0.5 decreases illegal migration by 14.63%, but increasing the rate of enforce-
ment from Probability of Apprehension = 0.5 to 0.9 decreases illegal migra-
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tion by 20.76%. Similarly, in the Closed setting, illegal migration decreases
by 22.68% when apprehension increases from 0.1 to 0.5, but decreases by
32.52% when apprehension increases from 0.5 to 0.9. The greatest gains can
be made when governments capture more than six in ten irregular migrants,
an ambitious figure when one considers the volume of irregular migration and
the diverse forms it can take. For example, according to data from the Mex-
ican Migration Project (MMP), the probability of apprehension along the
US-Mexico border ranged from 15% to 33% between the years 1960 to 2010
(the MMP dataset is described in Chapter 9). This figure does not include
internal enforcement efforts to apprehend unauthorised migrants who may
have entered the country with a visa – what we have termed semi-legal mi-
gration. Internal enforcement measures are greatly hampered by difficulties
in verifying migrants’ legal status and eligibility for work (Meissner et al.,
2013; Simon, 2010) and errors in their practical implementation can be po-
litically costly. In 2012, the UK implemented interior enforcement policies
where access to housing, bank accounts, and even health services, were sub-
ject to immigration checks (Kirkup and Winnett, 2012; Elgot, 2018). The
public denounced this policy in the 2018 ‘Windrush’ scandal, when elderly
legal immigrants were mistakenly deported after having been in the UK for
decades (Walshe, 2018).
Figure 7.11 also shows that if enforcement of illegal migration is 80-90%,
levels of illegal migration tend to converge across all policy settings. That is,
strictly speaking, when levels of enforcement are sufficiently high, the visa
policy restrictions have little effect on the rate of illegal migration. This
suggests that more than 80% of all illegal migrants would have to be ap-
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prehended to account for the increased reorientation of stringent policy re-
strictions. These results indicate that substantial investment on enforcement
would be needed to offset the unintended consequences of restricting legal
entry channels.
7.6 Discussion
This chapter presents a theoretically-informed and data-driven agent-based
model of migration that simulates the effects of immigration policies, allow-
ing us to observe the reorientation of flows towards illegal channels when legal
channels are restricted. This model brings together the work presented in all
previous chapters. Based on the theoretical framework developed in Chapter
2, migration is conceptualized as a non-binary outcome, where individuals
may either migrate through a series of legal and illegal channels, depending
on individual capabilities, attitudes, and the boundedness of their own ex-
periences and the experiences of network ties. Key theoretical relationships
embedded in the decision-model were examined using original experiments,
with the aim of mitigating several empirical challenges associated with the
study of immigration policy and illegal migration. These experiments – their
design and results – were presented in Chapters 5 and 6, and the resulting
coefficients are used to set effect sizes in this computational model.
Results show that government-imposed restrictions on migrants can de-
crease total migration, but some restrictions are highly ineffective and others
only decrease legal migration at the cost of changing the balance of legal and
illegal migrants. The impact of immigration policy depends on the specific re-
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striction imposed. Policies that prevent students or high-skilled workers from
migrating legally have little effect because eligible individuals are likely able
to migrate through alternative legal categories. Meanwhile, restrictions on
family-based visas produce the largest reorientation towards illegal channels.
Restricting low-skilled work reduces total migration to a lesser extent than
family-reunification restrictions, but the rate of illegal reorientation is also
much lower. Results also show that, relative to a system of free movement,
the minimal eligibility conditions required to impose migratory channels are
highly restrictive on their own.
A further factor that may influence migrant decision-making is the ap-
prehension probability associated with illegal strategies. Results show that
illegal migration remains quite high even at the highest rates of apprehension.
The effect of changing the rate of apprehension is non-linear, and the most
substantial reductions in illegal migration are achieved at very high rates of
enforcement. These findings are consistent with recent empirical literature,
which has found increases in border enforcement in the United States to be
highly ineffective at reducing irregular migration (Massey et al., 2016c). As
public spending on enforcement has increased, unauthorized migration to
the United States has more than tripled since 1985 (Dixon and Gelatt, 2005;
Massey et al., 2016a; Passel et al., 2009; Hoefer et al., 2009). Massey, Durand
and Pren (2016a, p. 1558) demonstrate that, “whether measured in terms of
personnel, patrol hours, or budget, studies indicate that the surge in border
enforcement had little effect in reducing unauthorized migration.”
Findings suggest several avenues for future research. First, although the
behavioural rules developed and presented in this chapter are simple and
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grounded in migration theory, case selection is important. This issue will
be discussed further in the concluding chapter of this thesis. Second, this
model limited its scope to migrant entries. Future extensions can expand
its scope beyond migrant entry, allowing for undocumented migrants to reg-
ularize their status in the destination, or for legal migrants to become un-
documented after entering legally. Third, while this model focused on how
immigration policy information is propagated through social networks, the
vast literature on this subject identifies various pathways by which networks
may exert their effects. As mentioned in Chapter 2, network effects may in-
volve not only the spread of information, but also material benefits that can
help reduce the monetary costs of migration. Future extensions of the model
will incorporate the effects of monetary and in-kind transfers (for example,
assistance upon arrival).
Finally, I look to extend this model by examining a wider range of adap-
tive behaviour to immigration policy. As mentioned in Chapter 2, According
to De Haas (2011), restrictive policies may reorient flows to different cate-
gories or countries; create time-clusters in migration before policy change; or
turn migrations that may have been temporary prior to policy change into
permanent ones. As I argued in Premise 5, these behaviours are facilitated
by boundedly rational learning and heuristics. The following two chapters
take steps towards incorporating these extensions by, first, expanding our
understanding of boundedly rational decision-making (Chapter 8) and, sec-
ond, examining another form of migrant adaptation to policy conditions –
changing destination countries (Chapter 9).
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Chapter 8
Biases in Learning about
Immigration Policy
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how migration persists despite re-
strictive immigration policies. I have argued that to understand the effects of
immigration policy, it is necessary to examine the ways in which individuals
respond to policy change and search for migration alternatives. In the previ-
ous chapter, I presented an empirically-calibrated agent-based model where
individuals formed expectations about the policy environment, primarily,
through feedback from their own experiences and those of their networks
(Massey et al., 1998; Massey and Zenteno, 1999). They were boundedly-
rational (Simon, 1972) but assumed to be perfectly objective. This chapter
builds on the former by relaxing assumptions of objectivity in agent cogni-
tion.
As I maintain in theoretical premise 5, aspiring migrants are unlikely
to be perfectly objective. Qualitative accounts of refugees and unautho-
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rised migrants (Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2016; Herna´ndez-Carretero, 2008;
Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2009; Ryo, 2015) suggest that cognitive biases affect
the acquisition, processing and sending of information about the odds of suc-
ceeding when attempting to migrate. This evidence, shown in Chapter 2,
suggests that migrants (1) downweight negative information about their mi-
gratory journey in order to maintain a ‘successful image’, resulting in biased
information from the sender’s perspective (Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2016;
Herna´ndez-Carretero, 2008; Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2009; Ryo, 2015). On the
receiving side, individuals who wish to migrate or have already embarked on
the journey will tend to (2) seek information that confirms the hypothesis
that migration is possible (confirmation bias Wason, 1960) and (3) will also
display “unrealistic optimism” about their personal chances of succeeding
(Hastie, 2001). This literature tends to suggest that individuals who desire
to migrate will tend to weight positive information about the odds of mi-
gration more heavily than negative information. Aspiring migrants in these
qualitative accounts also (4) display a bias favouring their own experiences
over those of others – a process termed ‘egocentric discounting’ (Yaniv and
Kleinberger, 2000).
The presence of these biases may have implications on resulting migrant
flows. For example, if all individuals consistently weight positive information
over negative information in calculating expected odds of success, they will
be more likely to attempt migration, regardless of prevailing policy or en-
forcement levels. Governments’ ability to control migration by manipulating
probabilities of success is, of course, inhibited if aspiring migrants distort
these probabilities when making decisions. However, despite its potential
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significance and pervasiveness, bias in migrant decision-making has, as of
yet, been largely underexplored (Bala´zˇ et al., 2014). Although we know,
from qualitative accounts, that these biases are likely to exist in migration
decisions and the direction they are likely to take, we do not know whether
or not they influence migration at a macro level.
This chapter aims to set a basis for future work of this kind by examining
whether the presence of these cognitive biases affect the volume and legal
composition of migration flows. To answer this question, I present additional
results on a slightly modified version of the ABM presented in the previous
chapter. Unlike the ABM presented in Chapter 7, agents in this model are
prone to bias. For the purposes of a macro-level exploration, it is possible to
group these biases according to their broader expectations about the weight
agents apply to policy signals. I group ‘successful image’, ‘confirmation bias’
and ‘unrealistic optimism’ under the broader category of ‘valence bias,’ as
they will all result in either positive or negative information weighing more
heavily in a potential migrant’s decision. To approximate ‘valence biases,’
I vary the weight agents assign to positive and negative signals. Similarly,
to approximate the possible effects of ‘egocentric discounting,’ I vary the
weights agents assign to personal experiences independently from the weights
they assign to second-hand migration experiences. I refer to my stylised
interpretation of this bias as ‘self/network bias.’
I draw the the following expectations for the analyses. First, I expect
that weighting positive information about the odds of success more heavily
than negative information will have stimulating effect on migration, while
weighting negative information more heavily will have a suppressing effect.
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However, if immigration policy is restrictive, individuals will need to search
for alternative strategies to legal migration in order to migrate. This learn-
ing process requires both positive and negative information: Individuals must
learn from failures in order to search for other, more successful strategies. As
such, I expect that maximum levels of unauthorised migration, and of migra-
tion overall, under policy constraints will exist in non-extreme ‘valence bias’
configurations. That is, where the difference between positive and negative
signal weighting is not too large.
Second, as I argue in Chapter 2, individuals who weight the experiences of
similar others (as the network configuration described in Chapter 7 ensures),
should receive information about the environment more quickly, enabling
them to find a feasible alternative more efficiently. For example, if legal
migration is difficult in the current policy scenario, an individual who listens
to her networks and takes their experiences seriously, is more likely to search
for more feasible alternatives rather than wasting their time attempting this
strategy. Therefore, I expect that a network bias may stimulate migration.
However, its legal composition will be shaped by the policy setting and which
type of migration it facilitates or inhibits.
The chapter is organised as follows. First, I briefly reiterate the ABM pro-
cesses relating to agent learning and show the effects of varying the weights
attached to first- and second-hand experiences on relevant equations. I, then,
present simulation results examining valence and self/network biases in turn
before discussing their implications.
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8.1 Background: Learning Equations
The purpose of the following tests is to examine the aggregate migration
outcomes that might emerge from a differential weighting on valence and
self/network dimensions. In order to more easily understand these results,
it is useful to reiterate the process by which individuals receive and process
information about immigration policy.
In Chapter 7, agents learned about policy conditions through strategy-
specific signals, where the strategy set, S, consists of legal migration, semi-
noncompliant migration and fully noncompliant migration. The signal, gen-
erated from one’s own experience or the experience of network ties, is either
positive or negative. That is, a successful attempt generates one positive
signal, whereas an unsuccessful attempt generates a negative signal. At the
end of the learning process, agents collate all first-hand and second-hand
migration experiences (or signals) and re-evaluate their perceived ability to
migrate. If signals for a strategy s are overwhelmingly negative (assuming
positive and negative signals are weighted equally), individuals will lower
their perceived ability to migrate using strategy s. Conversely, if signals are
overwhelmingly positive, agents will elevate their perceived ability to migrate
for strategy s.
As the learning process for any given strategy is identical, I present only
three equations: the network learning component, Equation 8.1; the personal
learning component, Equation 8.2, and the final ability adjustment, Equation
8.3. The final equation, 8.3, simply aggregates all components and uses them
to alter agents’ current perceived ability to migrate for strategy s. The key
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variable we consider in this chapter is the weight attached to signals, pi, which
will be varied to simulate different cognitive biases. This variable is present
in equations 8.1 and 8.2 below.
First, we examine the network learning component:
Cti,± = ±pi(1 + log
J∑
j=1
ηj) (8.1)
Variable C is the unique effect of signals accumulated from network con-
tacts, ηj, on their ability to migrate through a given strategy. Agent i com-
putes C separately for positive (C+) and negative (C−) information at time
t. The only difference is the direction of the weight pi. Each additional sig-
nal transmitting migration success or failure when attempting a strategy is
assumed to have a decreasing marginal effect on agents’ perceived ability to
migrate through that strategy. As such, I take the natural log of the sum
of contacts, j ∈ J , who relay an experience with immigration policy. This
functional form is consistent with established literature on the learning curve
(Estes, 1950; Heathcote et al., 2000).
Individuals also learn from their own “probing” (Gigerenzer and Selten,
2002) of the policy environment. These experiences form the personal learn-
ing component. The learning component is always negative, as a positive
experience would entail successful migration and an end to the learning pro-
cess. B is defined as the unique effect of an agent’s accumulated experience
with immigration policy on the ability to migrate through a given strategy.
The effect of one additional migration failure, f , for agent i, is considered to
be marginally decreasing, similar to Equation 8.1.
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Bti = −pi(1 + log
F∑
f=1
ηi,f ) (8.2)
Finally, each simulated year, agent i updates its ability to migrate for
each strategy s as follows:
Ati,s = A
t−1
i,s + ∆Bi + ∆Ci,+ + ∆Ci,−, (8.3)
where Ati,s is censored to maintain the range of the original survey scale.
The value of the weight pi in Chapter 7 is equal to the coefficient of
the policy experiment presented in Chapter 5, 0.55. In this chapter, I vary
pi across its full range (0 - 1) to observe the effects of cognitive biases in
learning. To illustrate the effects of altering pi on the above equations, Figure
8.1 presents the value of learning components as a function of the cumulative
number of signals received, for values of pi ranging from 0.2 to 1 at intervals
of 0.2 (I do not present pi = 0 as this curve is flat). The left panel refers to
component C+ and the right panel can be applied to components B and C−.
As pi is a scaling factor in equations 8.1 and 8.2, the larger the value of pi,
the larger the magnitude of the learning component and its effect on agents’
ability to migrate through any given strategy, as shown in Equation 8.3. As
can be seen in Figure 8.1, the first signal received will decrease ability by
pi. The signals received thereafter will have progressively smaller marginal
effects.
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Figure 8.1: Learning Curves
8.2 The Effects of Cognitive Biases on Mi-
gration
In the these results, I test how alternative values of pi would change model
outputs. For simplicity, I vary the values of pi associated with legal and illegal
strategies together. That is, individuals are biased in terms of the valence
and the source of the signal but not in terms of strategies. Each parameter
combination was run 100 times for 12 years and the average was taken across
cumulative values at the end of the run.
In the first set of results, shown in Figures 8.2 and 8.3, I vary the weight
agents attach to positive relative to negative signals. For simplicity, I refer to
these as pi+ and pi−, respectively. In the second set of results, shown in Figures
8.4 – 8.7, I vary the weight agents attach to their own experiences, pii,relative
to their networks’ experiences, pij. In all tests I present two outcomes: the
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volume and the legal composition of migrant stock. Observing volume is
important as it can give us an overview of the effect of biases. However,
in order to observe substitution effects – or the strategic search-and-switch
process that potential migrants employ when adapting to immigration policy,
it is necessary to disaggregate authorised from unauthorised migrants, as was
done in Chapter 7.
The policy settings used in these two sets of experiments are different.
In the valence experiments (Figures 8.2 and 8.3), immigration policies are
set to the same values as the validation model presented in Chapter 7. This
setting is intended to simulate a realistic case – specifically, United States’
immigration policy between 2000 to 2012.1
In contrast to the valence experiments, where successes and failures are
greatly affected by the weight attached to them, agents in the self/network
experiments are evaluating migration successes and failures objectively. That
is, the bias is placed on the source, not the content of the information and,
therefore, the policy setting will play a more important role in driving out-
comes. It is easier to disentangle the effects of the self/network bias from the
effects of policy when policy is unambivalently restrictive or unambivalently
open. Therefore, in Figures 8.4 – 8.7, I employ two extreme policy scenarios:
‘Free Movement’ and ‘Closed’ policy conditions. As noted in Chapter 7, the
‘Closed’ scenario is highly restrictive but not entirely impermeable. Further-
more, a small amount of unauthorised migration may take place in the ‘Free
1Note, however, that in these validation tests, a proportion of agents abroad equal to
the proportion of the Jamaican adult population present in the US in the year 2000 (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2000; Warren, 2003) are placed abroad at the start of the simulation run.
In this Chapter, I do not do so in order to make the effects of learning easier to observe.
Therefore the validation tests is not directly comparable to these figures.
273
Movement’ setting, despite it being unnecessary as some agents (with initial
values set to data from the MDP survey) may not have fully adjusted prior
expectations on the policy environment. In all experiments, I maintain the
level of enforcement or, more specifically, the probability of arrest at 0.7, as
in Chapter 7.
For easier visualization of small effects, I reduce stochasticity in these
models relative to those presented in Chapter 7. I do so in two ways. First,
in the Choose Strategy S∗ procedure detailed in Chapter 7, agents use proba-
bilities, weighted by perceived ability to carry them out, to select the optimal
strategy. For the models presented in this chapter, agents simply choose the
strategy associated with the highest perceived ability. Second, in the models
presented in this chapter, agents evaluate whether the ability associated with
the optimal strategy is higher than a threshold (the midpoint in the ability
scale, indicating indifference). Chapter 7 employs a probability function in-
stead.
Valence Bias
In the analyses below, I vary the weight of negative signals on the x-axis
and positive signals on the y-axis, from 0 to 1, at intervals of 0.1. I show
how the weight attributed to each type of signal influences two outcomes:
migrant volume and legal composition. In Figure 8.2, I present the percentage
of agents who are abroad in 2012. In Figure 8.3, I examine unauthorised
migration in the same year, as a proportion of all agents. Darker hues indicate
lower values of migrant volume or unauthorised migration, and lighter hues
indicate higher values.
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In Figure 8.2, the percentage of agents who migrated varies between 8.1%
and 17% across the full range of pi−, pi+ combinations. Overall, when agents
assign a larger weight to positive than to negative signals, the volume of
migration increases. Conversely, as the value of pi increases for negative
relative to positive signals, overall migration decreases. This is to be expected
as individuals are adjusting abilities upwards more than they are adjusting
them downwards when learning about immigration policy.
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Figure 8.2: Effects of different weights on negative and positive signals on
volume and composition: Proportion of agents migrating
However, though cognitive biases can distort the real effects of immigra-
tion policy, they cannot fully offset them. As mentioned earlier, the policy
275
setting employed in Figures 8.2 and 8.3 reflects the U.S. case, which is re-
strictive. If an individual were objective, she might perceive her odds of
successfully migrating to be dire. An individual who weights positive infor-
mation more highly than negative information will be more optimistic about
her chances. However, the fact remains that, in this policy setting, negative
signals will have a numerical advantage over positive signals. As such, chang-
ing the weights applied to negative signals will have a larger effect on the
system than changing the weights applied to positive signals. This can be
observed when we isolate the effects of positive and negative signals in turn.
When we move from the lowest to the highest value of pi− and maintain pi+
constant at 0, we can see that migrant stock decreases from 13% to 8.1%,
that is, 4.9%. When pi− is set to zero and we move from the lowest to the
highest value of pi+, on the other hand, migration increases by a total of 4%.
This means that, regardless of positivity bias in cognition, restrictive policies
can still shape migration by controlling the frequency of failure.
In Figure 8.3, I examine how the relative weighting of signal valence
also affects the proportion of all agents that migrate illegally. In this case,
the ratio of illegal migrants to the full sample ranges from 5% to 7.6%,
suggesting that changing pi± would neither eliminate unauthorized migration
nor increase it dramatically.
For agents to switch from a legal to an illegal strategy, they must learn
that a legal strategy is not feasible (by way of negative signals) and an alter-
native one is (by way of positive signals). In the unbiased model presented
in Chapter 7, agents will, generally, first attempt legal migration. Only as
they learn they are not likely to succeed using this strategy, will they adapt
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Figure 8.3: Effects of different weights on negative and positive signals on
volume and composition: Proportion of agents migrating illegally
and attempt illegal migration. This means that, the first signals circulating
through the system will be primarily about legal migration. Only later in
the simulation will agents learn more about unauthorised strategies. These
first signals will also have the largest marginal effects given the shape of the
learning curve (See Figure 8.1). As such, when positive signals are weighted
heavily, individuals will adjust their ability to migrate legally quite early
in the simulation. Only later on in the simulation, will they have the in-
formation necessary to adjust their ability to migrate through unauthorised
strategies.
This temporal difference will play a role in the legal composition of the
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resulting migrant stock, particularly when individuals are not processing in-
formation in an objective manner. In a restrictive policy scenario such as
this one, objective agents would evaluate negative feedback and eventually
consider alternative strategies. In a case where positive signals are weighted
heavily and there are no negative signals to counterbalance them, agents will
attempt and continue to attempt legal migration. Illegal migration, in con-
trast, will tend to decrease (albeit only by 1.2 percentage points across the
full range of pi+, holding pi− at 0). With a restrictive legal entry policy, this
is akin to hitting oneself against a wall.
Negative signals are necessary for individuals to pursue alternative strate-
gies. As soon as negative signals are turned on, we can see individuals
adopting illegal channels (this can be observed in a large part of the area
where pi− ≥ 0.4). However, when agents are more greatly affected by nega-
tive rather than positive signals, the proportion of undocumented migrants
generally hovers around 6.6%, one percentage point below the maximum
value across the parameter space, which is 7.6%. Being overly positive or
overly negative does not lead to the greatest levels of reorientation towards
unauthorised channels. However, neither does being perfectly objective. The
area in the grid displaying the highest proportion of illegal migration is where
pi− = 0.4 and pi+ = 0.7 – that is, when positive signals are weighted a little
less than double the amount of negative signals.
In conclusion, positivity bias leads to higher levels of migration but does
not fully offset the effects of restrictive policies because governments can
shape the frequency of failure. The level of reorientation to unauthorised
channels is also maximised when there is a positivity bias in place. However,
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this effect is nonlinear. Extreme overconfidence will inhibit rather than aid
reorientation to unauthorised channels, because agents are not able to learn
from failure.
Self/Network Biases
In the following figures, I vary the weight of personal signals on the x-axis
and network signals on the y-axis and show effects on migrant volume and
composition. Doing so allows us to explore the effect of effectively ‘switching
networks off and on’: When the value of pi applied to networks is zero,
individuals do not learn from their networks.
As explained above, the effect of policy manifests itself in the proportions
of positive and negative signals agents receive. As such, when varying the
weight applied to positive and negative signals, the underlying effects of
policy could, effectively, be partially offset by varying the weight of negative
relative to positive signals. The question examined in this section is much
more dependent on the policy environment because individuals are evaluating
migration successes and failures objectively. The bias is now placed on the
source, not the content, of the information. As such, to better disentangle the
effects of the source from the effects of policy, I employ two policy scenarios:
one where signals are overwhelmingly negative – the ‘Closed’ setting – and
one where signals are overwhelmingly positive – the ‘Free Movement’ setting.
First, I examine the proportion of agents who migrated in the ‘Closed’
setting. Figure 8.4 shows that varying self/network weights has a smaller
effect on volume than does varying valence weights in a less restrictive set-
ting (8.2). Across the parameter space, the lowest value for volume is 10%
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of agents and the highest is 14% of agents. This represents only a 4% range.
However, these effects are still noteworthy for their implications on our un-
derstanding of learning in migration.
Overall, we can see that migration decreases as more weight is applied to
agents’ own experiences, relative to those gathered from network contacts.
This is to be expected: personal signals can only have negative effects on
ability to migrate, while networks transmit both positive and negative signals.
We can observe the unique effects of pii by turning networks off. In this
scenario, we find that migration decreases 2% across the range of pii. This
is a small number, but its is still notable given the already small range that
the volume of migrant stock can take across the parameter space.
If turning networks off reduces migration by 2%, then networks clearly
have a stimulating effect on migration when aggregating over all values of
pii. This is to be expected, as networks can have positive effects on perceived
ability to migrate by propagating messages of success. However, these pos-
itive effects can only be observed where pij ≤ 0.1. In this area of the grid,
increasing network pi has a positive or null effect on migration for any given
value of pii. For example if we maintain pii constant at 0.4 and move along
the y-axis from pij = 0 to pij = 0.1, we can see that the higher the value of
pij the higher the volume of migration.
However, as soon as the weight applied to network signals is above 0.1,
we actually see the opposite effect. In this area, increasing the weight of
network signals appear to help slightly reduce migration in a restrictive policy
setting. To see this effect in Figure 8.4, we can choose the same value of pii
as above (0.4) and move vertically along the y-axis, starting at pij = 0.1;
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Figure 8.4: Effects of varying the importance of personal and network feedback
on overall volume of migration: Volume, Restrictive Policy
we can see that, as the value of pij increases, migration decreases. This
takes place because network information in these experiments objectively
reflect the policy environment. Therefore, although they have the potential
to transmit positive stories, they will not do so as much in a restrictive setting.
Instead, most stories propagated through the network will be negative.
In the ‘Free Movement’ setting, Figure 8.5, networks appear to be the
single source of signals. In fact, when we compare Figure 8.5 to Figure 8.4
we can see that policy appears to function like a switch, giving one source of
information more relevance than the other. That is, when the policy setting
281
is highly restrictive, as in Figure 8.4, (negative) personal experiences play a
larger role in driving migration outcomes, whereas in the ‘Free Movement’
setting (Figure 8.5), personal experiences have no significant effect regard-
less of how heavily they are weighted. Why does this happen? In a ‘Free
Movement’ scenario, individuals are mostly succeeding in their migration at-
tempts and, therefore, do not need to learn from personal experiences at all.
Agents still learn from their networks abroad, which, in this policy scenario,
is a consistent source of positive information. These signals, in turn, prompt
agents to attempt migration, succeed and send further positive information
to their ties back home.
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Figure 8.5: Effects of varying the importance of personal and network feedback
on overall volume of migration: Volume, Free Movement
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In the last two figures, I look at undocumented migration – measured as
the percentage of all agents who migrated illegally – under the same policy
conditions as in the previous two figures. I examine Figure 8.6 first, which
depicts the restrictive policy setting. Both the weights applied to personal
experiences and those applied to the experiences of others can stimulate
unauthorised migration. Reorientation towards illegal channels can function
as an escape valve, allowing migration to continue despite legal restrictions.
As we observed in the valence experiments, this reorientation is the result of
a learning process, by which agents evaluate failures – their own or those of
their networks – and the successes of their networks. In this process, they
may learn that they are not sufficiently able to carry out their primary al-
ternative (i.e. legal migration) and, if they hear that others are successfully
migrating using an alternative strategy (i.e. unauthorised migration), they
may attempt this alternative strategy instead. However, in Figure 8.6, we
can see that the percentage of agents who migrate illegally is not very sensi-
tive to the weight applied to network or personal signals. The full range of
values observed across the parameter space is only 2%. However, out of the
two, networks have the strongest effect. When we turn networks off, we see
less than half a percentage point change in illegal migration. A larger effect
can be seen when we turn personal learning off. Here we can observe 1.1%
difference in illegal migration between pij = 0 and pij = 1. This relationship
seems to hold relatively steadily across all vertical lines intersecting pii, in-
dicating that networks can drive up illegal migration in a restrictive policy
environment, while personal learning does not. This is because both posi-
tive and negative information is needed for individuals to learn and reorient
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to alternative channels and networks are the only source of information for
potential migrants that is able to provide both.
Of course, in a highly restrictive scenario, not many positive network
signals will be circulating through the system. The lack of positive signals
partly accounts for the relatively small effects of varying both pii and pij on
unauthorised migration.
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Figure 8.6: Effects of varying the importance of personal and network feedback
on illegal migration: Composition, Restrictive Policy
Networks are also most important in the free movement setting, shown
in Figure 8.7. In this setting, legal migration is the easiest alternative for
migrants as the probability of arrest of unauthorised migrants is still high.
Therefore adaptive agents will tend to migrate legally. When networks are
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turned off, personal learning has a negligible effect on illegal migration. At
the highest values of pii, where agents learn rapidly from failed illegal attempts
– movement through illegal channels is slightly lower. Meanwhile, more
agents tend to migrate legally as we increase the weights of network learning
because agents observe their networks migrating successfully through legal
channels.
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Figure 8.7: Effects of varying the importance of personal and network feedback
on illegal migration:Composition, Free Movement
In summary, the weight assigned to network or personal experiences does
not appear to affect migration volume or composition by a significant amount.
However, in restrictive policy environments, we do see minor decreases in the
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volume of migration as we increase pii. The value of pij tends, instead to
increase migration slightly overall. However, this effect is highly inconsistent
across the parameter space and may, in some instances, help decrease mi-
gration. This is due to the fact that networks are objectively propagating
information about the policy environment. In a ‘Free Movement’ setting,
networks appear to be the sole drivers of migration. This is because indi-
viduals are able to migrate easily and, therefore, do not record any personal
experiences for future migration attempts. When it comes to driving up
unauthorised migration, networks appear to matter the most, regardless of
the policy environment, because they are the only source of positive infor-
mation that can encourage migration attempts.
8.3 Discussion
To understand how individuals respond to changes in immigration policy, it
is important to consider humans’ cognitive limits. In Chapter 2, I reviewed
two theoretical streams of decision-making: bounded rationality and cogni-
tive biases. I integrated the two into premise 5, which guides the limits of
agent cognition and learning. The experiments presented in this chapter fol-
lowed from the theoretical exploration of cognitive biases in Chapter 2. This
exploration allowed us to form expectations on the type of biases involved in
the decision-making of aspiring migrants. First, it is likely that individuals
who aspire to migrate will tend to over-weight information that will support
and facilitate this desire, at the expense of objectivity. Second, literature
on egocentric discounting suggests that individuals will tend to value their
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personal experiences more highly than they would others, because they will
have more evidence for their own rationale. These hypotheses are supported
by existing qualitative evidence on migrant decision-making. The purpose
of this chapter was to examine the likely macro-level effects of policy when
agents’ decision-making is affected by these biases.
Changing decision weights has minor but noteworthy effects on overall
model outcomes. First, I examined the effects of differential weighting of
positive and negative signals under a realistic policy setting, specifically the
U.S. case. In the presence of confirmation bias, we should expect aspiring
migrants to weight positive feedback about migration odds higher than they
would negative feedback. I find that, overall, when agents assign a larger
weight to positive than to negative signals, the volume of migration increases
– indicating that confirmation bias may, in fact, facilitate migration. How-
ever, a closer look indicates that a dose of negative feedback is necessary for
adaptation to strict policy environments. When negative feedback is com-
pletely discarded, agents pursue the same unprofitable strategy repeatedly.
The highest level of ‘strategy-switching’ or illegal migration, under the U.S.
policy setting, takes place when positive feedback is given a little over double
the weight of negative feedback.
Policy has more straight-forward effects when evaluating the biases placed
on the source, rather than the content, of the information. In this case,
individuals are evaluating migration successes and failures objectively and
outcomes are, therefore, more sensitive to changes in migration odds. To
better disentangle the effects of source weighting from the effects of policy, I
employ two policy scenarios: one where signals are overwhelmingly negative
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– the ‘Closed’ setting – and one where signals are overwhelmingly positive –
the ‘Free movement’ setting.
Network information, in general, tends to increase the volume of migra-
tion across all settings – reflecting the importance of networks in perpetuat-
ing migration flows. However a closer look yielded several interesting insights
about the nature of network effects. First, networks have the potential of cir-
culating positive signals but, they will not always serve a facilitating role. If
the policy is restrictive, the balance of negative to positive network signals
being sent through the system will reflect this. Furthermore, network signals
have a numerical advantage over personal experiences. In a sense, agents are
learning about the policy environment by crowd-sourcing experiences. This
allows agents to learn about the policy environment more quickly – be it
restrictive or lax. As such, even if individuals engage in egocentric discount-
ing and underweight network signals, this source of feedback can still play a
significant role.
These results have theoretical as well as real life implications. First,
migration literature has focused on the positive, self-perpetuating effect of
networks, focusing on the feedback that is sent by successful migrants at
the detriment of the negative feedback sent by those who attempted and
failed (De Haas, 2010). This theorization ignores the current policy climate.
Network feedback is just as likely to be a reflection of policy conditions –
albeit imperfect and biased at several points as it travels from sender to
receiver. Starting with this premise, we can explicitly investigate the effects
of motivated reasoning on information search and processing.
Second, taking cognitive limitations into account is important. Not only
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because doing so brings us closer to reality (Simon, 2000), but because as-
suming perfect knowledge and rationality can lead to erroneous expectations
about the effects of policy – namely, that governments can perfectly deter-
mine aggregate behaviour by changing policy (Castles, 2004a). Individuals
who are thoughtful and resourceful will not respond to policy in a straightfor-
ward manner: they will seek alternatives and help other aspiring migrants do
the same. Theories on bounded rationality and learning help us understand
and model this iterative search process. The cognitive biases considered in
this chapter are also important, as they will tend to distort individuals’ per-
ceptions of their likelihood of succeeding, thereby also distorting the effects
of policy at the micro level.
The qualitative studies described in Chapter 2 have suggested the impor-
tance of biases in migrant decision-making, however, we have no quantitative
measure of their pervasiveness or what factors may make an individual more
or less prone to bias. We also know that networks aid migrants overcome
restrictive policy environment (Massey et al., 1998) but we do not yet know
the mechanisms by which they do so (Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2016). Do
they aid migration by transmitting useful information that can allow them to
learn about the policy environment, thereby bolstering their agency? Or do
they, instead, appear to facilitate migration by distorting their experiences
with immigration policy and enforcement? These two mechanisms suggest
different motivations from the sender’s perspective. The first motive is, to an
extent, altruistic. The second motive is self-interested and is far from how
literature generally describes network effects – as sources of social capital
(Garip and Asad, 2016). The lack of work on this front is part of a larger
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gap in literature on the effects of immigration policy on migration decisions.
Future empirical work should seek to disentangle the micro-level mechanisms
that underlie the decision-making of aspiring migrants and the various forms
of influence that social networks have in this process.
This chapter highlights an important limitation of the ABM of unau-
thorised migration presented in Chapter 7: the lack of return and repeat
migration. Individuals who migrate are assumed to stop learning about im-
migration policy, but learning should continue if individuals are making sev-
eral migration trips. This will likely have implications on the effects of policy.
In the next chapter, I take a step in this direction by examining a model of
return and repeat migration and another form of strategic adjustment to im-
migration policy: changing destination choice. Although migration is widely
considered a social process (Roberts and Morris, 2003; Arango, 2004; Faist,
1997; Haug, 2008; Massey and Espinosa, 1997), network theory has not de-
veloped a systematic explanation of why individuals return. Therefore to
develop a theoretical framework that can guide future work, I develop an ab-
stract model which formalises network theories of migration and integrates
them with existing theories of return migration. In doing so, I also observe
the interaction between these two behaviours under different immigration
policy scenarios. This model will lay the groundwork for a future exten-
sion of the ABM of unauthorised migration, which will incorporate spatial
reorientation and repeat migration.
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Chapter 9
Social Networks and Spatial
Reorientation
At the start of this thesis, I set out to examine how migration systems adapt
to changing immigration policies with the aid of their social networks. In
previous chapters, I have described how individuals adapt to restriction by
learning about policy and illegal migration alternatives from their networks.
In this chapter, I examine another observed form of adaptation: reorientation
towards other destinations. However, examining this type of reorientation
requires a different strategy than previous chapters: Unlike reorientation to
unauthorised channels, spatial reorientation presents a theoretical puzzle.
As discussed in Chapter 2, theories on migrant networks and cumula-
tive causation1 have provided some of the most recognised explanations for
the widely-documented concentration of immigrants from one origin in host
1Social network theory and the theory of cumulative causation, both detailed in Chap-
ter 2, are complementary theories with very similar expectations on the role of social
networks in migration. I refer to them here as social network theories.
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destinations. Between 1980 and 1990, Western European countries received
immigrants from the same traditional origins: North Africans migrated to
France and Turkish and Eastern Europeans migrated to Germany, for exam-
ple (Collyer, 2005). In 1990, 90 percent of all Hispanics lived in just 10 U.S.
states, with 54 percent of all Hispanics concentrated in California and Texas
(U.S. Census Bureau, 1993). According to social network theory (SNT), this
empirical regularity emerges because the migration-related benefits that so-
cial networks can provide are constrained to the specific locations where these
contacts reside (Haug, 2008). As such, movement to other destinations is not
expected to occur – even in the presence of changes in policy conditions that
might make alternative destinations easier to access (De Haas, 2010; Massey
et al., 1993).
We know, however, that spatial reorientation does take place. Evidence
of migrant flows reorienting away from locations where co-ethnics have his-
torically settled is pervasive in literature. In the 1960s, restrictive immi-
gration laws in the United Kingdom reoriented migration from Caribbean
countries to the United States and Canada which, at that time, were in-
troducing relatively more favourable skill and education based immigration
policies (Glennie and Chappell, 2010). Within the United States, the emer-
gence of new Hispanic destinations has been widely documented (Lichter
and Johnson, 2009; Leach and Bean, 2008; Lichter and Johnson, 2006; Ter-
razas, 2011), with reorientation sometimes being attributed to non federal
immigration laws (e.g. Ellis et al. 2014; Garc´ıa et al. 2011; Bohn and Pu-
gatch 2015). Collyer (2005) finds that policy restrictions in France diverted
Algerian asylum-seekers with France-based family networks to the United
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Kingdom.
The emergence of new migrant destinations for migrants from old source
countries presents a challenge to network theories and speaks directly to this
thesis’ research question: Can the influence of social networks on adapta-
tion to policy extend to ‘spatial substitution’ – or the choice of alternative
destinations promising easier entry? For this to be the case, social network
theories need to be able to reconcile the existence of both path-dependency
and spatial reorientation found in the real world – two outcomes that appear
mutually exclusive. In this chapter, I examine whether they can.
This chapter develops a simple, theory-driven agent-based computational
model (ABM) which formalises the expectations of social network theory. As
mentioned in Chapter 1, agent-based models are an ideal platform for “com-
plex thought experiments” (Cederman, 1997), allowing us to introduce or re-
lax assumptions and test the boundaries of theoretical expectations (Epstein,
1999). It is also, perhaps, one of the most suitable methods for examining
this particular theoretical puzzle. In the real world, migration corridors are
formed as a result of a chain of unique historical events, limiting our ability
to understand the conditions under which corridors form, break or bifurcate.
These dynamics limit our ability to falsify the expectations of social network
theories using observational evidence. Agent-based modelling allows us to de-
velop expectations about the real world by simulating how the system might
behave under different scenarios, taking into account the effects of random
variation that can produce different, path-dependent, migration outcomes.
To examine whether policy can produce spatial reorientation in network
migration, I exogenously vary the immigration policies of two destinations:
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one with a sizeable diaspora (the traditional destination) and one without
(an alternative destination). The model shows that dynamic migration sys-
tems can display both path dependency and reorientation – but only in the
presence of return migration. Out- and return migration helps the system
update itself by allowing networks, and the benefits they bring about, to vary
across space. Flows can then adapt to exogenous changes in immigration pol-
icy conditions and follow the path of least resistance to a new destination,
which may eventually become dominant. This chapter aims to demonstrate
that, when we consider return migration, network theories can explain the
emergence of path-dependent as well as adaptive migration systems.
Network theories have not developed a systematic explanation of return
migration and this process is very often ignored (King, 2012). This chapter
develops theoretical expectations on return migration by combining insights
from network theories and a complementary approach – the New Economics
of Labour Migration (detailed in Chapter 2).
This chapter differs substantially from that Chapter 7 and the support-
ing work that preceded it. The ABM of unauthorised migration applied a
theoretical framework that borrowed from a range of theories across the so-
cial and behavioural sciences (this framework was developed in Chapter 2,
Section 2.4). In this chapter, I focus on social network theories exclusively.
This focus affects model design in substantial ways. As mentioned in Chap-
ter 2, social network theories operate at the meso-level and do not focus on
individual decision-making (Massey et al., 1993; Haug, 2008) or the micro-
level process by which individuals learn and adapt to changes in immigration
policy. As such, agent cognition in this model is simplified; agents are less
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thoughtful and strategic in the way they interact with immigration policy
than they were in Chapter 7. This model also differs in its use of data.
While this model is abstract and theoretical and does not aim to produce
depictions of realistic policy scenarios, I do use empirics to anchor model pa-
rameters to realistic values. As argued in Chapter 3, empirical embeddedness
is a good way to reduce researcher arbitrariness and discretion. However, as
this model was produced before fieldwork in Jamaica began, I was not able
to use the MDP survey for calibration. Instead I employ a widely-used sur-
vey of Mexico-U.S. migration: the Mexican Migration Project (MMP). This
dataset determined the variables I was able to use and the origin country I
was able to depict.
The chapter will proceed as follows. Section 9.1 complements Chapter 2,
Section 2.1.2, by deriving expectations on how social networks may matter
to the return migration decision. These expectations will guide agent rules,
which will be described in Section 9.2, followed by results and discussion.
9.1 Social Network Theories and Return Mi-
gration
According to social network theory, each additional individual who migrates
provides information and assistance to social ties who will, then, help their
own contacts migrate as well. By doing so, networks directly counteract
policy measures that increase the risks and costs of migration. The impli-
cation of this mechanism is that migration flows will be “siphoned off” to
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already dominant destinations following the movement of others. Alterna-
tive destinations, on the other hand, have limited appeal despite changes in
policy conditions that might make the alternative destination easier to access
(De Haas, 2010; Massey et al., 1993). Chapter 2, Section 2.1.2 outlined net-
work theories’ main expectations. In this section, I draw several assumptions
on the likely role of networks on the return migration decision and derive a
set of principles to guide agent rules.
First, network theory does not make assumptions about whether indi-
viduals intend to migrate permanently or temporarily. A dynamic theory,
SNT holds that “acts of migration at one point in time systematically alter
the context in which future migration decisions are made” (Massey et al.,
1993, p.449). This means that, in contrast to neoclassical economic models
of migration, migrants are unlikely to make complex calculations with spe-
cific time-horizons (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1). Individuals are likely to
set off with a particular migration goal in mind, but the location where their
social networks are residing at a given point in time will play an important
role in inter-temporal decisions to return or remain abroad.
Second, we can expect social networks to serve a similar facilitating func-
tion for return as they do for out- migration: Reducing the cost of return
and helping migrants secure employment or reintegrate in other ways (Haug,
2008; Massey et al., 1987; Constant and Zimmermann, 2012; Constant and
Massey, 2002; De Haas and Fokkema, 2011; Klabunde, 2014). A 2015 Pew
Research Centre report indicated that six in ten Mexican return migrants
considered reuniting with family at home to be the leading motivator for the
decision to end their stay abroad (Gonza´lez-Barrera, 2015). In a recent sur-
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vey on Mexican return migration conducted in Jalisco, which has the highest
return migrant population of the country, networks of family and friends are
not only desired but relied upon for reintegration, given a lack of support
services from government and other organizations (Mexicans and Americans
Thinking Together, 2013). In the case of Italian migrants in Germany, Haug
(2008) finds that when migrants’ family ties return home, migrants them-
selves are more likely to return shortly after.
Third, by the same token, networks in the host country will tend to de-
crease an individual’s probability of return (Massey and Espinosa, 1997). Us-
ing a nationally representative longitudinal survey of German guest workers
from major source countries, Constant and Massey (2002) finds that having
a spouse or children in Germany strongly lowers the probability of returning,
while having a spouse and children outside of Germany strongly increases
it. Similarly, Haug’s (2008) single corridor study finds that the more social
ties Italian immigrants accumulated in Germany, the less likely they were to
return home. In the United States, Massey and Espinosa (1997) find that
the migration of wives and children and the birth of children in the United
States was associated with a much lower probability of Mexicans returning
to their home country.
Though SNT emphasises networks’ role in facilitating return, it does not
offer an explanation of return motivations. When (if at all) and why will a
migrant wish to return to the origin country? Neoclassical Economic theory
(NE) and the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) offer, perhaps,
the clearest expectations on motivations for return. Both these theories are
discussed in Chapter 2. According to NE, individuals migrate to higher-
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wage locations in order to maximise expected net lifetime earnings (Sjaastad,
1962). Return migration will happen only if expectations of employment and
higher wages have not been met. According to the NELM, on the other hand,
people migrate with the intention of returning. Migrants are conceptualised
as “target savers,” a term which includes personal savings with the prospect
of possible investment upon return, and remittances sent home (De Haas
and Fokkema, 2011, p. 759). Presumably, remittances will also be sent
for savings and investment purposes if migrants are considering eventual
return (Amuedo-Dorantes and Mazzolari, 2010). Once migrants meet their
‘target savings’ they return home where, among other monetary and non-
monetary advantages, they can enjoy the higher purchasing power of their
foreign earnings (Constant and Massey, 2002; Stark et al., 1997; Dustmann,
2003). According to Boyd (1989), accumulating as much foreign currency
as possible in a short period of time, with the aim of return, is a common
migrant strategy. Individuals often migrate to save enough money to buy a
home or invest in a small business in their home community (Massey et al.,
1987). However, quantitative studies have found mixed support for NE and
NELM and suggest return motivations are likely heterogeneous (Constant
and Massey, 2002; De Haas and Fokkema, 2011).
This chapter does not aim to test motivations for return migration. In-
stead, it aims to show the effects of return migration on geographical patterns
by contrasting a model where migration is temporary to one where it is per-
manent. I implement NELM’s concept of ‘target savings’ to model return
migration because the NELM framework can be considered complementary
to social network theory (see, for example, Massey et al., 1993). Remittances
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– an essential risk-reducing mechanism within SNT – are an anomaly within
NE, which expects that earnings are used to maximise migrant utility in the
host country. Within the NELM framework, these private transfers play a
key role (Constant and Massey, 2002).
From social network theories’ expectations on out- and return migration
we can derive several assumptions to define agent rules:
a Agents will value destinations more highly if their networks have migrated
there.
Networks are key sources of information and benefits which reduce the
costs and risks of migration to their area.
b Individuals migrate with the intention or goal of earning a foreign wage,
saving, and sending remittances home.
c In an individual’s out-migration calculus, network benefits overshadow
macro-level variables such as immigration policy and wage differentials.
d Agents’ return migration calculus will consider both ‘target savings’ and
network benefits.
Individuals tend to move to or remain in the location where they can
draw on the benefits of network membership.
This chapter aims to show that, even though immigration policy is as-
sumed not to play a role in an agent’s calculus, it does affect decisions by
limiting migrant inflow and, by extension, network benefits (assumption c).
To do this, I simulate and vary a very simple immigration policy barrier,
which I explain in more detail in the following section.
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9.2 Model Description
Agent-based computer simulation is suitable for developing a more nuanced
understanding of the behavioural mechanisms at play in international migra-
tion. In this chapter, I develop a conceptually simple, dynamic model, to
demonstrate that migrant adaptation to policy change can take place when
we consider the effect of return migration on future flows. This behaviour
runs counter to network theoretical expectations.
This model is middle range: geographic entities are abstract and the net-
work structure stylised, while agent characteristics are empirically guided
(Gilbert, 2008). In this chapter, I opted for this strategy in order to an-
chor parameters to realistic values while maintaining a simple architecture.
I initialise 272 agents, with no two agents occupying a single cell (or grid
square) at any given time. This number of agents was chosen to strike a bal-
ance between runtime, sample size and the exploration of a large parameter
space. It is important to note that equations operating at the macro-level
are normalised by number of agents and will, therefore, scale in proportion
to this number, mitigating any effects of sample size (more detail is provided
below). In Appendix B.1, I display additional results using a larger number
of agents (with a smaller number of repetitions and parameter combinations)
and, as expected, find that sample size does not significantly affect results.
In this chapter, agents can migrate to one of two destinations but the model
supports migration to three destinations.
When possible, agent variables are set by randomly drawing values from
a distribution with empirical central tendency and dispersion parameters, as
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well as a shape similar to that shown in data. Input parameters are set using
the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) dataset2 and alternative sources. The
MMP survey combines techniques from ethnographic and survey methodol-
ogy, which obtain a wealth of valuable migration-related information. Com-
munities are surveyed only once and are selected based on diversity in terms
of size, ethnic composition and economic development, but not levels of out-
migration (Massey and Zenteno, 1999). Approximately 200 households are
surveyed for the MMP in December-January each year.
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Figure 9.1: Differences in net migration before and after 1989, MMP, with a
square demarcation indicating the period of data used
The span of data used as inputs to this model is restricted to U.S. entries
after the implementation of the sweeping Immigration Reform and Control
Act (IRCA) in 1989 and before 2013. Passed in 1986, the IRCA reduced U.S.
entries and exits by Mexican migrants and was powerful enough to herald a
“new era of Mexican migration” (Durand et al., 1999). As an illustration,
2mmp.opr.princeton.edu
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Figure 9.1 shows yearly differences in net migration3, from 1982 to 2013.
This measure – as opposed to a cumulative measure – more clearly shows
the sharp decrease in migration after the 1989 finalization of the IRCA reform
roll out.4 The coloured lines depict the average difference in net migration
prior to and post 1989. Given these clear patterns, I consider 1990 a natural
starting point for the simulation.
The network structure of Mexican communities is unknown. Therefore
I initiate the model using a stylistic small-world network topology (Watts
and Strogatz, 1998), following other simulation models of migration (e.g.
Klabunde, 2011; Fagiolo and Mastrorillo, 2013). The agent network is spec-
ified following Wilensky (2005) which is based, in turn, upon Watts and
Strogatz (1998). As in Wilensky (2005), all agents first form a circular lat-
tice of γ nearest neighbours, similar in number to Angelucci et al. (2009).
Ties or edges are then rewired with probability pi. Specifically, if an edge
is selected for rewiring, one of the two agents at its ends will rupture its
connection to the other agent and connect with another, randomly selected,
agent (never with itself). Though the spatial position of agents changes with
migration and return, the network arrangement remains constant through-
out a simulation run. Following Rossi (1955), migration decisions are taken
within a simulated year. This means that, if an agent has decided to migrate
to a destination k and is successful, it must wait until the next year to decide
whether to return home. By the same token, if the agent was not successful,
3To be clear, net migration in the previous year was subtracted from net migration in
the current year.
4In this figure, duration of stay was divided by 12 and rounded. This means that trips
lasting 5 - 12 months are recorded as one year.
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it must wait until the next year to make another migration decision.
The model abstracts the migration decision to be a function of only two
variables: network benefits and expected wage (assumptions a - c in section
9.1). Agents originate from a single location and can migrate to one of two
destinations. If they are abroad, they may return to their home. The utility
for return is a function of target savings and network benefits (assumption
d).
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Figure 9.2: Diagram of Interdependencies Across Levels of Aggregation
Though conceptually simple, Figure 9.2 shows the model’s extensive macro,
meso and micro level interdependencies and feedback. In this figure, agent
calculations are distinguished by white boxes, macro-level or global processes
are denoted by vertical line hatching, and meso-level feedback (information
transmitted through networks), by grey shading. Let us look at out-migration
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decisions first (starting from “Networks” box). After setting current location
and wage variables at the start of the simulation, individuals residing abroad
relay information on these variables to network ties at home. This feedback
will form the basis of these ties’ destination utility calculations (which, as
mentioned, is a function of network benefits – or the presence of network
members in a given location – and expected wage). Migrants also send re-
mittances to help their home ties counter the costs of out-migration. An
agent residing at home may decide not to migrate. If they do decide to
migrate to a destination k, the potential migrant is subject to the financial
costs of migration as well as the probability of being granted a visa.
Two macro-level variables have direct or indirect effects on individuals’
ability to migrate at this stage: Immigration policy and average wage. Gov-
ernments grant visas to some potential migrants and not others (in this simple
model, all agents are equally likely to obtain a visa given a probability or
quota). From the perspective of the non-migrant, the more restrictive the
policy, the smaller the network living abroad is likely to be. At an aggre-
gate level, restrictive immigration policies limit the stock of migrants in k
– or the supply of labour – which, in turn, affects the average wage in this
destination5 (see “Supply-Demand Update” box). A change in the average
wage has a number of implications at the agent level. It, primarily, affects
the actual wage obtained by individual migrants. However, because migrants
send information and monetary resources to their ties at home, it also in-
fluences non-migrants’ earnings expectations for the destination where their
ties are located (and, therefore, their utility for migrating there), as well as
5For simplicity, this model assumes perfect employment in all destinations.
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the resources they have available to offset the costs of migration.
The decision to return will depend on the interplay of two factors: at-
taining a ‘savings target’ and the current location of networks ties, following
assumption d. As such, return decisions will be informed by network feedback
on current location (see “From Networks” and “Return Decision” boxes). Fi-
nally, when a return migrant updates their location status, they will affect
out-migration utilities by reducing expected network benefits in the location
where the former migrant used to reside. In what follows, I provide further
detail on model processes.
9.2.1 Emigration and Destination Choice
The emigration procedures in this model are drawn from Epstein (2008) and
follow the theory described in Section 9.1. According to Epstein, an individ-
ual’s utility function for migrating to a particular location k (Uk) depends
on two variables: wage (wk) and networks present at that location (Nk).
6
Utility increases with respect to wages and with respect to the immigrant
stock (for the benefits that networks entail). This is defined by the following
partial differential equations:
∂Uk(wk, Nk)
∂wk
> 0,
∂Uk(wk, Nk)
∂Nk
> 0 (9.1)
For a given utility, the size of networks and wages are substitutable. In
other words, if wages drop, the migrant can be compensated by an increase
in network size (Epstein, 2008, p. 570).
6Wages are often log transformed but this is not done in Epstein (2008).
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dwk
dNk
= −
∂Uk(wk,Nk)
∂Nk
∂Uk(wk,Nk)
∂wk
< 0 (9.2)
The wage in equilibrium is a function of the stock of immigrants in the
country: as the stock of immigrants increases, the equilibrium wage decreases
(Epstein, 2008, p.571)7. The wages that satisfy the equilibrium constraint
are denoted by w∗f . The full derivative summarizing the utility, as a function
of the equilibrium wage and networks, with respect to networks is described
as follows:
dUk(w
∗
f , Nk)
dNk
=
∂Uk(w
∗
f , Nk)
∂Nk
+
∂Uk(w
∗
f , Nk)
∂w∗f
dw∗f
dNk
(9.3)
An increase in the size of the network at the destination has two opposing
effects: a positive one through the increase in network benefits and a negative
one via the decrease in wages. The first component of the right hand side of
the above equation is positive, while the second is negative, reflecting these
opposing effects. When (3) equals 0, the additional network benefits from
one extra migrant equals the decrease in benefits coming from wages. After
this peak is reached, the utility for migrating as a function of networks at the
destination begins to decrease: “the probability of an individual migrating
to a certain country has an inverse U-shape relationship, with regard to the
stock of immigrants already in the host country”[p.573].
Following this description, I define the equilibrium wage for destination
k (Wk) as the negative linear function
7Though immigrants wages are also a function of native population size as well as
immigrant stock, non-immigrant population is assumed to remain constant (Epstein, 2008,
p. 571).
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Wk = −βdk + b (9.4)
The y-intercept b is set to the mean U.S. wage from the MMP sample,
for years 1990 to 2013. As the stock of immigrants, Nk, increases relative
to available jobs, Gk. This ratio is denoted as dk, wages decrease. The
number of available jobs is equal to the total number of grid squares in each
destination k. When all available jobs have been occupied, Wk = 0.
When agents migrate to a destination, they are assigned an individual
wage from a random exponential distribution (wki ) with the mean equal to
Wk, to approximate the distribution of wages for individuals surveyed by
the MMP. That is, individuals are earning, on average, the equilibrium wage
given the size of the immigrant labour supply. As the stock of immigrants
increases, the equilibrium wage decreases and, thus, migration continues to
be beneficial for the host country.
Agents at the origin can only obtain information about host country con-
ditions from the migrants they are connected to through network ties. Let
xij = 1 if a tie exists between decision-maker i and agent j, and xij = 0 oth-
erwise. We then define Xi = {j ∈ I|xij = 1}, which is the set of all con-
nections between decision-maker i and persons j from all agents I, and
Xki = {j ∈ Ik|xij = 1}, which is a subset of Xi including only agents who are
in location k. Agents at home construct their expected wage value E(wki ) as
the average wage of network contacts living in destination k.8
8For simplicity, networks are not weighted differentially.
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E(wki ) =
∑
j∈Xki
wkj
|Xki |
(9.5)
Network benefits form the second component of the emigration utility
function. Newcomers can derive benefits from migrants they are connected
to through social ties and will therefore be drawn to the location where these
migrants reside. By the same token, an individual will have greater home
bias when a smaller proportion of his or her network has migrated, consistent
with assumptions a and d (Section 9.1). As such, I define the network term
Nki as the proportion of total network contacts living in destination k as:
Nki =
|Xki |
|Xi| (9.6)
Having defined its two components, I describe the final emigration utility
function, Uki , following Epstein (2008).
9
Uki = E(w
k
i )c · log(aNki + 1) (9.7)
where c and a are constants, and a affects the curvature of the logarithmic
function. The value of Uki does not surpass 1. The utility for remaining
in the origin country h, relative to moving abroad, is simply the result of
subtracting the average utility for all foreign destinations, k ∈ K, from the
maximum utility possible:
9Epstein (2008) describes the utility for migrating to location k for individual i in
terms of its functional form and inputs, but does not describe the shape of the network
term, or whether the function is additive or multiplicative. Equation 9.7 is in line with
the functional form he describes.
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Uhi = 1−
( K∑
k=1
Uki
K
)
(9.8)
In conclusion, the decision to migrate consists of three steps. First, the
agent will choose to reside in the location with the highest utility, including
home. If there is no single winner, agents will select a location by randomly
choosing across the highest valued options. Second, having chosen their
destination, agents at the origin will migrate if their accumulated wealth in
the current year, Λhi,t, is larger than or equal to the cost of migration ζm. The
costs of migration include one month of destination country income forgone
while transitioning into the new labour market,10 as well as transportation
and visa costs. Third, agents will encounter a ‘policy filter’, whereby they
will migrate subject to a probability of attaining a visa.11
Λhi,t is given by adding the savings accumulated in all previous time pe-
riods, si,t to the wages and remittances received in the current time period
(whi,t and R
h
i,t, respectively):
Λhi,t = si,t + w
h
i,t +R
h
i,t, (9.9)
Individuals who have migrated before maintain the wealth they accumu-
lated abroad, Λki,t=n, and are able to use these savings in addition to any they
accumulated at home, shi , to re-migrate. Hence,
10Decision-makers must consider the effects of a loss of income relative to the cost of
living in the destination.
11The cost of migration is an important consideration when migrating. However, I keep
costs fixed across destinations to observe the unique effects of varying policy restriction.
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si,t = Λ
k
i,t +
t=n∑
t=0
shi , (9.10)
where t = 0 indicates the year they arrived at the destination. According
to the 2012 National Survey of Financial Inclusion (INEGI, 2012) 36 per cent
of the Mexicans claim to have at least one formal savings product. Thus,
36 percent of agents in the origin are equally likely to be marked as home
country savers at initialization. Agents not marked as home country savers,
will only accumulate wealth from working abroad (if they migrate).
Once abroad, all agents in destination k spend their yearly (t) wages,
wki,t, on food and lodging (consumption), C
k
i,t. They may also send remit-
tances Rki,t. Remittances are private transfers generally sent to nuclear or
extended family recipients (De Haas, 2007). In this abstract model, agents
do not strictly identify connections as family ties, as this would require mak-
ing assumptions on family dynamics and, possibly, joint migration strategies
(Stark and Bloom, 1985). However, agents identify one home country recip-
ient at random, upon migrating, and maintain this recipient throughout the
simulation run to approximate the stable relationship an individual would
have with family.
The proportion of an agent’s wages dedicated to consumption and re-
mittances is equal to the median proportion of yearly destination country
wages consumed and remitted, respectively, by MMP respondents across all
relevant years.12 Yearly wages not spent on consumption and remittances
(a little more than half the agent’s yearly wage) is saved and added to the
12Destination country wealth is computed differently than origin country wealth (de-
scribed above) because, data on Mexican consumption was not available for the latter.
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wealth accumulated heretofore (see Table 9.1).
Wealth at the destination, Λki,t, is given by:
Λki,t =
( t=n−1∑
t=0
Λki
)
+ wki,t − (Cki,t +Rki,t) (9.11)
The accumulation of savings play a part in the length of a migratory trip,
as is explained in the following section.
9.2.2 Return Migration
I model return migration utility, U ri , as a function of (1) the benefit of an
additional network tie residing in the home country and (2) the benefit of
approaching savings target η (assumption d). These are the first and second
components, respectively, on the right hand side of equation 9.12. As both
components are necessary for return, utility is modelled multiplicatively:
U ri =
log(aNhi + 1)
log(a+ 1)
(
2
1 + exp(−bski )
− 1
)
(9.12)
Nhi is defined as the proportion of ties to individuals in migrants’ home
location over their total number of connections. All else equal, the larger
Nhi , the larger the motivation to return. On the other hand, if the number
of migrants at home is small, either a large portion of friends and relatives
have joined the migrant or moved to other locations and cannot help the
migrant to reintegrate. Alternatively, the migrant may have never had a
large network at home (e.g. because of young age at the time of migration).
The savings target agents strive towards, η, is obtained from aggregate
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MMP data. I construct η by adding return savings and remittances for
savings and investment purposes accumulated throughout the length of stay
of returned survey respondents, and take the median.13
Agents may be satisfied with saving an amount of money that is ‘close
enough’ to the savings target, while not fully reaching it. As such, the utility
for approximating η is modelled as a logistic function (scaled and shifted such
that the inflection point is at the origin) to reflect the diminishing marginal
utility of approaching a concrete savings target. Equally – and consistent
with network benefits in the emigration utility equation – the added benefit
each additional home-based social tie can bring the agent is also marginally
decreasing.
To solve for constants a and b, I hold the second utility component at the
savings target, η and find two reasonable values or ‘anchor points’ for the
first utility component – network benefits – in terms of U ri . If the amount
of savings accumulated equals η, we would expect the utility of returning
home, U ri to be highest when the proportion of network ties residing at the
13The MMP records the amount of savings with which a migrant returns to Mexico as
well as the amount of remittances sent and their purpose. In the survey, respondents can
select up to 5 purposes for their past remittances from a list of 16 (including an “other”
category). Following Massey and Parrado’s (1994) handling of the same dataset, I divide
the average remittance value reported equally between the purposes reported to determine
the amount of remittances used for each purpose. That is, if individuals reported 5 ways
in which they intended their remittances to be spent, their reported yearly remittance
amount is divided by 5 to obtain how much they sent under each category. The categories
of interest are: “Construction and repair of house”, “purchase of house or lot”, “purchase
of vehicle”, “purchase of tools”, “purchase of livestock”, “purchase of agricultural inputs”,
“start/expand a business”, and ”savings.” As the authors observe, dividing remittances in
this way may have the effect of understating the first category mentioned and overstating
the latter. I consider both savings and investment remittance purposes because savings
may be used for a variety of investment purposes in the home country at any point in the
future (e.g. Massey et al. (1987)) and, therefore, it is impossible to distinguish between
the two in survey responses.
312
origin, Nhi , is also highest. Hence, when N
h
i = 1, I set U
r
i to 0.9. When
Nhi = 0.3, U
r
i = 0.6, slightly above the midpoint. This reflects that, even if
target savings have been met, having few network members at home has a
discouraging effect. The largest possible value of U ri is 1. If able to pay
the costs of return, ζr, individuals head home subject to the outcome of a
Bernoulli trial,
P (Return) ∼ B(1, U ri ).
All parameter settings described above are summarised in Table 9.1 be-
low.
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Table 9.1: Parameter Settings
Variables Values Equations
Empirical Parameters Wealth Λhi,t=1(si, w
h
i , R
h
i ) 9
(fixed) Λki,t=1(s
k
i , C
k
i , R
k
i ) 11
Wage variables wki : X ∼ Exp(Wk), 4,5
0 ≤Wk ≤ µk,
µk = 22, 075
whi : X ∼ Exp(µh),
µh = 4, 502
Consumption Cki = 0.25w
k
i 11
Remittances Rki = 0.19w
k
i 11
Savings si(s
k
i , s
h
i ), 10
shi : X ∼ N (µs, σ2),
µs = 45,
σ ≈ 0.1µs,
p(shi ) = 0.36
ski = Λ
k
i,t−1
Avg. number of ties γ = 6
Endogenous Variables Networks (proportion) 0 ≤ Nki ≤ 1 6,12
0 ≤ Nhi ≤ 1
Exogenous Variables Probability of Forming pi = 0.25
Random Tie
Financial Costs ζm : X ∼ Exp(µζm),
of Migration µζm = 2, 197
Costs of Return ζr : X ∼ Exp(µζr ),
µζr = 441
Savings Target η = 2, 846 13
Pr. Entry 0 ≤ P (Success) ≤ 1
Pr. Return 0 ≤ P (Return) ≤ 1
Notes: µs is the average net savings in a year among Mexican bank clients, which is
equal for the poorest and best-off third of households in the sample collected by (Peachey,
2008, p. 24). No deviation measures were provided. ζm include one month of destination
income forgone while transitioning into the new labour market, transportation and visa
costs from Klabunde (2011) and U. S. Department of State (2015), respectively. ζr
include one month of home country income forgone while reintegrating into the home
labour market and transportation costs. All other fixed parameters are from MMP. All
monetary units are in United States Dollars set using the Consumer Price Index for 2012
as the base (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012) except for time-invariant variables.
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9.3 Results
Network theory predicts that, once a critical number of migrants have estab-
lished themselves in a destination, they help channel future flows to the same
destination. At this point, migration corridors will be robust to changes in
governments’ attempts to influence movement (De Haas, 2010; Massey et al.,
1993). I have argued that policy can lead to the reorientation of flows in the
presence of return migration. Return migration can aid the system’s adap-
tation, allowing corridors to more easily shift to the destination that offers
the greatest possibility for successful entry.
To test this, I present a scenario where a migration corridor has been
established between the origin and destination 1, while comparably fewer
migrants have settled in destination 2. That is, destination 1 is dominant.
Specifically, I place 30 percent of all agents in the traditional destination (des-
tination 1) at initialization, and only 4 percent in the alternative destination
(destination 2). I start each simulation run with a specific immigration pol-
icy setting and maintain this policy constant throughout 24 simulated years,
matching the span of the input data.
Across simulation runs, I vary the probability of a migrant gaining entry
to both destinations (Pr(Success)L1 and Pr(Success)L2) from 0 to 1, at
intervals of 0.02 (small enough to observe granularities or non-linear effects
that may emerge). I run the model 100 times per unique destination pol-
icy combinations and display the average across these runs. All parameter
values not discussed in this section are shown in Table 9.1. In this section,
I show results on the spatial reorientation of migrants in response to policy
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conditions in the two destinations. I show patterns at a single point in time
– at the end of 24 years – and then examine inter-temporal variations.
In the first set of results, I compare experiments where return migration
is disabled and where it is enabled to show its unique effects on migrant reori-
entation. At initialization, the traditional destination is dominant. However,
if individuals begin to move to an alternative destination, their social ties,
drawn by network benefits, may subsequently follow the same path. If more
individuals migrate to the alternative destination than to the traditional one,
a new dominant destination is established. The relative dominance of a des-
tination St is measured by subtracting the proportion of migrants in the
alternative destination, N2t , from those in the traditional destination, N
1
t , at
a given point in time t. It is defined as follows:
St =
N2t −N1t
K∑
k=1
Nkt
(9.13)
Given the initialization settings described above, St at the start of a
simulation run will equal -0.76. The value of St increases as migrants reorient
to destination 2 and will be positive if destination 2 becomes dominant.
Reorientation of flows is driven by immigration policy inequality. Specif-
ically, if destination 2 offers the greatest possibility for successful entry, we
can expect a larger number of individuals to move there. In the following
figures, 9.3a and 9.3b, I examine migrant reorientation at the end of 24 years
for different L1 and L2 immigration policy combinations. I compare the re-
sults for unequal policy combinations to the average value of St = 24 when
policies across destinations are equal (the baseline). This is equal to -0.55.
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Figure 9.3a displays results where return migration is turned off and Fig-
ure 9.3b shows a model where return migration is enabled. For visual clarity,
I use grey scale tones to depict values of St=24 that are below zero (that is,
the proportion of migrants in the, traditional, destination 1, continues to be
larger than in destination 2) and positive values of St=24 (destination 2 has
become dominant) are shown in green hues. Within these two colour ranges,
lighter shading indicates higher values of St=24, or greater reorientation to
destination 2.
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Figure 9.3: Spatial reorientation and dominant corridor shifts across available
destinations
For the most part, migrants continue to flow to the traditional destination
(L1), regardless of policy, when return migration is turned off – as expected
in network theory. In Figure 9.3a, destination 2 becomes dominant only at
extreme levels of policy restriction in the traditional destination. Even when
the L1 closes its borders completely, the alternative destination must admit
a minimum of 1 in 4 migrants to become the new dominant destination.
Otherwise, migrants will persist in their attempts to follow their social ties
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to destination 1.
When policy in destination 1 is most restrictive (Pr(Success)L1 = 0)
and policy in destination 2 is most liberal (Pr(Success)L2 = 1), destina-
tion 2 accumulates 33% more migrants than destination 1 at the end of
24 simulated years. However, reorientation from the traditional to the al-
ternative destination decreases sharply as destination 1 relaxes restrictions
even slightly. Holding Pr(Success)L2 at 1, St=24 drops from 0.33 to 0 when
Pr(Success)L1 is just 0.08. That is, as soon as destination 1 accepts 8%
of all migrants, destination 2 – despite being extremely liberal – loses its
dominance.
Figure 9.3b shows that return migration has a significant effect on the
reorientation of flows. A cursory look at the grid surface shows a substantial
tendency for the alternative destination to replace the traditional one. The
upper left triangular of the grid displays values of St=24 that are mostly
larger than 0. Where the dominant destination is at its most restrictive
and the alternative at its most liberal, L2 effectively replaces L1 as the sole
migration corridor (St=24 = 1). Once the probability of entry in destination
1 is equal to or surpasses 78%, corridors will not shift regardless of policy in
destination 2, but some spatial reorientation still takes place at high values
of Pr(Success)L2.
To lend further context, it is useful to explain the mechanism by which
reorientation takes place. In the simple case where destination 2 is closed,
the migrant stock in both destinations varies as agents return and emigrate.
Agents will make an average of 5 migration trips in a 24-year simulated period
if they are able to enter the traditional destination when they please. As we
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restrict migrant entry to L1, however, agents are able to return home freely
but not necessarily re-migrate. In fact, the average number of migratory
trips an agent takes to destination 1 decreases linearly as we restrict the
probability of entry.
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Figure 9.4: Number of trips to L1 made in a 24-year period when L2 is closed
As can be seen in Figure 9.4, if half of all applicants are granted a visa,
agents will make 3 migration trips to destination 1, on average. When 1 in
10 agents are accepted, agents will only make one migration trip, on average,
throughout the 24-year period. This means that, when the probability of be-
ing granted a visa to the traditional destination is low, agents will migrate,
return, and stay home, reducing the the number of migrants in L1. In this
restrictive scenario, new migrants are also unable to replace those return-
ing home. With these two effects taking place, we might expect migration to
cease completely. However, as the traditional corridor is contracting, changes
are occurring at the micro and meso levels, which will increase the migrant
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population in L2. Return migration affects the locational composition of
some agents’ networks and may tip these agents’ decisions in favour of the
alternative destination. These individuals, in turn, may spur network migra-
tion towards the alternative destination. Through this process, the system
can adapt and corridors can shift in response to hostile policy conditions.
However, a more restrictive policy does not always lead to greater spa-
tial reorientation. Figure 9.3b shows that the relationship between policy
restrictiveness in the traditional destination and the value of Pr(Success)L2
required to make the alternative location dominant is non-linear. Specifi-
cally, the alternative destination will have more difficulty becoming dominant
when immigration policy in the traditional destination is extremely restric-
tive. However, if the traditional destination loosens its entry policy by a
only small amount, becoming dominant becomes much easier for L2. When
the probability of entry in destination 1 is just 2%, destination 2 must be
willing to admit approximately 5 times more migrants to become dominant.
By comparison, when Pr(Success)L1 = 10%, destination 2 needs to admit
2.5 times more migrants than destination 1 to become dominant and, when
Pr(Success)L1 = 20%, it needs to admit only double that of destination
1. This finding is counter-intuitive as it should be easier for the alternative
destination to become dominant when destination 1 is extremely restrictive.
Further exploration on this finding uncovers an interesting avenue for fu-
ture research: the pre-existence of a corridor – and the financial benefits this
entails – may, in fact, be conducive to the establishment of an alternative
one. As mentioned, spatial reorientation takes place because aspiring mi-
grants have networks with different locational compositions. For example, at
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the start of the simulation, one agent may have one-sixth of their migrant
network living in the alternative destination and a second agent may have
none. As these agents’ network contacts return home from the dominant
destination, where most migrants were located at the start of the simulation,
the composition their migrant networks will change. The first agent may
find that her only migrant contact is now in destination 2 and may now wish
to migrate there instead. However, migration is costly and having monetary
resources is a necessary condition for migration into any destination. If pre-
vailing policy in destination 1 does not allow aspiring migrants to enter, they
cannot reap the financial benefits of migration to re-migrate or help other
aspiring migrants mitigate the costs of movement through remittances. As
such, agents who may have wished to migrate to an alternative destination
and facilitate the establishment of a new corridor are unable to do so.
In real life, several factors may inhibit our observation of spatial reorien-
tation. First, we may not be able to observe extreme differences in policy
across major labour importing countries (Hollifield et al., 2014). As an illus-
tration, let us consider the case where country 1 grants a visa to 8 percent
of applicants (the probability of a Mexican applicant obtaining a U.S. green
card in 2012 was 7 percent, according to MMP data). According to simula-
tion results, in order for country 2 to become dominant, it must grant a visa
to 24 percent of applicants from this origin country in a given year – more
than 3 times the percent admitted in country 1. In real life, this scenario
may be unlikely. If the alternative destination is desirable for migrants and
the demand for labour is relatively similar to that of destination 1, destina-
tion 2 may also employ tough policy restrictions to curtail otherwise large
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immigration flows.
Second, the policy impacts we observe will be dependent on the point
in time at which we look. The following set of results examine fluctuations
in destination dominance over time. Figures 9.5 and 9.6 focus in on the
patterns displayed in Figure 9.3b. Figure 9.5 displays the average number of
times, within a 24-year run, where differences between the stock of migrants
in destination 1 and destination 2 cross zero. Lighter hues signify a larger
number of crossovers, or number of times dominance fluctuates from one
location to the other.
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Figure 9.5: Average number of fluctuations in destination dominance
The average number of crossovers in the parameter space delimited by
Pr(Success)L1 ≤ Pr(Success)L2 is 2.7, with the highest activity concen-
trated at low values of Pr(Success)L1 and Pr(Success)L2, where there may
be up to 6 crossovers. Most fluctuation in this area takes place where entry
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policies are similar, as it is in these cases that migrant stock may tend to
become equal across destinations over time. This convergence, in turn, gen-
erates more indifferent potential migrants choosing destinations at random.
In the area where Pr(Success)L2 is decisively larger than Pr(Success)L1,
the number of crossovers decreases substantially. The remaining parameter
space (the bottom-right triangular of the grid) is very stable (0.16 crossovers
on average), indicating that agents are continually flowing to destination 1,
where a majority of migrants were placed at initialization.
Agents have networks with different locational compositions and are af-
fected by random migration events which can generate distinct path-dependent
outcomes. As such, new corridors to destinations with lower immigration re-
strictions may not always establish themselves or may display a high degree
of instability over time. Figure 9.6 displays a range of migration patterns
that emerge over time when policy in destination 1 is set to an 8% prob-
ability of successful entry and set at 80% success in destination 2. Figure
9.6a shows the case of a simple crossover, while 9.6b shows some instability
before a new corridor establishes itself after year 7. Figure 9.6c shows a case
where the proportion of migrants in both locations is equal at three points
in time but destination 2 never becomes dominant. Figure 9.6d displays a
case of where instability remains high across time. Future work will examine
how these patterns may be affected by network size. A larger network may
result in agents’ destination utility being less sensitive to the movement of
few individuals.
In this model, agents take short trips, which likely enhances the rate at
which the system is able to adapt and corridors can shift. Averaged over
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Figure 9.6: Proportion of migrants in each destination, P (Success)L1 = 0.08
and P (Success)L2 = 0.8
100 model runs, approximately 56% of migrants remain abroad for one year,
12% of migrants remain abroad for two years and 3.4% remain abroad for
three years. For simplicity, these calculations are based on a setting where
probability of successful entry to both destinations is 0.8, but length of stay
is not directly affected by entry policy setting. These results are similar to
the length of stay distribution for the MMP sample used. Pooled across the
full timespan of the data, 52% of the sample remain abroad for one year,
18% remain abroad for two years and 9.6% remain abroad for three years
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(see Appendix B.2). However, it is important to note that US-Mexico return
migration patterns have changed throughout the 1989 to 2013 time period
and short-term migration has, for many, given way to longer stays abroad.
This trend, which cannot be observed in this stylised model, is discussed in
further detail below. We can expect the dynamic effects of return migration
on the adaptation of flows to be reduced with prolonged migration trips.
9.4 Discussion
This thesis seeks to understand how individuals adapt to changes in immigra-
tion policy with the aid of their social networks. In this chapter, I examine
a particular form of adaptation: spatial reorientation. Unlike unauthorised
migration – the focus of previous chapters – the role of social networks in
spatial reorientation is unclear. Network theory holds that once a migra-
tion corridor has been established, flows will not reorient to an alternative
destination when immigration policy becomes restrictive (De Haas, 2010).
However, empirical studies have shown that spatial reorientation does take
place. I formalise social network theory as an agent-based computational
model to examine whether these, seemingly mutually exclusive, outcomes
can coexist.
This chapter integrates literature explaining emigration and return, which
is often dissociated. It also extends the explanatory power of network the-
ories by showing that the same behavioural rules that predict geographical
clustering can also predict the reorientation of flows under conditions of pol-
icy inequality across destination options. However, this only happens when
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we consider return migration.
Results show that, if return migration is not enabled, spatial reorientation
takes place only at extreme levels of policy restriction in traditional destina-
tion. The presence of return migration has a significant effect. In contrast
to the no return model, even minor differences between policy settings in
the traditional and the alternative destination (where the former is more re-
strictive) leads to the alternative destination replacing the dominant one. I
also examine the behaviour of corridors over time. These results show that
new corridors are not always stable and may contract and reform at various
points over time, depending on the policy environment. An new corridor’s
hold is likely to be particularly weak when policies are strict across destina-
tion options. These results indicate that immigration policy restriction can,
in fact, have an important effect on network migration, despite theoretical
explanations. Policies can lead corridors to contract and re-form. Moreover,
this effect can be explained by social network theories when we take return
migration into account.
This chapter contributes to literature seeking to understand the wide-
ranging effects of immigration policy and does so from the perspective of
network theory, which has, to date, provided one of the most recognized
explanations for why migrants from a given origin form geographical clus-
ters in host countries or regions (Epstein, 2008). This simple model will
lay the foundation for future work exploring individuals’ complex interac-
tions with immigration policy. Spatial reorientation is just one of a wide
range of ‘substitution effects’ resulting from trade-offs in decision-making
when faced with tough entry laws. As I will discuss in the next and final
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chapter, individuals faced with policy restrictions may adapt by changing the
date of departure in expectation of a policy shift (‘intertemporal substitu-
tion’), migrating through other (il)legal channels (‘categorical substitution’),
and extending the duration of their stay abroad (‘reverse-flow substitution’)
– in addition to choosing an alternative destination (‘spatial substitution’)
(De Haas, 2011).
Reverse-flow substitution, has been widely documented in Mexico-US mi-
gration. Several studies have observed that migrants first consider whether
they will be able to re-enter the U.S. in the future before they decide to
return. The circular movement that characterised migration prior to IRCA
has given way to prolonged or permanent stays abroad (e.g. Durand et al.,
1999, Massey and Pren, 2012, De Haas, 2011). In the light of the results
presented in this chapter, reverse-flow substitution is likely to reduce spatial
reorientation. Additionally, undocumented migration can allow geographi-
cal clustering to continue, defying visa restrictions. As such, unauthorised
migration can also reduce spatial reorientation. Future extensions of this
simulation model will seek to factor policy tightening into return intentions
and undocumented movement, and observe the extent to which these effects
interact with spatial reorientation.
By focusing on only two forms of adaptation – unauthorised migration
and spatial substitution – the work covered in this thesis has only scratched
the surface. Next chapter concludes this thesis and describes plans for future
work, including extensions to the model that can incorporate a wider range
of adaptive behaviour and help us understand how they interact with one
another.
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Chapter 10
Summary and Discussion
The aim of this thesis was to examine how migration flows adapt to chang-
ing immigration policies with the help of their social networks, specifically
by adopting illegal routes or alternative destinations. Despite a widespread
consensus that immigration cannot be “turned off like a tap” by restricting
entry (Castles, 2004a), no systematic empirical research exists to assess what
migrants do when their options for migration are limited (De Haas, 2011). I
have argued that the study of migration needs to take seriously the role of
individual agency when movement is restricted and must also explicitly ex-
amine the network-based feedback processes that help migrants adapt. This
perspective can allow us to understand the full impact of immigration policies
by expanding our scope of expected migrant behaviours.
My thesis develops a new agency-centred, multi-level theoretical frame-
work for the study of migration decisions under immigration policy con-
straints, drawing from literature across the social and behavioural sciences.
Methodologically, it presents a new approach to: (1) observe clandestine
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populations, (2) examine policy targets’ adaptive responses while overcom-
ing challenges in causal identification, (3) capture the complex outcomes
that emerge at the macro-level when policy information is spread across net-
works, and (4) bridge migratory processes occurring at macro- meso and
micro levels. Specifically, I use agent-based computational modeling (ABM)
to naturally integrate a series of individual-level empirical designs targeting
key parts of migrants’ decision-making process. This combination of meth-
ods allows us to examine the effects of potential policy scenarios and their
counterfactuals, which are impossible or impractical to observe in real life.
From a policy standpoint, these capabilities can be very useful as they can
help policymakers anticipate the outcomes of policies before implementing
them, and it can also help us improve policy design by identifying numerical
thresholds or parameter ranges (e.g. level of enforcement or visa quotas) that
will yield the desired effects. In short, this approach can help governments
make better informed cost-benefit decisions and substantially aid the policy
design process. This work sets the stage for a new research agenda that uses
simulation models as both a guide and a thread that ties together a set of
targetted empirical designs. Future work will both (a) expand the purview of
my research questions and (b) refine data collection and design techniques.
The chapters of this thesis are organised around the design, implementa-
tion and results of an agent-based model of unauthorised migration. Chapters
2 to 4 provide a general background of the model, Chapters 5 and 6 refer to
the empirical specification and calibration of specific portions of the model.
Chapters 7 and 8 present the results of the agent-based model of unautho-
rised migration, integrating all the work shown in previous chapters. The
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last chapter of my thesis, Chapter 9, expands beyond unauthorised migra-
tion to examine another form adaptation: the reorientation of migrants to
alternative destinations.
Specifically, Chapter 2 builds the theoretical framework that guides the
ABM of unauthorised migration and some aspects of Chapter 9. I critically
review interdisciplinary literature on migration, decision-making and the rule
of law with a particular focus on their treatment of individual agency and
their implications on our study of the effects of immigration policy. Drawing
from this literature, I develop eight premises:
1. Migration is non-binary. States’ laws and entry classifications define
different migration modes, spanning legal and illegal forms of migration.
The decision to migrate cannot be understood without considering the
different situation individuals find themselves in within each mode.
2. The effects of policy are heterogeneous. The legal categorisation of mi-
gration gives individuals with different demographic profiles and rela-
tionships abroad different opportunities (Carling, 2002; Borjas, 1989a).
3. Inequalities between aspiration and perceived ability drive unauthorised
migration. (a) Individuals may consider migrating through unautho-
rised channels if policy constraints make it difficult or impossible for
them to migrate legally (Carling, 2002; Castles, 2004a). However, (b) a
continued aspiration to migrate is a necessary pre-condition for unau-
thorised migration.
4. Potential migrants’ agency under policy constraints lies in their re-
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flexivity. Individuals are not atomistic utility maximisers. They are
reflexive and creative, and may not respond in predictable ways to
immigration policy. This definition follows Giddens’ ‘ontology of po-
tentials’ (Cohen, 1989).
5. Individuals’ understanding of policy is limited. Individuals learn by
probing their environment and learning from others and use simple
heuristics for decision-making (Simon, 1972; Gigerenzer and Selten,
2002). This is one of, possibly multiple, observable behaviours stem-
ming from the conception of agency described above. Individuals also
send and receive information that may be biased (Sabates-Wheeler
et al., 2009; Ryo, 2015; Wason, 1960; Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000).
6. Potential migrants adapt to policy environments. Migrants adjust to
conditions that are negatively affecting their well-being by actively
searching for opportunities within objective conditions. It is highly
likely that such opportunities will exist in within the ‘immigration in-
terface’ (Carling, 2002; Hollifield et al., 2014).
7. Migration is a multi-level process. The effect of immigration policy
trickles down from the macro-level to the decision-maker and her social
context (Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2016).
Chapter 3 reviews literature using data-driven agent-based modelling to
study migration. I focus specifically on strategies for incorporating empirics
in ABMs. Based on this analysis, I propose a proactive approach to empiri-
cal embeddedness, which integrates the design, analysis and presentation of
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empirical pieces with the computational modelling process. This approach
sets the stage for a description of the Migration, Decisions and Policy survey
in Chapter 4. This survey was designed specifically to inform and calibrate
the ABM of unauthorised migration. Chapter 4 also provides details on
case selection, as well as an overview, including descriptive statistics, of the
variables used in or to inform the model.
Chapters 5 and 6 address key ABM design choices and empirical ques-
tions that arose when specifying the ABM of unauthorised migration: (1)
Does policy decrease perceived ability only? or also aspiration? (2) Does
the aspiration/ ability gap drive support for illegal strategies? (3) Does
successful past migration and successful migration of network ties increase
perceived ability to migrate? Do past failures to migrate decrease perceived
ability to migrate? These questions represented key elements of model design
and therefore required empirical testing to evaluate whether these theoretical
relationships were present in the data used to calibrate the ABM of unautho-
rised migration, as argued in Chapter 3. Answering these questions is also
important for theoretical development. First, we know that immigration
policy is likely to reduce people’s perceived ability to migrate, but migration
scholars have provided contradictory expectations on whether aspirations are
affected as well (e.g. Carling, 2002; Castles, 2004a). This question also sits
at the crux of an important social theory debate: Do individuals’ adapt their
expected life choices to objective conditions, as Bourdieu’s concept of habitus
might suggest (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012, p. 214-215), or do they search for
opportunities within these conditions in order to further their goals? (Co-
hen, 1989). These two underlying mechanisms would, in practice, give way
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to two very different types of behavioural outcomes: non-migration or a
range of creative alternatives, including unauthorised migration strategies,
respectively – addressing our second question. The third question, which
regards learning and feedback has been explored by few researchers (Ryo,
2015; Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2009; Reyes et al., 2002; Herna´ndez-Carretero,
2008). As such, there is little theoretical or empirical guidance as to how
failures affect future attempts from a migration perspective.
These questions were examined using novel experimental and non-experimental
items from the MDP survey to inform the design of the ABM of unautho-
rised migration. Chapter 5 tackles the first and third questions by examining
the effects of receiving information about immigration policy on aspiration
and perceived ability to migrate. The effects of immigration policy are diffi-
cult to isolate from other factors limiting migration using observational data.
Immigration policy is also not exogenous: policies might respond to migra-
tion flows and vice-versa and we, generally, cannot observe the outcomes
that might have occurred in the absence of policy change. These threats to
causal identification are mitigated through an experimental design. Chap-
ter 5 examines the effects of receiving information about immigration policy
on aspiration and perceived ability to migrate by randomly assigning indi-
viduals to view a short video about immigration policy. Findings showed
that, while perceived ability to migrate was affected by information about
immigration policy, aspiration to migrate was not. These findings were com-
plemented with a multiple regression analysis that leveraged novel network
and migration history items in the MDP survey. These analyses showed that
past migration experiences negatively affected individuals’ perceived ability
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to migrate and that network ties’ successful migration experiences positively
affected individuals’ perceived ability to migrate. Numerical findings from
Chapter 5 are used to calibrate a key variables of the ABM of unauthorised
migration, relating to the influence of policy on migrant decision-making.
Answering the second question – whether involuntary immobility drives
unauthorised migration – is not straight-forward. As this topic is sensi-
tive, social desirability bias may affect measurement (Glynn, 2013; Kuklinski
et al., 1997). Chapter 6 describes and examines the results of a list exper-
iment, a novel approach to measurement that protects individuals’ privacy
and thereby limits these effects. Experimental results show that a perceived
gap between aspiration and ability is associated with a higher likelihood
of supporting two types of unauthorised strategies: full-noncompliance and
semi-noncompliance (defined in Chapter 2). This analysis lends evidence to
the specification and calibration of the relationship between involuntary im-
mobility and unauthorised migration in the model. Chapter 7 presents the
ABM of unauthorised migration, bringing together the work presented in all
previous chapters. The results of this model show that barriers to family
and low-skilled migration have the largest effects on migrant reorientation
towards unauthorised channels and that border enforcement is ineffective.
In the ABM of unauthorised migration agents were assumed to objec-
tively evaluate information about immigration policy. However, it is likely
that individuals weight information differently, depending on whether it is
positive or negative, or whether it is based on one’s own experience or those
of others. Following literature on cognitive biases reviewed in Chapter 2 (e.g.
Wason, 1960; Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000), Chapter 8 examines whether the
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manner in which individuals weight feedback can have effects on macro level
migration patterns. This is done through further experimentation on the
ABM of unauthorised migration.
In chapter 9, I evaluate another form of adaptation: reorientation to-
wards other destinations. This type of reorientation is a theoretical puzzle:
We know that spatial reorientation takes place (e.g. Ellis et al., 2014; Col-
lyer, 2005) and we know that networks are essential in perpetuating migra-
tion flows. However, network theories cannot explain how reorientation takes
place. Because network benefits are location-specific, theory expects migra-
tion to emerge in robust spatially clustered patterns that will not shift when
policy is restricted. I use agent-based modelling as a “complex thought ex-
periment” (Cederman, 1997) to examine the conditions under which spatial
reorientation may emerge in a networked system. I find that an oft-neglected
aspect of migration – return – helps the spatial distribution of migration up-
date periodically, allowing corridors to shift in space.
10.1 Future Work
Several avenues of future research were identified in previous chapters. I
develop them further in this section and point to additional paths that may
be taken.
10.1.1 Substitution Effects and Interdependencies
In this thesis, I have examined two forms of reorientation to immigration pol-
icy restriction: unauthorised migration and movement to other destination
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countries. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, these behaviours
only scratch the surface of a lengthy research agenda. As part of this research
agenda, I intend to implement and further develop the theoretical framework
presented in this thesis to examine other types of adaptive behaviours and
their interdependencies. When adopting an agency-centred perspective, it
is possible to conceptualise migrant decision-making as consisting of a wide
range of creative options. De Haas’ (2011) ‘substitution effects’ (see Chapter
2) are a good starting point.
Categorical Substitution
Categorical substitution refers individuals’ choice to shift across legally de-
fined categories. In chapters 5 to 8 of this thesis, I have focused on one type of
categorical substitution: the movement from any legal category to an illegal
category. I have assumed that individuals are indifferent across the vari-
ous legal categories available to them and will choose randomly across them.
However, aspiring migrants are likely to have distinct preferences across legal
categories. Visas such as family reunification may give individuals the op-
portunity to migrate abroad permanently, whereas a low-skilled guest worker
permit will not; some visas are attached to particular forms of employment,
which may restrict migrants’ career mobility. The exchange visitor visa in
the US, for example, is attached to employment for the visa sponsor (US De-
partment of State, 2018). Future fieldwork will gather evidence on whether
individuals follow an ordered set of preferences when shifting across the visa
categories available to them.
337
Spatial Substitution
In Chapter 9, I have examined the reorientation of individuals to countries
with laxer policy measures with the aim of understanding the mechanism un-
derlying this sort of reorientation in a networked system. However, for some
empirical cases it may be interesting to conceptualise spatial reorientation as
continuous and more closely tied to physical and monetary impediments and
facilitators as well as location-specific border policing. For example, since
the 1990’s crossings along the US border are constantly shifting in response
to Border Patrol crack downs on specific sections. In 2013, illegal border
crossings shifted from Arizona to Rio Grande Valley of South Texas – lead-
ing to a very different type of crossing. According to the New York Times,
this shift entailed “makeshift rafts crossing the river in increasing numbers,
high-speed car chases occurring along rural roads and a growing number of
dead bodies turning up on ranchers’ land” (Lipton and Preston, 2013). The
effect of physical distance may also make treks more difficult and payment
to smugglers more onerous (Kulish, 2018). These physical factors likely play
a part in shaping the spatial shifts that take place.
Inter-temporal Substitution
Anticipation of changing policy can trigger ‘now or never’ migration. This
sort of behaviour can affect measurement. A pre-policy surge in flows may
create an artificially high baseline, affecting our comparison with post-policy
measures (Czaika and De Haas, 2013). This sort of ‘now or never’ migration
was documented in 2016 in response to US President Donald Trump’s plans
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to build a border wall (Dart, 2016). The UK, similarly, saw a pre- EU
referendum inflow of 284,000 EU citizens leading the country to reach a record
level of immigration (650,000 people) (Travis, 2016). Ongoing research on
refugees displaced in the Mediterranean has found that migrants respond
to signals from political rhetoric before a policy is even implemented (Jakli
et al., 2018).
Reverse-flow Substitution
As mentioned in Chapter 9, restrictive policies can discourage return migra-
tion for fear of a difficult re-entry, if it were to be needed. Massey (2005)
shows that increased enforcement unintentionally encourages illegal migrants
to remain in the United States by driving up the cost of border crossing.
Viewed from the perspective of the decision-maker, these adaptive mecha-
nisms can be conceived as trade-offs. One may not wish to migrate irregularly
and, therefore, chooses to move to a more liberal destination instead. Strate-
gies may also be conceptualised as multifaceted. In many of the examples
above, individuals adopt unauthorised routes in addition to shifting their en-
try point into a country, or choosing to remain abroad longer than they would
have. This interdependence is important because considering various forms
of substitution simultaneously, may change our expectations on the incidence
of any given adaptive behaviour on its own. In the long-term, I aim to build
an agent-based model where all these adaptive behaviours are in place and
migrants can shift across them depending on their personal preferences and
characteristics, as well as the characteristics of the alternative itself.
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A further question that future ABM research might seek to address is
whether policy effects on the above behaviours are asymmetric (Czaika and
de Haas, 2016). For example, Is the magnitude of effect observed when
transitioning from a more restrictive-policy scenario A to a more liberal-
policy scenario B equivalent to the transition from scenario B to A, or does
the size of the effect depend on the direction of the change? Answering this
question would require restricting or liberalising policies at different points
within a simulation run.
10.1.2 Migration Contexts
In this thesis I have focused mainly on migration from Jamaica. I have used
data from Mexico to inform parameters in the theoretical model presented
in Chapter 9, but I did not do so with the intention of examining the Mex-
ican case in particular. The use of data in this case was simply to anchor
parameters to realistic values.
Future work will seek to extend beyond the case of Jamaica to various
other migration contexts. I have identified two types of contexts that are
particularly useful to extend the explanatory power of the ABM of unautho-
rised migration: (1) different demographies and migration histories, and (2)
different types and magnitudes of migration pressures.
Demographic and Historical Contexts
Jamaica differs from other source countries because of the migration related
characteristics of its citizens as well as its migration history. As mentioned
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in Chapter 4, Jamaica has a long history of emigration and a large dias-
pora abroad (Thomas-Hope, 1992; Glennie and Chappell, 2010). This is a
characteristic feature of islands. Islanders often look abroad to escape harsh
living conditions, as well as relative seclusion compared to the mainland
in terms of resources, employment and other opportunities (Burholt et al.,
2013; Thomas-Hope, 1992). Emigration drives further emigration because of
its developmental impacts (e.g. brain drain (Glennie and Chappell, 2010))
and because it becomes ingrained in the culture and traditions of the island.
That is, migration is part of an islander’s set of alternatives simply because it
has been practised throughout history (Bourdieu, 1977). As such, Jamaican
migration may differ, specifically, from mainland emigration in important
respects.
Results will also vary when compared to countries where fewer individu-
als aspire to move abroad or have greater access to additional legal channels.
The complexity of this phenomenon makes it difficult to form expectations,
attesting to the need for a model that identifies the various dynamic aspects
that can feed into the decision-making and behaviour of migrants. We could
consider the case of Mexico, for example. Mexican citizens tend to have
much lower intentions to live or work abroad than Jamaicans (Zechmeis-
ter, 2014), but are also generally wealthier – with a GDP per capita almost
double that of Jamaica (World Bank, 2016) and therefore will likely have a
relatively higher ability to migrate legally. At the same time, the well estab-
lished tradition of coyotaje, or the hiring of smugglers, in Mexico may also
make illegal migration easier and more accessible to this population (Spener,
2009). Likewise, we could examine Indian migrants, who represented the
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highest proportion of high-skilled (H-1B) visas and the second highest pro-
portion of student visas to the US in 2016. Indian nationals accounted for
74 percent of the 345,000 H-1B petitions approved by the U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) that year, and 16 percent of the 1 million
international students (Zong and Batalova, 2017). These circumstances are
notably distinct from those of Jamaican migrants, for whom high-skilled and
student visas are largely inaccessible.
Pressure Contexts
In this thesis, I have examined cases of voluntary migration. However, mi-
grants flee to escape conflict, environmental change, persecution, as well as
extreme poverty. These drivers often intertwine to form unique pressure sce-
narios. According to a 2011 UK Government report, environmental change
will become an increasingly important factor driving migration decisions in
the next decades, around the world. While 17 million individuals around the
world were displaced by natural hazards in 2009, this figure rose to 42 mil-
lion in 2010. Compared to 2000, there may be between 114 and 192 million
additional people in urban areas of Africa and Asia whose homes will be in
floodplains by 2060 (Foresight, 2011).
Environmental change is interlinked with other drivers of migration, such
as poverty and conflict. In 2004-2006, for example, temporary labour mi-
gration among Kenyan households that were farming land with high quality
soil was 67% lower than in households using poor soils. Increased levels of
drought due to climate change is, therefore, expected to increase migration
pressures (Black et al., 2011). El Salvador is another example of a coun-
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try facing interlinked migration pressures. El Salvador is part of Central
America’s ‘Dry Corridor’ and, according to a 2016 FAO report, is suffering
from one of the worst droughts in recent history, with 3.5 million in need
of humanitarian assistance (FAO, 2016). Large-scale violence perpetrated
by armed criminal gangs at the origin and in transit areas simultaneously
drives individuals to flee and endangers their journey into and through Mex-
ico (Amnesty International, 2017).
Migrants fleeing from extreme pressure are likely to make decisions in a
very different way than the voluntary migrants depicted in this thesis: Flows
are likely to have different characteristics and the role of the receiving state
will also be different. Hein (1993) describes several characteristics that make
refugee flows different from voluntary migration. First, although refugees or-
ganise migration through social networks, similar to voluntary migrants, the
demographic composition of network migration is different. Social networks
for voluntary migration are selective – networks abroad help others that are
like them (Faist, 1997). However “refugee populations include many persons
who would not leave home on a voluntary basis” (Gold, 1992, p. 17). Refugee
migrations are also more often composed of families than individuals. This
is due to the need to leave an area of danger, but also due to admissions
systems that facilitate group migration (Hein, 1993, p. 50). Second, refugee
crises will produce distinct migration waves with similar dates of departure,
while voluntary migration may not take place in such distinct temporal clus-
ters. Third, refugee migration seeks protection of the receiving state and,
therefore, the state is more involved in the adaptation of the migrant to the
host country.
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A model similar to the ABM of unauthorised migration applied to these
distinct migration contexts can generate interesting differences worth exam-
ining in detail.
10.1.3 Other Barriers to Migration
In this thesis, I have concentrated on isolating the effects of immigration
policy on migration flows. According to Carling (2002, p. 26), “today, a
person wishing to migrate from a poor country to a wealthy country is likely
to find that the greatest barriers are connected to the destination country’s
immigration policies.” This is because social contacts can, in theory, help
mitigate many of the financial difficulties involved in voluntary migration
by providing credit for the journey. A visa, on the other hand, cannot be
negotiated.
However, not all individuals are able surpass non-policy barriers to mi-
gration. Bryan et al. (2011) test the effects of providing a small monetary
incentive on internal migration rates during famine season in Bangladesh.
Individuals from 100 Bangladeshi villages were randomly allocated to one of
three treatment conditions (cash, loan and information treatment) or a con-
trol group. The cash and loan treatments consisted of providing $8.50 - the
cost of a round-trip ticket - either upfront, or in the form of a zero-interest
loan with limited liability. The third treatment group were provided with
information about jobs at the destination. Researchers monitored actual mi-
gration flows carefully and added an extra incentive of $3.00 for households
reporting having migrated to the destination. The authors found a 22 percent
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increase in movement at the household level for treatment groups, relative
to the control group. Moreover, the migration rate was 10 percentage points
higher in treatment areas a year later, and 8 percentage points higher three
years later after the incentive was removed. This study showed that seem-
ingly small barriers to migration can have substantial effects on migration
rates. As alluded to above, any study that considers the financial barriers to
migration must also take into account the importance of financial transfers
across networks, as was done in Chapter 9. Future extensions of the ABM
of unauthorised migration will incorporate these aspects.
This stream of future work can also be tied to research on other pressure
contexts. Many migration pressures can also function as barriers, such that
the pressure is “equally likely to make migration less possible as more proba-
ble” (Foresight, 2011, p. 9). Individuals experiencing conflict or violence may
face a great deal of danger when attempting to escape, as mentioned in the
context of El Salvador (Amnesty International, 2017). Similarly, individuals
driven to poverty by climate change or any other factors will have the most
need and as well as the greatest difficulty in migrating (De Haas, 2007).
10.1.4 Developing a Better Understanding of Migrant
Decisions
To identify agents’ rules for behaviour, this thesis used quantitative, sta-
tistical methods to find support for the presence or absence as well as the
magnitude of relationships within a theoretical decision model. This ap-
proach is useful because it allows us to find numerical parameters necessary
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for calibrating an ABM and it also allows us to infer whether relationships
are likely to be present beyond our limited sample.
However, relative to qualitative methods, this approach has two impor-
tant shortcomings. First, finding support for indicators of a theory in a
quantitative sense does not mean the theoretical mechanism is present in the
data. That is, we can find support for a set of rules but not for the way
these rules hang together in a decision process. Second, statistical inference
relies on observations being independent of one another. This hampers our
ability to observe and find evidence for the interaction processes depicted in
the model.
Qualitative techniques can help mitigate both concerns and may be used
in conjunction with quantitative approaches. As mentioned in Chapter 3,
modellers have used a range of different qualitative techniques such as ‘role
playing’ or ‘companion modelling.’ In these techniques, the subjects rep-
resented in the model provide the researcher with direct information about
model rules. Modellers usually present participants with a representation of
the model in a workshop, for example, which sets the stage for a focused dis-
cussion that can help modellers refine its rules (Janssen and Ostrom, 2006;
Naivinit et al., 2010).1
Regardless of whether or not we use the model as an elicitation technique,
the use of qualitative evidence can improve our understanding of the deci-
sion process (Tubaro and Casilli, 2010). Qualitative strategies can include
in-depth interviews, focus groups (where subjects are asked to discuss top-
1However, having a model in place can potentially also ‘lead’ participants to confirm
the current model rather than alter it.
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ics of interest in small groups), ethnography (where researchers observe, or
observe and participate, in the life of the subjects of interest) and a variety
of other methods (Berg, 2009). Modellers may use a combination of these
techniques to obtain answers to different questions prompted by the mod-
elling process. For example, interviews can be useful for gaining in-depth
information about decision-making unaffected by group dynamics. Focus
groups and ethnographies, on the other hand, allow us observe the effects of
social context and can be useful for developing rules for agent interaction (I
expand on this point below). Focus groups also lend themselves to depicting
hypothetical scenarios or conducting experiments, much in the same way as
an ABM. In future work, I plan to incorporate qualitative methods in the
first stages of the model design, as suggested in the ‘Proactive Approach to
Empirical Embeddedness’ developed in Chapter 3.
10.1.5 Developing a Better Understanding of Network
Structures
There is a lack of evidence on the structural characteristics of migrant net-
works (Fazito and Soares, 2013). This is, in part, due to the costs involved
in collecting information on full networks, as required when building a net-
worked system of agents in a computational model. Random sampling pro-
vides a way to generate inferences about a population without surveying ev-
eryone in it, which significantly reduces the costs of data collection. However,
when collecting social network data, we want to observe interdependencies
and, therefore, we must survey the whole population of interest. Due to bud-
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get constraints, this thesis used existing theory to generate social networks
in the ABM rather than collecting full network data. However, the pro-
cess of combining ABM with empirics helped illuminate some cost-effective
strategies to develop a better understanding of network structures in future
work. These strategies involve identifying the rules for network formation
empirically and then growing the network in the ABM.
Focus groups provide a suitable method for extracting the rules for net-
work formation because they allow interaction to take place in a controlled
setting. The formation of social networks can be observed through the anal-
ysis of a focus group transcript and may be further facilitated through the
use of a private survey conducted after the discussion takes place. For exam-
ple, using social network name generators, we can elicit information about
how focus group participants perceived one another (e.g. a survey question
might read: “Please indicate the ID letters of participants with which you
agreed” or “Please indicate the ID letters of participants you found most in-
formative”). Using this information, correlated with relevant characteristics
of focus group participants, we can construct network matrices on several di-
mensions of interest. For example, we may be interested in knowing: To what
extent do experts (return migrants or individuals with substantial knowledge
of immigration policies) become key nodes of influence? Is optimism a signifi-
cant attractor of migration preferences, as suggested in qualitative migration
literature (e.g. Herna´ndez-Carretero and Carling, 2012)?
These types of questions can help us develop rules for growing a network
in an ABM. Once we have grown the network, we can, then ask several
further questions of the ABM such as, in which cases do individuals converge
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on an extreme preference (Amblard and Deffuant, 2004), for example an
unauthorised migration strategy, and which structural characteristics of the
network facilitate this outcome?
10.2 Summary
In summary, this thesis set out to examine how migration systems adapt to
changing immigration policies. Specifically, it examined the extent to which
migrants adopt unauthorised routes or seek alternative destinations when
policies impede entry into the chosen destination. This thesis advances the
study of migration and immigration policy on both theoretical and method-
ological fronts. Drawing on existing theories of migration, this thesis develops
a new theoretical approach to examine the effects of immigration policy on
adaptive migration systems. It formalises this theory as an ABM informed
by and calibrated with an original nation-wide survey of Jamaica. This
combination of methods allows us to examine the effects of potential policy
scenarios and their counterfactuals. This approach can help governments
be better informed about the costs and benefits involved in implementing a
policy – regardless of the policy area – and can help design smarter ones.
In this chapter, I identified several areas for future work that (a) expand
the purview of my research questions and (b) refine data collection and de-
sign techniques. These avenues for future work demonstrate how this thesis
initiates a promising, long-term research agenda.
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Appendix A
Chapter 7
A.1 Varying Specification of Attempt Prob-
ability on In-Silico Experiment Results
Figure A.1 shows results for alternative values of k, the curvature of the logis-
tic function outputting the probability of attempting migration (see Chapter
7). For each experiment in Figure A.1, I fully restrict one channel at a time,
while holding all others to their baseline conditions. As in the main text,
all models were run for a duration of 20 years. For each simulation run, I
compute the migrant stock accumulated across all simulated years. I then
compute the mean of this value across 700 runs.1 Each bar in Figure A.1
shows changes (as a proportion of aspiring migrants) from the baseline con-
ditions in terms of legal (blue) and illegal (red) migration and non-migration
(black).
1Results for k = 1 displayed in Chapter 7 did not change significantly between 700 to
1000 runs
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Figure A.1: Mean effects of policy scenarios on migration outcomes relative
to the baseline, alternative ks
I compare results for k = 2 and k = 3 to the results reproduced in Chap-
ter 7, where k is set to 1. In general, overall levels of migration increase at
lower values of k. This is due to the fact that the initial (survey) distribu-
tion of ability values for all three strategies is skewed towards values below
the midpoint (see Table 4.2). As such, altering the curvature of the func-
tion results in more individuals attempting migration initially, despite low
perceived abilities. However, legal, illegal and non-migration ratios remain
relatively constant across settings.
A.2 Changing Preferences over Lifecycle
Individuals’ preference for migrating may change in tandem with their bi-
ographical situation. In this article, we have assumed preferences remain
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constant over time. Here, we evaluate how sensitive our results are to relax-
ing this assumption.
There are several lifecycle events that may lead an individuals’ aspira-
tion to migrate to change. As Kley (2011, p. 473) suggests, “anticipating
life-course events may trigger considering migration by scattering peoples’
daily routines and therefore opening their minds for a broader view of pos-
sible actions.” Several key changes happen in early adulthood: leaving the
parental home, starting higher education, beginning one’s first job, or en-
tering a partnership or marriage. These life events can trigger a desire to
migrate (Mulder and Wagner, 1993; Mulder, 1993). Additionally, the birth of
a child has been shown to be a significant driver of domestic migration (Kulu
and Milewski, 2007), as couples may seek more spacious dwellings (though
evidence is mixed, see Clark and Huang, 2003). Anticipating the birth of
a child may also lead couples to seek alternative sources of income through
international migration.
These events are “framed by institutions” (Kley, 2011, p. 473) and, as
such, we can observe clear aggregate patterns for lifecycle events for different
age ranges. Table A.1 shows descriptive statistics from our cross-national
survey of Jamaica. As expected, we can see that most individuals pursue
higher education between the ages of 18-24. Many individuals start obtaining
their first permanent or seasonal job around these ages. However, there is a
large spike in the percentage of people working between ages 25-34, indicating
that at least as many individuals are obtaining their first job between their
mid-twenties and mid-thirties. Most of our respondents had at least one
child, but this percentage appears to be higher among respondents who were
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at least 25 years old (59%-98%). Co-habiting appears to be more common
later on in life, with 59% of respondents between 35-44 years of age indicating
they had a partner or spouse, in contrast with 30.4% in the 25-34 age range.
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics from MDP survey on Lifecycle Events by
Age
Age / Life Cycle Event Studying Job Co-habiting Child
18-24 32% 30% 6.7% 26.0%
25-34 5.9% 70% 30.4% 59.0%
35-44 1.6% 80% 59.0% 90.0%
45-54 0.1% 77% 55.9% 93.0%
55-64 0.1% 72% 62.9% 98.0%
65+ 0% 34% 43.4% 98.0%
As expected, age does have a significant effect on aspiration to migrate,
as shown in Table A.2. In fact, aside from prior migration, age is the only
significant predictor for aspiration to migrate. The coefficients for age and
age squared are, however very small.
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Table A.2: Effects of Age on Aspiration to Migrate
Dependent variable:
Aspiration to Migrate
Male −0.073
(0.110)
Age 0.057∗∗∗
(0.020)
Age2 −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002)
Education −0.047
(0.051)
Income −0.0001
(0.0001)
Prior Migration (=1) 0.310∗
(0.190)
Family Abroad 0.010
(0.022)
Constant 5.400∗∗∗
(0.460)
Observations 1,128
R2 0.170
Adjusted R2 0.160
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
For our in-silico sensitivity tests, aspiration was modelled as a linear func-
tion of age. To incorporate stochasticity, equation parameters were allowed
to vary randomly across a normal distribution centered around the point
estimates described in Table A.2. Specifically, as agents age a year, they
update their aspiration to migrate by inputting their new age into a linear
function. As coefficients vary randomly across their confidence intervals, the
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parameters of the function are slightly different each time any agent updated
their aspiration to migrate.
Figure A.2 shows the ABM results for this sensitivity test. As aspiration
to migrate – the denominator in the main text – is not comparable across
the ‘Original’ (black) and ‘Life Cycle’ (purple) models, we show outcomes
over number of agents instead. In all other aspects, Figure A.2 is comparable
to Figure 7.7 in Chapter 7: to distinguish the effects of policy, we subtract
results from the baseline eligibility model, and each model setting represents
the effects of closing a migratory channel completely (except for the Free
Movement setting, where channels are removed). As in Chapter 7, Figure
A.2 shows averages over 1000 model runs, but also includes the 2.75 and 97.5
percentile error band. As we can see in Figure A.2, there is no significant
difference between model outcomes when we model aspiration as a function
of age. This is due to the small (though highly significant) effect of age on
aspirations shown in Table A.2.
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Figure A.2: Comparison of Models: Changing Aspiration Over Lifecycle and
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Appendix B
Chapter 9
B.1 Results With Larger Sample Size
These results, using 8,930 agents, should be compared to Figure 9.3b. The
seemingly odd sample size is due to difficulties sizing and dividing the lattice,
but results will not differ from a model where 9,000 agents are used, for
example. Pr(Success)L1 and Pr(Success)L2 ranges from 0 to 1 at intervals
of 0.2 (in Figure 9.3b intervals are 0.02) and the number of repetitions per
parameter combination are 10. Due to the large intervals, the area where no
migration takes place due to extreme policy restrictiveness in both locations
(bottom-left corner), appears larger than in Figure 9.3b. As can be observed
in this figure, results are not significantly affected by number of agents.
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Figure B.1: Spatial reorientation and dominant corridor shifts across avail-
able destinations, return migration turned on
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B.2 Length of Stay Distributions
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